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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
The thesis is concerned with the exploration of the interconnections between philosophy 
and history in David Hume’s work and seeks to provide a reassessment of his 
remarkable transition from metaphysical philosopher and polite essayist to philosophical 
and narrative historian. The first part of the thesis puts forth a detailed reappraisal of 
Hume’s intellectual preoccupations and literary pursuits in the crucial but neglected 
period 1748-1752, a period that witnessed Hume’s tour of several European courts in 
1748, his intensive reading of the classics and his engagement with Montesquieu’s new 
system of socio-political analysis. These years saw a decisive shift in Hume’s thinking 
about human nature that resulted in an increasing emphasis on its historicity. It is argued 
that this helps to explain his growing insistence on the necessity of accounting for the 
varied manifestations of human nature in different historical periods by a reconstruction 
of the social, political and economical conditions of past societies as well as their 
customs, manners and belief systems. It is furthermore argued that Hume’s new holistic 
view of past civilisations found its expression in a number of diverse pieces which can 
be read as fragments of a cultural history of classical antiquity and contain an important 
agenda for a new kind of cultural history. 
     The second part of the thesis considers the significance of this thinking for Hume’s 
plans for a large-scale work of modern British political history. The discussion is 
focussed on the History of Great Britain under the House of Stuart (1754-56) and pays 
particular attention to his intentions as a political historian. It is shown that the success 
of his work depended largely on his skill in raising his readers’ ‘interest’ and his 
adeptness in conveying his own ‘impartiality’ as a historian. It is argued that Hume’s 
achievement can best be understood through an in-depth analysis of his innovative 
appropriation of a narrative device that had already been used by many historians from 
Thucydides to Rapin-Thoyras, the set-piece political debate, which Hume employed as 
the main device for explaining the emergence of a mixed British constitution. The thesis 
thus offers a fresh interpretation of the relationship between Hume’s concept of 
philosophical history and his aims and techniques as a narrative historian and seeks to 
contribute to our understanding of the trajectory of his intellectual and literary career as 
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Introduction: Hume’s Transition from Philosopher to Historian 
 
The present study seeks to provide an in-depth account of Hume’s intellectual and 
literary career in the crucial period extending from 1748 to 1756, a period of intense 
literary activity which saw the appearance of Hume’s mature works of epistemology, 
moral philosophy and political economy as well as his first and most important foray 
into narrative history which resulted in the production of the two-volume History of 
Great Britain (1754-56). The study focuses on a number of Hume’s intellectual 
preoccupations during this period and seeks to explore them in greater detail than has 
hitherto been attempted with the aim of providing a fuller picture of the development of 
Hume’s thinking on history during this period as well as a reassessment of his 
remarkable transformation from moral philosopher to philosophical historian. In so 
doing the study will reconsider the scholarly accounts so far given of this transformation 
and seek to establish in how far these adequately capture the complexity of the period. 
Before we commence our investigation of the first half of the period in question, it will 
be useful to consider the major scholarly accounts given of Hume’s overall career and 
enquire in how far they take notice of the period in question. A survey of these will be 
followed by a brief consideration of a number of common assumptions about Hume’s 
career which, though problematic, are shared by most scholars. This will in turn allow us 
to propose an approach to this period which differs from those employed by previous 
investigators. Before we embark on this survey and critique of existing scholarly 
accounts of Hume’s intellectual career, it will be requisite to give a necessarily very 
brief outline of Hume’s complex career. We shall take as our starting point a short 
account of a debate Hume is said to have had with two of his friends, which provides us 
with a number of insights into Hume’s career and thought.  
     One morning in early autumn 1761, David Hume received a visit from an old friend 
in his temporary London lodgings in Lisle Street, Leicester Fields. Robert Clerk was a 
London Scot with a promising army career whom Hume had known for well over ten 
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years and whom he regarded as a person of ‘great Cleverness & Ingenuity’.1 Among his 
friends Clerk was famed for his quickness of intellect and feared for his ferocious 
manner of arguing. Acting like a good army-man, he was known to give no quarter and 
defend every inch of ground in discussions with the Edinburgh literati, one of whom 
went so far as to remark that ‘of all the Men who had so much understanding, [Clerk] 
was the Most Disagreeable person to Converse’ with.2 Thus the stage was set for a 
heated debate. The conversation soon touched on a subject foremost in Hume’s mind at 
this time, namely the latest and last instalment of his History of England, concerned with 
the medieval period, which Hume was in then process of preparing for the press and 
which would be published in November of that year.3 Complimenting Hume on his 
‘Stile & Politeness in writing’, Clerk expressed his satisfaction that Hume ‘had taken to 
History in which he could not avoid being Instructive [a]nd Agreeable too’. Sensing a 
backhanded compliment, Hume replied:  
I certainly shall not endeavour to avoid either of these Effects [,] But I hope 
you dont think I have endeavoured to avoid them in any of my other Writings. 
     C[lerk:] If you endeavoured you have not succeeded [for] you are very 
much in fashion & I do not mean for your Doctrines. For I think you rather try 
to pull down other peoples Doctrines than Establish any of your own.  
     H[ume:] Pardon me, did I not sett out with a complete Theory of Human 
Nature which was so ill received that I determined to refrain from System 
making. 
     C[lerk:] That was rash. The world’s a System & the best we Can do is to 
Assist one Another in perceiving And Communicating its parts & their 
connections. 
     H[ume:] I don’t know what a Man of Letters is to get by that. To be writing 
what every body knows or may hear from every Coffee House Acquaintance.  
     C[lerk:] That would be very idle: but I do not think Mr Hume is in danger of 
that even if he should discard all paradox and take to the investigation of useful 
truths. 
                                                 
1 David Hume to Hugh Blair, 26 April 1764, HL, i, 435. Clerk (1724-1797) was soon to become Colonel 
(in 1762) and later General (1793).  
2 Alexander Carlyle, Anecdotes and Characters of the Times, ed. with an introduction by James Kinsley 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973), p. 231. Carlyle memorably described Clerk as ‘truly the Greatest Siccatore in 
the world’. 
3 Hume’s History of England, from the invasion of Julius Cæsar to the Accession of Henry VII was 
published in London on 11 November 1761. Cf. Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume (2nd 
edn., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980), p. 402.  
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     H[ume:] I own I am inclind to Scepticism & would avoid the Pedantry of 
Dogmatism [.] But have [I] not declared opinions on Commerce [,] Politics & 
Morals [?] 
     C[lerk:] I like some of your Thoughts on the Subject of Commer[ce] [,] But 
for Morals and Politics you seem [rather] to play with them than to be serious.  
     H[ume:] You surely think I am Serious in my Essay on Morality [?]4 
This last question caused the conversation to turn to a consideration of Hume’s moral 
philosophy in which Clerk directed his formidable though not always discerning 
energies against what he took to be a central principle of Hume’s mature moral 
philosophy, the concept of utility. Driven by the force of Clerk’s violent manner of 
arguing the conversation was about to reach a dead end when the servant entered to 
announce their mutual friend, Adam Smith, who ‘entered the Room with a smile on his 
Countenance and Muttering Somewhat to himself’ in his usual absent-minded manner.5 
We shall leave the scene at this point and, after briefly assessing in how far it can or 
cannot be considered authentic, enquire in which regards it might further our 
understanding of Hume’s overall intellectual and literary career.  
     It must be admitted that we cannot ascertain with any certainty whether the scene just 
described actually took place and that there is room for doubt as to whether the  
conversation itself evolved along these precise lines. To be sure, Hume frequently 
discoursed with Robert Clerk during his time in London and we know that he had asked 
Adam Smith to call on him at his lodgings in Leicester Fields, which was a boarding-
house frequented by Scots coming to London.6 Though we have no direct statement as to 
the specific date at which this conversation is said to have taken place, internal as well as 
external evidence points to the autumn of 1761 when all three disputants were in London 
                                                 
4 ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation: A Discourse between David Hume, Robert Clerk, and Adam 
Smith’, in Vincenzo Merolle (ed.), The manuscripts of Adam Ferguson (London: Pickering & Chatto, 
2006), pp. 207-216, esp. p. 207f. The dialogue was first published by Ernest Campbell Mossner from the 
MS in Edinburgh University Library: ‘“Of the Principle of Moral Estimation: A Discourse between David 
Hume, Robert Clerk, and Adam Smith”: An Unpublished MS by Adam Ferguson’, in Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 21 (1960), 222–32. The fullest discussion of Ferguson’s dialogue occurs in Ian Simpson 
Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 188ff.  
5 ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation’, in The manuscripts of Adam Ferguson, ed. Merolle, p. 209. 
Smith was in turn subjected to a similar critical barrage from Clerk which was mainly directed against 
Smith’s conception of sympathy as expounded in the The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).  
6 See Hume to Adam Smith, 29 June 1761, HL, i, 346 and Hume to Robert Clerk, 12 December 1761, 
NHL, i, 64f.  
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and Hume was seeing the last instalment of his History through the press. While all the 
circumstantial information given above can thus be verified from contemporary 
documents, the actual conversation said to have taken place at Hume’s lodgings presents 
us with a rather greater difficulty. The report – if such it is – of the debate between 
Hume, Clerk and Smith is contained in a manuscript essay by another Edinburgh man of 
letters, the clergyman and moral philosopher Adam Ferguson, entitled ‘Of the Principle 
of Moral Estimation’. To be sure, Ferguson was sufficiently well acquainted with all 
three disputants and he might well have been present at this occasion or else could have 
depended on oral or written testimony from one or more of the disputants.7  
     By far the greatest problem is presented by the fact that the manuscript in Ferguson’s 
handwriting dates from some time after 1800. In its present form – and we know of no 
other, though this does not exclude the possibility of an earlier draft – the report 
therefore dates from at least forty years after the event is said to have taken place.8 This 
might thus well be a fictionalised dialogue in the Platonic tradition rather than an 
accurate report of an actual conversation.9 It has moreover been suggested that Clerk, 
who occupies a central role in the piece and largely dominates the discussion, might be a 
mere mouthpiece for Ferguson, voicing the latter’s own, largely critical views of the 
systems of moral philosophy devised by Hume and Smith. Yet it is just as likely that 
Clerk himself would have voiced these criticisms, since we know that Smith had in fact 
communicated some of the ideas discussed in the dialogue to Clerk whom he asked for 
his critical assessment.10 Due to the absence of any additional testimony corroborating 
                                                 
7 The dialogue does not state whether Ferguson himself was present at this occasion and we do not possess 
any of his letters from that year which would allow us to ascertain whether or not he was in London at the 
time. Cf. The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (2 vols.; London: Pickering, 
1995), vol. i, p. cxli.  
8 The dialogue is written on paper watermarked 1801 and 1806, cf. The manuscripts of Adam Ferguson, 
ed. Merolle, p. 214 note 1. This does not exclude the possibility of an earlier version of the dialogue, a 
possibility which has to my knowledge not been raised in the literature on the subject.  
9 There is a similar dialogue by Ferguson which also features Hume in conversation with a number of 
other literati, entitled ‘An Excursion to the Highlands: Discourse on Various Subjects’. This manuscript is 
watermarked 1799 and was also preserved among Ferguson’s papers, cf. The manuscripts of Adam 
Ferguson, ed. Merolle, pp. 47-70.  
10 Smith to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 10 October 1759, in The Correspondence of Adam Smith, ed. Ernest 
Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross (rev. edn., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), pp. 48-57. Though this 
letter dates from two years before the most likely date of the conversation, it reveals that Smith was indeed 
eager to discuss the very same subject with Clerk, sure that he had removed potential objections to his 
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Ferguson’s account, we cannot establish with any certainty whether his dialogue 
represents an actual conversation or indeed conversations or whether it is a synthetic 
account that presents us with the gist of several conversations Ferguson had heard about 
or participated in. This does put the scene described at the outset in perspective, but it 
should not discourage us from enquiring about what light it might shed on Hume’s 
intellectual and literary career. Whether considered as an authentic report or as a largely 
fictional dialogue, this piece at the very least presents us with Ferguson’s perceptive 
assessment of that career based on his knowledge of Hume’s work and conversation.11 
Ferguson’s dialogue provides us with a précis of Hume’s intellectual and literary career, 
but the hints provided in that piece will need to be read alongside and checked against 
information gleaned from other, more reliable sources such as Hume’s correspondence 
with his fellow literati.  
     Hume tells us in the dialogue that he ‘sett out with a complete Theory of Human 
Nature which was so ill received that I determined to refrain from System making’. This 
refers to Hume’s systematic exposition of his epistemology and moral philosophy in his 
first and now most famous work, A Treatise of Human Nature, which he had composed 
when still in his mid-twenties and published anonymously in two instalments in 1739 
and 1740. The remark that it was ‘ill received’ reflects Hume’s perception of the failure 
of this, his first and now most famous work of philosophy, which did not attract either 
the audience or the critical attention Hume had envisaged for it and thus did not fulfil its 
author’s high expectations. The first and only British review of the work was considered 
by the author ‘somewhat abusive’ and the work itself was not widely read, though it had 
a profound impact on the few thinkers who did read it and through them greatly 
                                                                                                                                                
moral philosophy by the inclusion of a passage about the impartial spectator in the second edition of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments: ‘I am now about to publish a new edition of my Book ….’ In the dialogue 
Smith had mentioned the impartial spectator, which has led some commentators to conclude that he was 
most likely referring to the sixth edition of Theory of Moral Sentiments which was published in 1790. Yet 
there is no ground for such an inference as Smith’s remarks in the dialogue are equally consistent with the 
draft amendments to TMS which Smith had asked Gilbert Elliot of Minto to convey to Clerk. On this see 
Ross, Life of Smith, p. 190.  
11 Cf. Hume to Adam Ferguson, 9 November 1763, HL, i, 410-1 and Ferguson to Hume, 26 November 
1763, in Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Merolle, p. 55ff. Hume and Ferguson’s mutual friend 
‘General Clerk’ is mentioned in both letters.  
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contributed to the formation of the intellectual outlook of the Scottish Enlightenment.12 
Convinced that – as he later put it – the work’s lack of success ‘proceeded more from the 
manner than the matter’, Hume subsequently cast the three books of the Treatise anew in 
three separate publications, the Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding 
(1748; later retitled Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and often referred to as 
the first Enquiry), the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751; also known as 
the second Enquiry) and the Dissertation on the Passions (1757). Hume was largely 
pleased with the products of this process of recasting, which were more elegantly written 
and far more widely read than the Treatise.13  
     Defending himself against Robert Clerk’s charges of not having advanced any 
positive philosophical tenets, abandoned systematic thought and contended himself with 
subverting the philosophical systems of others, Hume states that he had in fact ‘declared 
opinions on Commerce [,] Politics & Morals’. ‘Morals’ almost certainly refers to the 
second Enquiry, the subject of the subsequent heated debate between Clerk and Hume 
on the concept of utility central to that work.14 Hume’s ‘opinions’ concerning politics 
and commerce were mainly contained in forty-two essays, most of which appeared in 
the twelve years following the publication of the Treatise. The Essays, Moral and 
Political, published in three instalments in 1741, 1742 and 1748, laid out Hume’s 
‘science of politics’ and contained essays on the British constitution and party system as 
well a number of more philosophical essays. In some of these Hume engaged in the 
polite, conversational style championed by Addison, though he adapted the essay form 
to suit his own ends and, unlike Addison, studiously avoided ‘writing what every body 
knows or may hear from every Coffee House Acquaintance’ as he put it in his 
conversation with Clerk.15 Hume’s Political Discourses, published in 1752, presented a 
system of political economy and an analysis of modern commercial society. Ferguson’s 
dialogue does not mention Hume’s Natural History of Religion or his essays on 
                                                 
12 Nicholas Phillipson, Hume (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p. 9.  
13 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, [March or April 1751], HL, i, 158. The Treatise was not republished 
during Hume’s lifetime.  
14 ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation’, in The manuscripts of Adam Ferguson, ed. Merolle, pp. 208-9.  
15 ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation’, p. 208.  
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aesthetics, which were published alongside the Dissertation on the Passions in his Four 
Dissertations of 1757. All these works, together with the two Enquiries, were 
subsequently republished in a collection of Hume’s works entitled Essays and Treatises, 
published in a variety of formats from 1753 onwards, which consolidated Hume’s 
reputation as a leading man of letters.16 
     In the meantime Hume had started work on a narrative history of the Stuart Age 
which was to appear in two volumes in 1754 and 1756 under the title The History of 
Great Britain. Though discouraged by the initially slow sales of the first volumes as well 
as the mixed reviews and critical responses elicited by both volumes, Hume persisted in 
his undertaking and, following a brief period of indecision about whether to he should 
‘go backwards or forwards in my History’, decided to write the history of the Tudor Era 
which was published in two volumes in 1759, this time under the title The History of 
England. 17 Thereafter, Hume again pondered whether to continue his history of Stuart 
Britain up to the Hanoverian Accession, but eventually settled on the early and medieval 
history of England. Having signed a lucrative contract with his bookseller, Hume then 
wrote the last two volumes of his History which present an account of the rise and slow 
decline of feudalism. These were published in 1761 and the following year the entire 
work was published in chronological order as a six-volume History of England, from the 
invasion of Julius Cæsar to the revolution in 1688. Hume’s History was frequently 
reissued and soon established itself as the standard history of England. Hume spent the 
last fourteen years of his life revising the work in line with the latest historical 
discoveries as well as his changing political views. From the 1760s onwards Hume’s 
reputation thus rested on two works, the Essays and Treatises and the History of 
England, and editions of both works that were published after 1768 featured a 
                                                 
16 Richard Sher has pointed about that Essays and Treatises was the main form in which eighteenth-
century readers encountered Hume’s philosophical and political works. Cf. Richard B. Sher, The 
Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 
Ireland, and America (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 46ff.  
17 ‘Shall I go backwards or forwards in my History? I think you us’d to tell me, that you approvd more of 
my going backwards.’ Hume to Adam Smith, [February or March 1757], HL, i, 246. Cf. Hume to William 
Mure of Caldwell, [Feb 1757], HL, i, 243. 
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frontispiece portrait of the author that includes two quills and two books. 18 These 
represent the dual calling of this man of letters, expressed in the words ‘History and 
Philosophy’ in the open pages of one of the books, a phrase that indicates that by the 
1760s Hume’s fame as a historian had eclipsed his renown as a philosopher.  
     In Ferguson’s dialogue Hume refers to his own occupation as that of a ‘man of 
letters’, a term used in a way which suggests that his various literary endeavours can be 
subsumed under this heading. This is confirmed by a letter Hume wrote in the late 1740s 
in which he speaks about the benefit he expects to reap from a diplomatic tour of 
Europe, on which he was about to embark, ‘as a man of letters, which I confess has 
always been the sole object of my ambition’.19 The man of letters had emerged in the 
early modern period as a literary career as well as a social identity distinct from that of 
the courtier, the party hack or the antiquarian scholar. Unlike these, the man of letters 
possessed a considerable degree of independence and addressed himself to a growing 
reading public.20 Hume used his works and correspondence to communicate his identity 
as a man of letters and later described himself in one of his letters as ‘a philosopher, a 
man of letters, nowise a courtier, of the most independent spirit, who has given offence 
to every sect’.21 Hume’s own career and literary output exemplifies some of the literary 
endeavours, which could encompass a diversity of genres from the philosophical treatise 
to large-scale narrative history. The breadth of interests and expertise underpinning these 
various pursuits is aptly summarised by John Valdimir Price: ‘The “man of letters” in 
the eighteenth century had to be philosopher, historian, and literary craftsman if he 
                                                 
18 Hume, The History of England, From the Invasion of Julius Cæsar to the Revolution in 1688. A New 
Edition, Corrected (8 vols., London: T. Cadell, 1770), i, facing title page.  
19 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 29 January 1748, HL, i, 108-9.  
20 From the very beginning Hume specifically addressed himself to this public as is testified by his remark 
in the ‘Advertisement’ to the first two books of the Treatise (1739): ‘The approbation of the public I 
consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determin’d to regard its judgement, whatever it be, 
as my best instruction.’ Treatise, p. 2.  
21 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 2 June 1765, HL, i, 504. For Hume’s identity as a man of letters 
see ‘Of Essay Writing’, Essays, pp. 533-537 as well as John Valdimir Price, David Hume (New York: 
Twayne, 1968), pp. 145-151; Jerome Christensen, Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of 
a Literary Career (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), esp. pp. 3ff; and Phillipson, Hume, pp. 
17-34.  
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wanted to have any impact on his readers.’22 Hume’s most extended statement on his 
identity as a man of letters occurs in his brief autobiography, My Own Life, written a few 
months before his death in 1776. This piece itself which testifies to the extent to which 
Hume’s social identity was intertwined with and dependent on his work since My Own 
Life is conceived as containing ‘little more than the History of my Writings; as, indeed, 
all my life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations’.23 The piece identifies 
Hume as a man of letters and tells the story of his struggle against adversity from the 
perceived failure of the Treatise to the eventual success of the History of England.24  
     Hume’s autobiographical piece was specifically designed to influence his own 
posthumous reputation, but it has had at least one unintended effect. In drawing his own 
character towards the end of the piece, Hume asserted that ‘the love of literary fame’ had 
been his ‘ruling passion’.25 This remark, which was harmless enough in an eighteenth-
century context, has been taken by twentieth-century philosophers as an indication that 
Hume’s desire for public acclaim or even notoriety led him to ‘abandon’ his true calling, 
the pursuit of ‘serious’ philosophy, after the Treatise had failed to attract the audience he 
had envisaged for it.26 Having turned his back on philosophy, Hume then took up history 
sometime in the late 1740s or early 1750s. The assumption that Hume ‘abandoned’ or 
‘deserted’ philosophy for history by 1752 is a problematic one for a number of reasons 
that we will have occasion to discuss later on.27 The once widespread notion that Hume 
abandoned his philosophy in favour of history rests on the presupposition that to Hume’s 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Stephen Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 15.   
23 ‘My Own Life’, reprinted in Essays, pp. xxxi-xli, esp. p. xxxi. For a recent interpretation and overview 
of the publication history of this piece see Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, pp. 53ff.  
24 The centrality of the notion of ‘success’ in ‘My Own Life’ has been explored by Robert Mankin in 
‘Authority, Succcess, and the Philosopher: Hume vs. Rousseau’, in Better in France? The Circulation of 
Ideas between Britain and the Continent in the Eighteenth Century, ed. F. Ogée (Lewisburg, Bucknell 
Press, 2005) 
25 ‘My Own Life’, Essays, p. xl.  
26 For an extended critique of this view and a reinterpretation of Hume’s remark about his ‘love of literary 
fame’ see Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract, pp. 3-26.  
27 The notion that Hume ‘deserted’ or ‘abandoned’ philosophy for history can be found in Henry Grey 
Graham, Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century (London: A. and C. Black, 1908), p. 43: 
‘Hume ‘had almost abandoned philosophy, and now turned to history’; J. B. Black, The Art of History: A 
Study of Four Great Historians of the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1926), p. 78: Hume 
‘deserted philosophy for history’; and R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1946), p. 73: Hume ‘deserted philosophical studies in favour of historical at about the age of thirty-five’.  
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mind the two were entirely distinct fields of endeavour. This assumption is in itself 
highly questionable, not only because Hume did at times subsume both philosophy and 
history under the heading ‘literature’, but because of the very first stated intention he 
presented to his readers, the ‘Advertisement’ to the first two books of the Treatise, 
published in 1739.  
     In the words of one of the earliest advocates of this view, there are a number of 
respects in which ‘Hume’s Essays and his History of England constitute continuations of 
his earliest work’.28 This view underpins much of recent scholarly work on Hume’s 
thought and intellectual career and has been fruitfully explored by philosophers, 
intellectual historians and literary scholars alike. This view receives some confirmation 
from an important statement Hume made when first addressing ‘the public’ in his 
earliest work. When publishing the first two books of the Treatise in 1739, Hume 
inserted a note to this effect: 
My design in the present work is sufficiently explain’d in the Introduction. The 
reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann’d out to 
myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the 
Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by 
themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in 
order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with 
success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; 
which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature.29  
This statement indicates that by 1739 Hume was planning to extend his philosophical 
investigations from epistemology to fields as varied as moral philosophy, political 
science and ‘criticism’.30 This statement thus provides a link between the first two books 
                                                 
28 David Fate Norton, ‘An Introduction to Hume’s Thought’, in CCH, pp. 1-32, esp. p. 21.   
29 Treatise, p. 2.  
30 It is generally assumed that the term ‘criticism’ here refers to Hume’s views on literary criticism or 
aesthetics touched upon in a number of his early essays and developed at length in two later essays, ‘Of 
Tragedy’ and ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, both published as part of the Four Dissertations of 1757. Cf. 
Peter Jones, ‘Hume’s literary and aesthetic theory’, in CCH, pp. 255-280, esp. p. 255. Yet Hume may well 
have use this term in a wider sense. To be sure, the term ‘criticism’ is employed three times in ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’, each time in the sense of aesthetic judgement or a system of rules for judging the merit 
of literary productions. Yet the terms ‘criticism’ and ‘the critical art’ are also used in Hume’s ‘Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations’ (1752) in a different sense, that of erudition or historical criticism. For 
Hume’s notion of historical criticism see Wootton, ‘David Hume, the historian’, in CCH, pp. 281-312, 
esp. pp. 285-290. Any revaluation of the possible meaning(s) of Hume’s remark in the ‘Advertisement’ to 
the Treatise would have to take into account the complex semantic history of the term ‘criticism’, which is 
reflective of the development of aesthetics, philology and historical criticism in the early modern era. For 
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of the Treatise and Hume’s subsequent works, in particular the earliest essays, some of 
which were composed during the period when Hume was in the process of preparing the 
Treatise for the press and published not long after that in 1741/42.31 The statement is 
however open to a number of interpretations since it does by no means make clear how 
many of Hume’s later forays into political science had at this stage been envisaged, 
planned or even written. Consequently there is still considerable disagreement among 
Hume scholars as to the precise nature of the connections between the Hume’s Treatise 
and his subsequent forays into a number of fields, including British politics, political 
economy, and history. As recent studies differ widely in their assessment of the possible 
connections between his early philosophical and his subsequent political and historical 
work, it will be necessary to sketch out the most important interpretations that have been 
put forth in recent scholarly work on Hume’s thought and intellectual career.  
     We have seen that Hume is said to have responded to Clerk’s charge of scepticism – 
‘I think you rather try to pull down other peoples Doctrines than Establish any of your 
own’ – by admitting that ‘I am inclind to Scepticism & would avoid the Pedantry of 
Dogmatism’.32 David Fate Norton, one of the first interpreters to insist on an underlying 
continuity of Hume’s thought over the entirety of his intellectual career, identified 
Hume’s scepticism as the single most important unifying element in his diverse works. 
Hume’s sceptical outlook and methodology, initially developed to describe the 
limitations of human knowledge in the Treatise, had subsequently been applied to 
several fields of knowledge, most notably that of history. The Treatise indicates that 
Hume was from the very beginning concerned with the profound implications of his 
sceptical philosophy for widely discussed problems about the nature, study and writing 
of history.33 In addressing these implications, he engaged with problems that had been at 
the core of a major seventeenth-century controversy about the possibility of historical 
                                                                                                                                                
this see Donald R. Kelley, Faces of History: Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder (New Haven 
and London: Yale UP, 1998), pp. 205-211.  
31 On this see in particular John Immerwahr, ‘The Anatomist and the Painter: The Continuity of Hume’s 
Treatise and Essays’, Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 1-14.  
32 ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation’, in The manuscripts of Adam Ferguson, ed. Merolle, p. 208.  
33 See David Fate Norton, ‘History and Philosophy in Hume’s Thought’, in David Hume: Philosophical 
Historian, ed. David Fate Norton and Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. xxxii-l.  
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knowledge. Hume’s statements amount to a cautious and sceptical defence of historical 
knowledge against the challenge posed by Pyrrhonism, an extreme form of scepticism 
that threatened to undermine all belief in the credibility of historical sources.34 Drawing 
on his philosophical account of causation to assess the credibility of historical 
testimonies, Hume worked out a methodology of historical criticism which he 
subsequently employed to great effect in his critique of belief in miracles.35 This 
methodology also underpins Hume’s historical work from the early 1750s onwards, 
from his critique of classical sources in his erudite dissertation on the populousness of 
antiquity to his investigation of the authenticity of historical documents in his History of 
Great Britain.36 Hume’s ‘constructive scepticism’, which expressed itself in his reply to 
the Pyrrhonian challenge, has therefore been identified as one of the main ‘logical ties 
between the historical and philosophical elements of Hume’s thought’.37  
     Building on this reassessment of this and further ‘logical ties’ between Hume’s 
philosophical and historical thought, a number of commentators have advanced 
interpretations of Hume’s intellectual career as a whole from his earliest concerns with 
epistemology and moral philosophy to his reformulation of his political and religious 
thought towards the end of his life. Writing in this vein, Donald Livingston presented a 
systematic revaluation of a number of key themes in Hume’s philosophy built on the 
assumption that ‘historical thinking is … an internal part of his philosophical thought’.38 
                                                 
34 On Pyrrhonism and Hume’s response to it see the following essays by Richard H. Popkin, ‘The High 
Road to Pyrrhonism’ and ‘David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy’, in The High Road to 
Pyrrhonism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. 11-37 and 133-147; ‘Skepticism and the Study of History’ 
in Hume: Philosophical Historian, ed. Norton and Popkin, pp. ix-xxxi. The most extended account of 
Hume’s place in the Pyrrhonian controversy and his account of the credibility of historical testimony is 
Dario Perinetti, ‘Hume, history and the science of human nature’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, McGill 
University, 2002), chapter 2.  
35 Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’ was omitted from the Treatise but later published as a section X of the first 
Enquiry, cf. EHU, p. 169-186. For Hume’s critique of the belief in miracles see M. A. Stewart, ‘Hume’s 
historical view of miracles’, in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1994), pp. 171-200.  
36 See David Wootton, ‘David Hume, the historian’, in CCH, pp. 288-290.  
37 David Fate Norton, ‘History and Philosophy in Hume’s Thought’, in Hume: Philosophical Historian, 
ed. Norton and Popkin, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.  
38 Livingston was building on David Norton’s work on the interconnections between Hume’s thinking on 
philosophy and history as well as the influential reassessment of Hume as primarily a moral philosopher in 
Norman Kemp Smith’s The philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central 
Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1941).  
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In commencing with an analysis of the first book of the Treatise and then proceeding to 
give an account of Hume’s political and historical works, Livingston sought to 
demonstrate the extent to which Hume’s overall philosophy is framed as a narrative 
account of the temporal order in which the human mind forms its ideas of the world 
outside it. Such a narrative account presupposes an essentially historical outlook and it 
was consequently history rather than experimental natural science which provided the 
paradigms and methodologies for Hume’s study of human nature as well as his ‘science 
of man’, the comprehensive study of man in his various moral, social and political 
contexts.39 Hume had projected such a science at the outset of the Treatise, outlined its 
foundation in his account of human nature in the course of that work and continued to 
develop it in his subsequent political and historical works.40 By drawing attention to the 
historical foundations of Hume’s ‘science of man’ as well as his political science, 
Livingston was able to affect a profound shift in Hume studies which has resulted in a 
thorough reassessment of the historical dimension of Hume’s thought.41 Other 
commentators have conducted their investigations of Hume’s philosophical and political 
thought along similar lines of enquiry and have thus contributed to the intensification of 
our understanding of the profoundly historical character of Hume’s project of a ‘science 
of man’.  
     The new account of Hume’s philosophy presented by Norton, Livingston and a 
number of other scholars could not fail to have a profound and discernable impact on the 
study of other areas of Hume’s thought. In the long run it has led to a revaluation of the 
relationship between Hume’s historicised philosophy on the one hand and the 
philosophical dimension of his historical writings on the other hand. This has involved 
extensive work on Hume’s political thought, which has been made possible by three 
                                                 
39 The reference to ‘the experimental method of reasoning’ in the title of the Treatise as well as Hume’s 
much quoted statement to the effect that this science was to be ‘on experience and observation’ had long 
been understood as a clear indication that Hume meant to Baconian or Newtonian experimental science. 
Livingston and others were able to show that there is an alternative interpretation, which recognises the 
fact that ‘experience and observation’ is either gleaned from history or developed in as narrative account.  
40 See Hume’s ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise, pp. 3-6.  
41 This has established itself as a major trend in Hume scholarship as is evident from the fact that the most 
recent systematic study of Hume’s philosophy is subtitled ‘Reason in History’, cf. Claudia M. Schmidt, 
David Hume: Reason in History (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 2003).  
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developments that have transformed recent study of eighteenth-century thought over the 
last forty years: a growing emphasis on the contextual analysis of masterpieces of 
political thought and historical writing, a reassessment of the political ideologies and 
religious controversies that shaped public life in the British Isles during the ‘long 
eighteenth century’ and an ever increasing interest in the intellectual culture of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.42 Duncan Forbes’ groundbreaking study on Hume’s 
Philosophical Politics (1975) was the first and so far the most comprehensive attempt to 
reconstruct and revaluate Hume’s political thought.43 Focusing on Hume’s relation to the 
natural law tradition and on the immediate party political context in which the Essays, 
Moral and Political (1741/2) were written and revised, Forbes drew a detailed picture of 
Hume as a philosopher directly engaged in the debates of his time while at the same time 
seeking to transcend entrenched party political divides. This picture is painstakingly put 
together and on the whole convincing, though it will be argued in the second part of the 
present study that Forbes at times exaggerated the extent to which Hume’s lofty aim of 
‘impartiality’ was actually realised in his historical narrative.  
     The interpretation of Hume as a political thinker preoccupied with the influence of 
factionalism received its clearest analysis and most incisive formulation in Nicholas 
Phillipson’s Hume. Phillipson provides an interpretation of Hume’s career that presents 
him as a modern man of letters in search of a medium to convey his lesson of 
moderation to a new reading public consisting largely of the middling ranks of society. 
To this end Hume successively experimented with a number of genres from the 
philosophical treatise to the Addisonian essay before appropriating the latter as an 
effective vehicle for serious philosophy rather than polite entertainment. Hume’s essays 
are concerned with the central political questions confronting Hume’s readers, questions 
about the nature of the British party system, the evaluation of political rulers and the 
analysis of the corrosive influence of religions divisions on civic stability. Moreover, 
                                                 
42 An overview of the most important developments in the scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment is 
provided by John Robertson, ‘The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment’, in The Scottish 
Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester 
Press, 2000), pp. 37-62, esp. pp. 37ff.  
43 Duncan Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975).  
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they constitute ‘a philosopher’s agenda for a History of England’ in which Hume works 
out the crucial issues faced by anyone aspiring to write the history of the British 
constitution.44 The essays are thus a first step in a natural process that led from the 
analysis of the modern British constitution and party system in Walpolian Britain via a 
narrative of its emergence in the Stuart Era and the Elizabethan constitution back to the 
feudal order. In the process of writing these pre-histories of the modern British 
constitution Hume is shown to have developed a novel and revolutionary account of 
constitutional history. Phillipson contends that it was in the field of narrative history, 
which took the form of a history of civilization in Britain, written in several instalments 
and revised for the rest of Hume’s life, that Hume found a medium that was both popular 
and ideally suited to the task of conveying his message of political prudence and 
moderation to a modern audience by presenting an effective philosophical antidote 
against the insidious effects of factionalism and religious strife. According to Phillipson 
the History of England, written at least in part in accordance with the agenda Hume had 
formulated in his early sets of essays and thus rooted in Hume’s project of a science of 
man, can thus be regarded ‘as the climax of an intellectual career rather than an 
afterthought’.45  
     Having surveyed a number of the leading interpretations in the field, it will be helpful 
to briefly assess a commonly held assumption about Hume’s career, which underpin 
most of these interpretations though they are by no means held by all commentators. The 
first of these consists in the often unstated supposition that the Treatise, together with his 
early Essays, contain the nucleus of substantially all of Hume’s subsequent work 
including the History of England. This view is rarely formulated in as bold and 
simplified a way as that, yet it is present in even the most sophisticated accounts. We 
have seen that Norton, Livingston and other commentators have based their 
                                                 
44 Cf. Phillipson, Hume, chapter 4, esp. pp. 53, 75.  
45 Phillipson, Hume, p. 1. Phillipson’s analysis is further developed in his ‘Propriety, Property and 
Prudence: David Hume and the Defence of the Revolution’, in Political Discourse in Early Modern 
Britain, eds. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), pp. 302-320. 
The impact of this interpretation can be seen in the description of Hume’s early political essays as 
‘contemporary history’ in J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: Narratives of Civil 
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 177-198.  
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interpretations on a close reading of the Treatise, while Forbes, Phillipson and, to some 
degree, J. G. A. Pocock’s interpretations hinge on the Essays, Moral and Political 
(1741-8), a work of political analysis in which Hume is deemed to have developed the 
basic elements of the historical views he was to expound in the History of England. The 
present study contends that such an assessment is questionable as it does not sufficiently 
take into account Hume’s later views on subjects as varied as commerce, manners, and 
the history of religion, some of which are not foreshadowed in the Treatise or indeed the 
Essays, Moral and Political. The present study will seek to demonstrate this by means of 
an in-depth examination of the works Hume composed after the publication of the last 
instalment of Essays, Moral and Political (1748), though it will be necessary to cast a 
brief glance at the treatment of history in the Treatise and early Essays.  
     From the very beginning of his literary career Hume pondered the theoretical and 
practical problems involved in the writing of history, as is evident from a number of 
discussions of related subjects in the Treatise and the early Essays. There are important 
remarks about history in all three books of the Treatise, yet these remarks by no means 
cover the entire range of aspects Hume was to explore in his subsequent work on 
history. In fact, discussions of history in the Treatise are focused on two main issues, the 
credibility of historical testimony and the nature of historical narration.46 These are 
important philosophical discussions about the dual nature of history as repository of 
factual information about the past and as narrative of past events.47 We should also take 
notice of an interesting remark about different kinds of historical subjects which occurs 
towards the end of Book Three of the Treatise:  
                                                 
46 The most extensive discussions of these subjects can be found in Treatise, pp. 58-59, 98-99 and 275-
276. To be sure, Hume makes use of historical data in the course of his discussion of the foundations of 
political allegiance in Book III of the Treatise, where the evidence provided by history is invoked since 
‘the study of history confirms the reasonings of true philosophy’. Cf. Treatise, pp. 359-360. 
47 These aspects have recently received increasing attention. On Hume’s discussion of the credibility of 
historical testimony see in particular Perinetti, ‘Hume, history and the science of human nature’, chapter 2. 
The most extensive treatment of Hume’s thinking on the nature of historical narration is S. K. Wertz, ‘The 
Nature of Historical Narration’, in Wertz, Between Hume’s Philosophy and History: Historical Theory 
and Practice (Lanham, New York and Oxford: UP of America, 2000), pp. 43-58.  
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The histories of kingdoms are more interesting than domestic stories: The 
histories of great empires more than those of small cities and principalities: 
And the histories of wars and revolutions more than those of peace and order.48 
Perhaps it was this remark which led Ernest C. Mossner to state that ‘Hume’s historical 
aspirations date at least from the Treatise in 1739’ and his ‘intention to compose a 
national history arose out of his pervasive study of the “science of man”’.49 Yet it would 
clearly be a mistake to read this general remark about the most interesting subjects of 
history as an indication of a specific intention on Hume’s part to write the history of a 
kingdom in an era of revolutions. After all, Hume is here clearly writing from the 
perspective of someone who reads and analyses historical narratives and expresses no 
intention whatever to write a history. In fact, the first remarks to the effect that Hume 
had ‘long had an intention, in my riper years, of composing some History’ occur towards 
the end of the 1740s.50 We can thus conclude that while the Treatise does indeed contain 
some of the philosophical foundations for Hume’s understanding of the nature of history 
and historical narrative, it cannot be said to contain anything like the range and richness 
of Hume’s mature philosophy of history as outlined in the second Enquiry nor any clear 
indication of an intention to ‘compose a national history’ along the lines of his later 
History of Great Britain.  
     Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political (1741-48) present us with a significantly 
different picture due to the fact that Hume drew far more heavily on historical evidence 
for his essays on contemporary British politics. History was constantly invoked in 
eighteenth-century political debates and it is no surprise to see that it is crucial to 
Hume’s arguments about the nature of the Hanoverian constitution and the emergence of 
the British party system. Yet while history thus features largely in Hume’s early Essays, 
one does get the sense that it is employed mainly as an auxiliary science that provides a 
resource of factual information to be utilized in his ‘science of politics’. A somewhat 
fuller picture of Hume’s views about the roles of history emerges from the short essay 
                                                 
48 Treatise, p. 391.  
49 Mossner’s footnote in NHL, p. 23 n.2 and Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 233. In both cases 
Mossner fails to back up his claim. Mossner’s use of Hume’s alleged historical reading notes as a means 
to date his first attempt to write history will be discussed further below.   
50 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 29 Jan 1748, HL, i, 108f. Cf. Hume to Henry Home, [early 1747], 
NHL, p. 23.   
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‘Of the Study of History’, a polite and somewhat whimsical piece that Hume later 
withdrew from editions of the Essays and Treatises. This essay focuses largely on 
benefits to be reaped from the study of history, which is presented as a source of 
entertainment, useful knowledge and even edification.51 The essay is thus again written 
from the perspective of an avid reader of historical works and presents little more than 
conventional views. While Hume states that history can and should be read for its own 
sake, he also stresses that ‘history is not only a valuable part of knowledge, but opens 
the door to many other parts, and affords materials to most of the sciences’.52 As in the 
case of the Treatise there is an important sense in which Hume’s later views on the 
philosophy of history and even his assessment of the different roles of history cannot be 
said to be fully contained or even anticipated in this or his other early essays.  
     While the views expressed in the Treatise and the Essays, Moral and Political reveal 
Hume’s extensive reading of historical works, his intense interest in history and his 
heavy reliance on historical evidence for his political arguments, it would be misleading 
to maintain that Hume had laid all or even the most important theoretical foundations for 
his later study of history. This point cannot of course be made summarily, but only by 
means of a detailed comparison of earlier and later statement. Since a complete 
comparison of that kind would transcend the confines of the present study, we will have 
to confine ourselves to these brief remarks before embarking on an in-depth account and 
analysis of Hume’s later views on history, which have on the whole been less studied 
than his earlier ones. Here we shall focus on two major areas, namely Hume’s theory 
and practice of source criticism and his revisionist account of Stuart history. While 
Hume stressed in ‘Of the Study of History’ that an ‘extensive knowledge’ of historical  
facts ‘belongs to the man of letters’, we shall see that it was not until the late 1740s and 
early 1750s that he himself actually acquired this kind of knowledge. Moreover, Hume’s 
account of Stuart history in the early political Essays is necessarily fragmentary and does 
not display anything like the depth and sophistication that was to characterise the 
interpretation he was to develop after 1752. His views on Stuart history therefore 
                                                 
51 ‘The advantages found in history seem to be of three kinds, as it amuses the fancy, as it improves the 
understanding, and as it strengthens virtue.’ ‘Of the Study of History’, Essays, pp. 563-568, esp. p. 565.  
52 ‘Of the Study of History’, Essays, p. 566.  
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changed drastically between 1741 and 1754 and we shall later have occasion to compare 
the diverging earlier and later interpretations and attempt to establish whether or not the 
views expressed in the Essays of 1741/42 anticipate some of the basic elements of his 
History of Great Britain (1754-56).  
     This directs our attention to the period of Hume’s career following the publication of 
his Essays, Moral and Political, the last instalment of which appeared in 1748. In the 
immediately ensuing period we can perceive a profound shift in Hume’s preoccupations 
as well as a marked increase in his literary activities. This is well illustrated by the 
number and range of works Hume composed in the late 1740s and early 1750s. In the 
relatively brief period extending from summer 1749 until summer 1751, Hume 
composed a number of works of varied length on subjects as diverse as moral 
philosophy, political economy, the philosophy and sociology of religion and suicide. 
The list of intellectual and literary projects Hume pursued in the late 1740s and early 
1750s does not belie any straightforward sequential scheme and defies easy 
categorisation, but it directs our attention to this period, which is at the same time one of 
the most neglected and one of the most crucial periods of Hume’s entire intellectual and 
literary career. In recent years increasing scholarly attention has begun to be devoted to 
the works Hume composed during this period such as the Enquiry concerning the 
Principles of Morals (1751), the Political Discourses (1752) and the Natural History of 
Religion (1757).53 The Political Discourses present a sustained interpretation and 
defence of commercial society built around a number of concepts that form the 
conceptual core of Hume’s mature political economy, in particular ‘commerce’, 
‘manners’, and ‘luxury’. These were concepts Hume had barely touched upon in his 
earlier writings, including his Essays, Moral and Political (1741-48).54 The Natural 
                                                 
53 The date of Hume’s composition of the Natural History of Religion cannot be established with any 
certainty, but most scholars concur that it was probably composed during the period 1749-51. For a further 
discussion of this see n. 218 and part II, n. 15.  
54 ‘The problems of maintaining the rules of justice and morality in a commercial society were reserved 
for the Political Discourses of 1752.’ Phillipson, ‘Propriety, Property and Prudence’, p. 318. On Hume’s 
theory of commerce, see Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation State 
in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2005), pp. 21ff, 
366ff; on the concept of manners see Yasuo Amoh, ‘The ancient-modern controversy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in The Rise of political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Tatsuya Sakamoto 
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History of Religion, most probably composed during this period but not published until 
1757, reflects Hume’s increasing preoccupations with the history and philosophy of 
religion during this period.55 At the same time philosophers have revisited and 
revaluated Hume’s two Enquiries and have demonstrated that both works display a 
number of new and important intellectual preoccupations and can therefore no longer be 
regarded as mere ‘milk-and-water versions’ of the allegedly more serious philosophy 
contained in the Treatise.56  
     As a period of multiple occupations, extensive research and intense literary activities, 
the years 1748-1752 provides ample material for the intellectual biographer seeking to 
reconstruct and re-evaluate the middle stages of Hume’s intellectual career. The dazzling 
richness and diversity of Hume’s intellectual and literary occupations during these years 
give rise to the question of how we are to approach this period in a way that will enable 
us to trace the impulses Hume might have received for his thinking on history. It is 
worth stressing that just as it is important to distinguish this period from Hume’s earlier 
and later thinking, it is necessary to establish an exact timeline for Hume’s manifold 
interests and pursuits within this period so as to avoid the common mistake of reading 
later statements into earlier ones and confusing the different stages of what was 
evidently a highly complex process. This should furthermore enable us to establish with 
greater accuracy whether or not there has been a significant development in Hume’s 
thinking on history. Thus, whereas the thematic or systematic approach followed in 
many studies of Hume’s philosophy presupposes a basic unity and coherence in his 
                                                                                                                                                
and Hideo Tanaka (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 69-85; on luxury and on Hume’s political economy as 
a whole see John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 360-371, esp. pp. 365ff.  
55 This work occupies a central place in the following two studies on Hume: Donald T. Siebert, The Moral 
Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990) and Jennifer A. Herdt, Religion and 
Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). Studies of the Natural History 
of Religion include Mark Webb, ‘The Argument of the Natural History’, Hume Studies, 17 (1991), 141-
159; and Michel Malherbe, ‘Hume’s Natural History of Religion’, Hume Studies, 21 (1995), 255-274.  
56 ‘Hume’s first Enquiry is widely regarded as a milk-and-water version of the author’s serious 
philosophy’. Cf. Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract, p. 3. Attention has largely focused on the first 
Enquiry, cf. Buckle’s study as well as Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: 
Essays on the first Enquiry (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002). Both works owe a debt to the first commentator to 
put the Enquiries centre stage, namely Antony Flew in his Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: A Study of his 
First Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1961).  
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thought, the chronological approach opens up the possibility of tracing changes and thus 
leads to considerations about an overall development in Hume’s thinking.57  
     A chronological approach such as the one I propose to adopt is by its very nature a 
biographical one, since the only way of placing Hume’s texts in an exact chronological 
sequence consists in a detailed consideration and assessment of the textual and 
biographical data on which the reconstruction of such a sequence must be based. A 
chronological and biographical approach will yield far richer results if it is pursued in a 
manner which takes due notice of what one could call the ‘connections’ between life and 
thinking, in other words, if it seeks to trace the complex and inextricable interrelations 
between the life of a man or woman of letters and his or her writings. This is an 
approach most readily associated with the term ‘intellectual biography’ or even 
‘philosophical biography’ and it is in the vicinity of this genre that I would situate my 
own approach in the first part of the present study.58 It might be worth quoting a useful 
definition of the term ‘intellectual biography’, described by an eminent historian of ideas 
as a biography ‘that throws light on [its] subject’s intellectual pursuits, not merely by 
trying to establish a sequence or chronological order in those pursuits, but by trying to 
establish a rationale for them both in terms of the subject’s motivations and in terms of a 
specific cultural and intellectual context within which those motivations are shaped and 
bear fruit’.59 Understood in this way, intellectual biography traces the interconnections 
between a person’s thought and work and the various biographical, social, cultural and 
intellectual contexts in which it can be situated. In the words of another commentator it 
‘presumes or demonstrates complex forms of interaction between the life and the 
thought’.60  
                                                 
57 James Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development: A Study of his Methods (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973) 
is an early example of such an approach.  
58 Works with the subtitle ‘An Intellectual Biography’ have been appearing frequently since the early 
1970s. For an attempt to define ‘philosophical biographer’ by one of the most eminent practitioners in the 
field see Ray Monk, ‘Philosophical Biography: The Very Idea’, in Wittgenstein: Philosophy and 
Biography, ed. James C. Klagge (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), pp. 3-15.  
59 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), p. 8.  
60 ‘The “biography of the philosopher” is a narrative which attempts some treatment of the full 
chronological sweep of the life, which offers reasonably detailed accounts of the philosopher’s thought, 
and which presumes or demonstrates complex forms of interaction between the life and the thought.’ 
Richard Freadman, ‘Genius and the Dutiful Life: Ray Monk’s Wittgenstein and the Biography of the 
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   At this point it is worth recalling that we are here not concerned with what one might 
call the broad sweep of Hume’s life or the widest possible contexts in which his life or 
work may be situated, but rather with the very specific question of the development of 
his thinking on one important subject, history, during a crucial period of his life. It will 
thus be necessary to modify the approach to suit the needs of a more narrowly focused 
enquiry, in which even closer attention needs to be paid to the intricacies of the 
‘interconnections between the life and the thought’. I would suggest that this can best be 
done by taking into account and seeking to establish the usefulness of a more particular 
concept, namely that of ‘influence’. While the concept of a ‘context’ suggests a wider 
view that takes into account a whole area of the intellectual culture of the period in 
which a work was conceived or written and within which it may be meaningfully 
situated, ‘influence’ is a less expansive and more rigid concept that seeks to trace 
specific and demonstrable connections between particular features of one author’s work 
and those of another. Due to the indiscriminate way in which the concept of influence 
has often been put to use in the writing of the history of ideas, it has however fallen into 
disrepute and has largely been replaced by more flexible concepts. 61 The most important 
of these alternative concepts is ‘intertextuality’, which has established itself as a very 
useful concept in the analysis of literary texts since it draws our attention to the web of 
direct and indirect references that characterise and – in the view of some commentators 
– constitute any given text. I would suggest, however, that the concept of ‘influence’ is 
more directly applicable in the case of Hume’s works of the period 1748-56 due to the 
fact that the existing textual and circumstantial evidence will enable us to trace concrete 
and direct links between Hume and his intellectual environment. It will be argued in the 
following chapters that a number of these links can justifiably be labelled ‘influences’.  
                                                                                                                                                
Philosopher as Sub-Genre’, in Biography, 25 (2002), 301-338, esp. 337. I disagree with Freadman who 
marks out what he labels ‘the biography of the philosopher’ as a sub-genre distinct from other forms such 
as the ‘intellectual biography’. This distinction appears to me largely artificial since the above definition 
can be applied to a great number of thinkers, writers and even artists whose lives have been or could be 
fruitfully written in the form of an intellectual biography.  
61 For a critique of the way the concept of influence has been (mis)used in the traditional history of ideas 
see Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in Skinner, Visions of Politics, 
Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge; Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 57-89, esp. pp. 75-6.  
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   To illustrate this general pointy we can briefly consider the relevant and much-
discussed case of Hume’s essay ‘Of National Characters’ which was first published as 
part of the last instalment of Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political in 1748. This piece can 
be read in a way that suggests that Hume referred to a general debate about the primacy 
of physical or moral causation, a debate that pervades contemporary literature and would 
have allowed Hume to discuss this question without making direct references to any one 
text in particular. Alternatively, the piece can – and has long been – read as engaging 
specifically with a work which Hume does not mention, but which he and his 
contemporary readers are deemed to have had in mind and to which his essay is thought 
to be a reply. This work is Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois, which had a tremendous 
impact upon its publication in 1748 and was immediately noted for its emphasis on the 
primacy of physical causes and its apparent endorsement of climatic determinism.62 
Both ways of reading Hume’s essay appear at first glance equally legitimate and it is 
only an in-depth examination of the two works in question and the biographical context 
in which ‘Of National Characters’ was written and published that can supply us with 
sufficient evidence to decide which reading we ought to prefer. The question, in other 
words, is not so much about whether influence is a useful concept, but how and when it 
can legitimately be applied without misconstruing the meaning of a text. There are strict 
criteria for the application of this concept, which we shall observe when reconsidering 
the case of this essay in the first part of the present study.  
     These considerations about the proper use of the concept of influence presuppose an 
investigation of the extent to which Hume was actually familiar with the texts he is said 
to have been influenced by. This in turn poses the need for a detailed reconstruction of 
Hume’s reading in the period in question. Part of the second chapter of this study will 
therefore be concerned with a re-evaluation of David Hume’s reading at an important 
moment of his literary and intellectual career. In the early 1750s, which he spent at his 
family’s country estate Ninewells in the Scottish borders, Hume engaged in an intensive 
reading of the classics, a reading that involved going back to works he had encountered 
                                                 
62 The most recent account of the so-called ‘querelle de L’Esprit de lois’ is Jonathan I. Israel, 
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752 (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford UP, 2006), pp. 824-839.  
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earlier as well as reading ones he was yet not familiar with. This reading or re-reading 
was to result in his longest and most learned essay, entitled ‘Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations’, and had a discernable impact on a number of major and minor 
writings written during this period. The initial aim of the section dealing with this 
reading of the classics lies in the reconstruction of the extent and depth of Hume’s 
reading as well as the uses – scholarly, philosophical and polemical – to which he put 
the information gathered in the course of it. In addition, I intend to raise questions about 
the significance of such intensive private reading under studious conditions and 
highlight some of the implications this might have for our understanding of the various 
writings Hume composed in the above-mentioned period. It will be argued that this 
reading, commonly overlooked or neglected, had a much wider significance than has so 
far been realized and can in fact be shown to have been integral to Hume’s intellectual 
preoccupations and literary pursuits during this crucial but neglected period of his 
intellectual career. 
     To conclude, while Hume’s life is often treated as a mere backdrop to his intellectual 
career, it has been argued that a biographical approach can shed considerable light on the 
development of his ideas. The interrelation between experience, reflection and the 
formulation of a theory of history will consequently be pursued in the first part of this 
study through an in-depth examination of the biographical episodes already mentioned, 
namely Hume’s tour of Europe, his response to Montesquieu, and his reading of the 
Classics. These impulses, it will be argued, had a profound and discernable impact on 
his subsequent work, in particular the second Enquiry (1751) and the Political 
Discourses (1752). Particular attention will be paid to the main product of his reading of 
the Classics and his direct engagement with Montesquieu’s theories, a long and densely 
argued piece entitled ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, published as part of the 
Political Discourses. It will furthermore be demonstrated that Hume’s reading, 
originally undertaken in preparation for this erudite dissertation, resulted in the 
production of a number of smaller pieces, which taken together constitute a fragmentary 
history of classical antiquity. One of these pieces, entitled simply A Dialogue and 
attached to the second Enquiry, presents us with Hume’s most important statement on 
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his philosophy of history and provides us with a reference point for our investigation of 
Hume’s notion of ‘philosophical history’ before 1752. Given Hume’s intense 
preoccupation with the history of classical antiquity in the period under consideration, 
we will then need to enquire why he eventually decided to write modern rather than 
ancient history. The transformation of Hume’s intention will form part of the focus of 
the second part of this study, which engages with the composition and narrative structure 






































































1. Confronting Cultural Diversity: Hume’s Travels and his Response to 
Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois        
 
1. 1. The Travelling Philosopher on a Diplomatic Tour of Europe, 1748 
 
During one of the periods Hume spent at his family estate Ninewells in the Scottish 
Borders and while in the process of composing and preparing for publication his 
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1748, Hume 
received an invitation from his friend and kinsman, Lieutenant-General James St. Clair, 
to accompany him as an aide-de-camp on a diplomatic mission to the courts of Vienna 
and Turin.63 These were the capitals of two of Britain’s most important European allies 
during the ongoing War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), which had by then 
entered into its last phase and was soon to be terminated by the peace treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle.64 St. Clair’s entourage was to proceed to the court of the King of Sardinia at 
Turin via the United Provinces, several German principalities, and the imperial court at 
Vienna. Hume’s excitement at the prospect of this diplomatic tour was mingled with ‘an 
inward reluctance to leave my books, and leisure and retreat’, as he confessed to his 
friend and kinsman, Henry Home.65 His intense feeling of anticipation and expectation 
at the prospect of what he repeatedly refers to as a ‘jaunt’ is, however, clearly conveyed 
by a farewell letter to an old friend: 
I got an invitation from General St Clair, to attend him in his new employment 
at the Court of Turin, which I hope will prove an agreeable if not a profitable 
jaunt for me. I shall have an opportunity of seeing Courts & Camps; & if I can 
                                                 
63 Cf. Hume’s statement in his later autobiography: ‘[In] 1747, I received an invitation from the General to 
attend him in the same station in his military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. I then wore the 
uniform of an officer, and was introduced at these courts as aid-de-camp to the general’. ‘My Own Life’, 
Essays, p. xxxv. 
64 The objective of St Clair’s mission appears to have been to make sure that Britain’s allies – in particular 
the Dutch Stadtholder, the Austrian Empress and the King of Sardinia – would fulfil the quota of troops in 
the field to which they were obliged by the substantial subsidies they received from Britain. Cf. Basil 
Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760 (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1960), chapter 9, esp. p. 264.  
65 Hume’s anxiety is also expressed in his above-quoted letter to Oswald: ‘But notwithstanding of these 
flattering ideas of futurity, as well as the present charms of variety, I must confess, that I left home with 
infinite regret, where I had treasured up stores of study & plans of thinking for many years. I am sure that 
I shall not be so happy as I should have been had I prosecuted these. But, in certain situations, a man dares 
not follow his own judgement or refuse such offers as these.’ 
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afterwards, be so happy as to attain leizure and other opportunities, this 
knowledge may even turn to account to me, as a man of letters, which I 
confess has always been the sole object of my ambition. I have long had an 
intention, in my riper years, of composing some History; & I question not but 
some greater experience of the Operations of the Field, & the Intrigues of the 
Cabinet, will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with judgement upon 
these subjects.66  
This passage about the advantage Hume expects from visiting ‘Courts & Camps’ echoes 
a classical commonplace about the proper education and background of the historian. 
Eighteenth-century literary culture professed to adhere to the classical and humanist 
precept that history ought to be written by a person with extensive experience and true 
insight into the machinations of power politics – the arcana imperii – as well as the 
intricacies of military operations.67 Hume’s highly-crafted statement thus testifies to the 
enduring appeal of the classical conception of history as a narrative of statecraft and war, 
usually composed by a retired political or military leader.68 Hume’s more general 
statement that ‘this knowledge may even turn to account to me, as a man of letters’ 
should lead us to enquire whether Hume’s high expectations with regard to the insights 
to be gained from such a jaunt were actually fulfilled and to what extent this jaunt can be 
shown to have had an impact on the works of moral philosophy and political science that 
Hume composed after his eventual return to Ninewells in 1749.  
     Upon his arrival on the continent, Hume wrote to his brother, commencing what he 
called ‘a sort of Journal of our Travels’ in which he intended to give ‘an Account of the 
Appearances of things, more than of our own Adventures’.69 This travelogue in the form 
of a very long letter charts the route taken by St Clair’s entourage in the spring of 1748, 
from the United Provinces through several principalities and free cities of the Holy 
Roman Empire, down the Danube into the heartland of the Habsburg dominions and 
finally over the Alps into the plains of northern Italy. It contains much more than the 
description of ‘Courts & Camps’, thus revealing that, beside the diplomatic purpose, this 
                                                 
66 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 29 January 1748, HL, i, 108-9.  
67 For this view see Phillipson, Hume, pp. 76-7; and J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: 
Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 7-25. 
68 Cf. Philip Hicks, Neoclassical History and English Culture: From Clarendon to Hume (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), passim; and Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense of the Past (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1969).  
69 Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 3 March 1748, HL, i, 114.  
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jaunt also allowed Hume and his travelling companions to visit cities and battlefields, 
and to appreciate the beauties of an ever-changing scenery.70 Hume’s journal is of great 
interest to our present enquiry as it reflects his immediate impressions as well as the 
transformation of his views, especially with regard to the German territories in the Holy 
Roman Empire: ‘There are great Advantages, in travelling, & nothing serves more to 
remove Prejudices: For I confess I had entertain’d no such advantageous Idea of 
Germany’.71 The journal does indeed allow us to trace this transformation and witness 
the emergence of a new understanding of the political landscape of central Europe. 
Passing through the Holy Roman Empire, with its quick succession of small 
principalities and free cities, gave Hume the opportunity to comment on their different 
circumstances and respective degree of economic prosperity and to reflect on the 
possible causes of these marked differences within a relatively short geographic space. 
Thus, he had the occasion to visit three rather different cities in the space of as many 
days: 
We were all very much taken with the Town of Nuremberg …. The People are 
handsome, well cloath’d & well fed: An Air of Industry & Contentment, 
without Splendour, prevails thro the whole. Tis a protestant Republic on the 
banks of a River (whose name I have forgot) that runs into the Maine, & is 
navigable for Boats. The Town is of a large Extent. 
     On leaving Nuremberg we enter’d into the Elector of Bavaria’s Country, 
where the Contraste appeared very strong with the Inhabitants of the former 
Republic. There was a great Air of Poverty in every Face: The first Poverty 
indeed we have seen in Germany. [Even though] the Country be good & well 
cultivated & populous, the Inhabitants are not at their Ease. The late miserable 
Wars have no doubt hurt them much. 
     Ratisbon is a Catholic Republic situated on the Banks of the Danube. The 
Houses & Buildings & Aspect of the People are well enough, tho not 
comparable to those of Nuremberg. Tis pretended, that the Difference is 
                                                 
70 Hume’s travelogue reads in part like a Grand Tour journal, ranging as it does from descriptions of 
people and places to observations on climate and customs. Hume did indeed see some of the places 
customarily touched upon by the Grand Tour, even though the intention of completing the Tour on the 
homeward journey was eventually abandoned. This impression is confirmed by Hume’s remark from 
Turin, envisaging their homeward journey: ‘I believe we shall make the Tour of Italy & France before we 
come home … so that we shall have seen a great Variety of Dutch, German, Italian, Spanish, & French 
Courts in this Jaunt.’ Cf. Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 16 June 1748, HL, i, 132. General St Clair did 
indeed intend write to London to ask permission to do some stations of the Grand Tour, but apparently 
without success. Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 213. 
71 Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 7 April 1748, HL, i, 126.  
 38 
always sensible betwixt a Protestant & Catholic Country, thro’out all 
Germany: And perhaps there may be something in this Observation, tho it is 
not every where sensible.72  
     In moving from one city to the next, Hume observed a great variety of factors such as 
the quality of the soil, the extent to which it was cultivated, and the population density in 
these territories. Proceeding from Nuremberg to the territory of the Elector of Bavaria 
and the free city of Regensburg, Hume noted the striking contrast between different 
political entities in such close proximity, which found its clearest expression in the 
appearance of the inhabitants. While as a traveller Hume gave his ‘Account of the 
Appearances of things’, as a political scientist he sought to discover the regularities 
underpinning the apparent diversity. In his journal we find him formulating general rules 
and then testing whether the complex reality he encounters conforms to these rules. At 
the end of his concise survey of three German territories, Hume thus hints at potential 
causal connections between the situation of the inhabitants on the one hand and the 
political regime and religious establishment on the other hand. He does however remain 
uncertain about whether such a rule can be universally valid, since ultimately there 
appears to be no single factor capable of determining the living conditions of the people. 
This becomes even clearer when, in the course of the journey, Hume’s attention shifts 
from the situation of the inhabitants of a territory to their physical appearance. Departing 
from Maria Theresia’s court at Vienna, St Clair’s party made its way towards Italy via 
Styria and the Tyrol. This stretch of the journey afforded Hume plenty of occasions to 
describe the dramatic alpine landscape as well as comment on the people. When moving 
from Styria into the Tyrol he was struck by the difference in the appearance of the 
inhabitants: 
But as much as the Country is agreeable in its Wildness; as much are the 
Inhabitants savage & deform’d & monstrous in their Appearance. Very many 
of them have ugly swelld Throats: Idiots, & Deaf People swarm in every 
Village; & the general Aspect of the People is the most shocking I ever saw. … 
Their Dress is scarce European as their Figure is scarce human. …73 
     But the Aspect of the People is wonderfully chang’d on entring the Tirol. 
The Inhabitants are there as remarkably beautiful as the Stirians are ugly. An 
                                                 
72 Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 2 April 1748, HL, i, 124-5.  
73 Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 28 April 1748, HL, i, 130. 
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Air of Humanity, & Spirit & Health & Plenty is seen on every Face: Yet their 
Country is wilder than Stiria. The Hills higher, & the Vallies narrower & more 
barren. They are both Germans subject to the House of Austria; so that it 
wou’d puzzle a Naturalist or Politician to find the Reason of so great and 
remarkable a Difference.74  
     This striking and seemingly unaccountable difference between the inhabitants of two 
neighbouring regions called for an explanation. It poses a problem usually framed in 
terms of different ‘national characters’ and we will later have to consider Hume’s 
contribution to this eighteenth-century discourse. At the end of this passage Hume 
alludes to two possible explanations. The first is the one advanced by the ‘Naturalist’, i. 
e. someone who holds that the physical appearance and constitution of a people is 
largely or even exclusively determined by such circumstances as the nature of the 
climate, the quality of the air or the fertility of the soil.75 This explanation does not, 
however, sufficiently account for the remarkable difference between Styrians and 
Tyroleans, as is the one commonly put forward by the ‘Politician’, i. e. someone who 
believes that the differences in the living conditions of a people can be accounted for by 
reference to the form of government or religious establishment of their state or territory. 
Hume notes that such an application does not apply in this case as the Styria and Tyrol 
were both Catholic, German-speaking parts of the Habsburg realm. This difference 
therefore does by implication remain either unaccountable unless a different kind of 
explanation is found. Whereas the contrast between these two peoples is thus different in 
kind from the one Hume observed with regard to the citizens of Nuremberg and 
Ratisbon, in both cases the general rule usually employed to explain differences in the 
situation of the people does not hold true. While Hume’s journal does not seek to 
provide any solution to this problem, one could infer that new rules might be formed on 
the basis of enlarged experience. What emerges most clearly from the pages of the 
journal, however, is Hume’s reluctance to rely on conventional sets of arguments and his 
tendency to eschew monocausal explanations.  
                                                 
74 Hume to John Home of Ninewells, 8 May 1748, HL, i, 131.  
75 Hume specifically mentions the numerous iron mines in Styria (HL, i, 130) but does not make the 
connection – common at the time – between the allegedly poisonous fumes rising from such mines and the 
health and physical constitution of the inhabitants. For this notion see Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: A 
Critical Biography (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961), p. 304-5.  
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     Hume’s journal ceased with his arrival in Turin, from where it was dispatched to 
Ninewells in June 1748. In any case, while Hume’s hope to ‘make the Tour of Italy & 
France before we come home’ was not fulfilled, the journey back to London did lead via 
Lyon and Paris and included at least two noteworthy incidents. The first was a chance 
encounter with the Young Pretender, Charles Edward Stuart, travelling incognito to his 
final exile in Rome, at a post-house inn at Fontainebleau, southeast of Paris.76 A second 
and more directly relevant incident occurred in Paris and is recounted in one of Hume’s 
later works, the Natural History of Religion, published in 1757. Even though Hume’s 
account does not specify the date at which this incident is supposed to have occurred, we 
can conjecture that it must have taken place during the few days that St Clair’s party 
spent in Paris, recovering from the journey and presumably moving in diplomatic 
circles.77 This is Hume’s account of it: 
I lodged once at Paris in the same hotel with an ambassador from Tunis, who, 
having past some years at London, was returning home that way. One day, I 
observed his Moorish excellency diverting himself under the porch, with 
surveying the splendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to pass 
that way some Capucin friars, who had never seen a Turk; as he, on his part, 
tho’ accustomed to the European dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure 
of a Capucin: And there is no expressing the mutual admiration, with which 
they inspired each other. Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a 
dispute with these Franciscans, their reciprocal surprize had been of the same 
nature. And thus all mankind stand staring at one another; and there is no 
beating it out of their heads, that the turban of the African is not just as good or 
as bad a fashion as the cowl of the European.78 
This is yet another experience of bewilderment such as the one Hume had upon first 
seeing the Stryrians, on whom he commented that ‘[t]heir Dress is scarce European as 
their Figure is scarce human’. This time, however, Hume is the intrigued observer of a 
‘clash of civilizations’, a mutual inability to understand the fashions and – by extension 
– the opinions of those with whom we are unacquainted. The unsettling of ‘otherness’ of 
the Tunisian ambassador as seen by a Capucin friar corresponds to a similar sensation 
evoked in the ambassador on seeing the ‘grotesque figure’ of a Capucin. Hume becomes 
                                                 
76 Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 218-9. 
77 Mossner, Life of Hume, p. 219. Mossner’s conjecture is based on the assumption that Hume would have 
been unlikely to stay at a first-class hotel during his previous stay in Paris in 1734.  
78 NHR, pp. 75-6.  
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an observer of this scene of mutual bewilderment and the philosophical lesson he draws 
from it take the form of an impassioned plea for the recognition of the relativity of 
customs. Moreover, Hume’s telling anecdote, a case study in cultural misunderstanding, 
is reminiscent of the uses of the Orientalist fiction popular with an eighteenth-century 
readership, which found its classic expression Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes (1721). 
Hume was indeed reflecting on Montesquieu’s work during this period, and it is to this 
aspect of his thinking that we must now turn. In order to understand its precise status as 
well as it complex relation with his travels, we need to reconsider Hume’s relationship 
with Montesquieu’s works, which, as we have already noted, display several parallels 
with Hume’s thinking and writing in these years and is generally held to have been 
crucial for the development of his views. 
 
 
1. 2. ‘Of National Characters’ (1748): A Critique of L’Esprit des Lois? 
 
The writings of Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) exerted a 
considerable influence on the social, political and historical outlook of the Scottish 
literati to the extent that the formation of the social and political thought of the Scottish 
Enlightenment may be described in terms of the refutation or appropriation of his 
theories of climate, causation and constitutions.79 Hume is said to have initiated the 
reception of his work in Scotland by offering a powerful critique of L’Esprit des Lois 
(1748) in his essay ‘Of National Characters’, published the same year, which is deemed 
to have set the agenda for his fellow literati’s response to the influential theories 
presented in that work. As Hume’s direct response to Montesquieu is of immediate 
relevance to the development of his historical thought during the years we are at present 
                                                 
79 
To the extent that the formation of the social and political thought of the Scottish Enlightenment may be 
described in terms of the refutation or appropriation of his theories of climate, causation and constitution. 
Cf. Richard B. Sher, ‘From Troglodytes to Americans: Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment on 
Liberty, Virtue, and Commerce’, in Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, ed. 
David Wootton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 368-402; and Fania Oz-Salzberger, ‘The 
political theory of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, ed. Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 157-177, esp. 
pp. 170-2. 
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concerned with, we need to consider it in some detail and – I would suggest – greatly 
modify the common interpretation of Hume’s response to Montesquieu. The reception of 
L’Esprit des Lois by Hume and his fellow literati was preceded and prepared by his 
earlier writings, above all the Lettres Persanes (1721), a key work of the early 
Enlightenment as well as an eighteenth-century bestseller, with which Hume had been 
familiar since the early 1740s.80 This familiarity, as well as the close business 
connections between Montesquieu and a number of Hume’s Edinburgh friends, would 
have helped to pave the way for the almost instantaneous reception of L’Esprit des Lois 
on its first appearance in 1748.81  
     The first direct evidence we have for Hume’s reading and response of L’Esprit des 
Lois is a long letter he wrote to Montesquieu in April 1749, containing a list of detailed 
reflections on and corrections of specific passages and arguments in that work.82 This 
amiable and slightly pedantic letter which initiated the correspondence between the two 
thinkers is generally held to have been preceded by an earlier and much more critical 
response to L’Esprit des Lois. This, Hume’s initial and influential critique of 
Montesquieu, is generally thought to be contained in his essay ‘Of National Characters’, 
first published in late 1748 and thus immediately after the appearance of the work it is 
presumed to criticize.83 While Hume’s essay does not contain any direct references to 
                                                 
80 Hume refers to Montesquieu in his essay ‘Of Polygamy and Divorces’, Essays, p. 628. In this instance 
the variorum section of this edition is incorrect and needs to be checked against the first edition: David 
Hume, Essays, moral and political. The second edition, corrected (Edinburgh, 1742), ii, 186. A 1730 
edition of the Lettres Persanes can be found in a posthumous catalogue of David Hume’s library. Cf. 
David Fate and Mary J. Norton, The David Hume Library (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, 
1996), p. 115.  
81 In addition to Montesquieu’s European-wide reputation as a man of letters, he was known to the 
Edinburgh literati, especially Lord Elibank and Lord Morton, through their connection with the Bordeaux 
wine trade. The success of L’Esprit des Lois may have contributed to the sale of his wine, as Montesquieu 
commented in 1752. Montesquieu to Guasco, 4 October 1752, OC, iii, 1439-40. See also Montesquieu to 
the Abbé de Guasco, 16 March 1752, OC, iii, 1426; James Douglas, 14th Earl of Morton to Montesquieu, 
29 October 1754, OC, iii, 1517-8.  
82 Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, HL, i, 133-138. Montesquieu found Hume’s remarks ‘pleine de 
lumière et de bon sens’. From this letter we can infer that Montesquieu had sent Hume a copy of the De 
l’Esprit des Lois, presumably identical with the two-volume 1749 edition of the work mentioned in the 
letter (‘l’édition in-quarto de Genève’) and found in the library catalogue. Cf. Norton and Norton, David 
Hume Library, p. 115.  
83 Cf. Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Providence and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of William 
Robertson’, in William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire, ed. Stewart J. Brown (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1997), pp. 55-73, esp. pp. 58-9.  
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Montesquieu’s work, it does indeed present an extended critique of the kind of argument 
that is developed at length as well as accorded great prominence in L’Esprit des Lois. 
According to this argument, the manners of a people or what was then commonly 
referred to as their ‘national character’, were fundamentally determined by the influence 
of so-called ‘physical’ causes, defined by Hume as ‘those qualities of the air and 
climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and 
habit of the body’.84 In several chapters of L’Esprit des Lois, Montesquieu had indeed 
accorded unprecedented importance to physical, particularly climatic, causes and this 
was one of the most controversial and debated aspects of the work on its appearance.85 
Appearing shortly after L’Esprit des Lois and vehemently denying the influence of 
physical causes on national characters, Hume’s essay is thus often assumed to be a 
critique of Montesquieu’s allegedly reductionistic theory of human nature and its 
particular manifestation in different national characters.  
     At first glance, ‘Of National Characters’ thus appears to be a direct response to 
L’Esprit des Lois, an interpretation that receives some support from Hume’s claim to 
have read the latter work ‘last autumn in Italy’, that is at some point during his residence 
in Turin, which lasted from June to November 1748.86 Upon closer consideration, 
however, a number of issues become evident and render this seemingly straightforward 
interpretation rather problematic. The first of these consists in the date of publication of 
the two works, which appeared a month apart.87 This would be a rather short span of 
                                                 
84 ‘Of National Characters’, Essays, p. 203.  
85 This contrasts with his earlier Lettres Persanes, in which climate is barely mentioned. Even though the 
Esprit des Lois accords a much greater role to physical causation, Montesquieu never advocated climactic 
determinism insofar as he conceded that the pervasive influence of the climate on a people was generally 
modified by other factors and could be countered by sets of laws. Yet despite his modifications, the 
statements on the influence of climate were immediately remarked upon and remain among the most 
discussed aspects of this complex work. Cf. Shackleton, Montesquieu, chapter 14. 
86 Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, HL, i, 133.  
87 Paul E. Chamley, ‘The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume: A Study of the Origins of Adam 
Smith’s Universalism’, in Essays on Adam Smith, ed. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 274-305, esp. pp. 286-291, has unravelled the complex publication process of 
both works, which is complicated by the fact that Britain was then still adhering to the Julian Calendar. 
The first quarto edition of L’Esprit des Lois appeared in Geneva at the beginning of November 1748: 
Anon. [Montesquieu], De L’Esprit des Loix (Geneva: Barillot & Fils, 1748). Hume’s Three Essays, Moral 
and Political (London: A. Millar; Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, 1748) appeared in London on 18 November 
(according to a notice in the Daily Advertiser of the same day), which corresponds to 29 November in the 
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time for Hume to have read through or at the very least skimmed the two tomes of 
Montesquieu’s work, to have composed his own essay, and to have prepared it for 
publication. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Hume was on the 
continent, hundreds of miles away from his publisher in London with whom he could 
only have communicated via post, that is, with two to three weeks delay.88 To this we 
can add a statement in Hume’s later autobiography to the effect that the two years spent 
on the military and diplomatic missions with General St Clair ‘were almost the only 
interruptions which my studies have received during the course of my life’.89 In short, a 
closer examination of the biographical circumstances makes it appear rather unlikely 
that ‘Of National Characters’ is a direct outcome of Hume’s reading of Montesquieu’s 
L’Esprit des Lois. Yet this conclusion leaves us with a problem, namely to account for 
the parallels between the two works.  
     At this point we need to briefly consider two ingenious solutions that have been 
offered to this problem. On the basis of meticulous research and painstaking 
reconstruction, Paul Chamley has traced the way in which rumours about the central 
argument of Montesquieu’s magnum opus were leaked during the prolonged printing 
process and – due to a web of connections including secret agents – made their way 
                                                                                                                                                
Gregorian Calendar. The two works thus appeared almost a month apart. I do not agree with Chamley who 
considers Hume’s claim to have read L’Esprit des Lois in Italy in autumn 1748 as ‘extremely doubtful’. 
There is no reason to exclude the possibility that Hume had access to a copy of that work before leaving 
Turin on 29 November, even though there is no reason to assume – as Mossner does – that it was in Turin 
rather than at London that Hume prepared his detailed reflections contained in the 1749 letter to 
Montesquieu. As we have seen, these reflections specifically refer to the 1749 quarto edition also found in 
the Hume library and not – as Chamley incorrectly states – to the first (1748) edition of L’Esprit des Lois. 
88 Unfortunately this section of the correspondence between Hume and his publisher Andrew Millar does 
not appear to have survived. Hume’s last letters before his departure from Ninewells do touch upon the 
publication of a new edition of the Essays, including three new essays which are specified, yet curiously 
the essay ‘Of National Characters’ is not among those mentioned. This as well as the considerable delay in 
publication has led commentators to infer that the essay probably did not exist before his departure and 
would thus have been written during his travels or his residence at Turin. It needs to be stressed, however, 
that the delay as well as the omission of this essay can at least in part be explained by the fact that Hume 
initially wished to publish another essay entitled ‘Of the Protestant Succession’, which he eventually 
withdrew due to its topical nature and presumably on the instigation of his friends. This delay has been 
taken to indicate that Hume took a long time to write a new essay, yet it could equally well mean that it 
took time for him to be persuaded to omit the old one, especially since communications between Britain 
and the continent were slow. In short, it is quite possible that Hume had his essay on ‘National Characters’ 
– or an early version thereof – in the drawer when he left for the continent and only decided to take it out 
and polish it once he had finally decided to omit ‘Of the Protestant Succession’.  
89 ‘My Own Life’, Essays, p. xxxv.  
 45 
from Geneva to Turin, where they would have caught Hume’s attention and raised his 
interest.90 Such information about the contents of Montesquieu’s work could thus have 
provided an impulse as well as a target for his case against climatic determinism in the 
essay on national characters. An alternative, though not necessarily contradictory, 
interpretation has recently been advanced by Tatsuya Sakamoto, who on the basis of 
Hume’s observations on the Styrians and Tyroleans – quoted and discussed above – 
argues that the essay on national characters was ‘an inevitable byproduct’ of his tour of 
European countries.91 These two equally ingenious interpretations could indeed help to 
explain the origins of Hume’s interest in climatic determinism, even though both are 
grounded in the somewhat problematic assumption that Hume would have conceived 
and composed the essay, as well as corresponded with his publishers and corrected the 
proof sheets, while on his travels or during his residence in Turin.92 We need to enquire 
whether elaborate explanations such as the ones offered by Chamley and Sakamoto are 
actually required to explain the origins and purpose of Hume’s essay. In other words, 
would it be possible to fully explain the argument of this essay without reference to 
either Montesquieu’s work or the impressions travelling had left on Hume? To answer 
this question, we must turn to the essay itself.  
     Having defined ‘moral’ and ‘physical’ causes at the outset of his essay ‘Of National 
Characters’, Hume proceeds by denying that the latter have any real influence on the 
manners of a people:  
As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their operation in 
this particular; nor do I think, that men owe any thing of their temper or genius 
to the air, food, or climate. …. 
                                                 
90 Chamley, ‘The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume’, pp. 286-296. 
91 Tatsuya Sakamoto, ‘Hume’s political economy as a system of manners’, in The Rise of political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Tatsuya Sakamoto and Hideo Tanaka (London: Routledge, 
2003), pp. 86-102, esp. pp. 90ff.  
92 Three Essays, Moral and Political, including the essay ‘Of National Characters’, appears to have been 
published on the day Hume left Turin, 29 November 1748 (according to the Gregorian Calendar). Three 
Essays, Moral and Political (London: A. Millar; Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, 1748). The date of its publication 
is given in Chamley, ‘The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume’, p. 291; the date of Hume’s 
departure from Turin in Mossner, Life of Hume, p. 218. Mossner does however give an incorrect date for 
Hume’s arrival in Turin, cf. p. 213. 
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I assert, then, that all national characters, where they depend not on fixed 
moral causes, proceed from [accidents], and that physical causes have no 
discernible effect on the human mind.93  
If we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover 
every where signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the 
influence of air or climate.94  
This statement clearly sets Hume in opposition to Montesquieu’s emphasis on physical 
causation, a fact of which the latter was well aware. 95 On the basis of these statements, 
as well as a number of examples Hume uses to corroborate them, it has been alleged that 
Hume’s essay is self-evidently an implicit reply to the climatic arguments in the L’Esprit 
des Lois.96 Yet upon closer examination this inference appears far from conclusive. 
Montesquieu’s magnum opus was the result of much reflection, travel and reading and 
even though he gave uncommon prominence to the influence of climate, he was by no 
means the first to develop a theory around this idea. We shall have to briefly consider 
another possible source that could have provided Hume with a similar reference point 
for his case against the influence of physical causes on national characters.  
     By the mid-eighteenth century a body of literature had grown around the question of 
climatic determinism, among which John Arbuthnot’s An essay concerning the effects of 
air on human bodies, first published in 1733, stands out as one of the most influential 
contributions. Like other authors writing on the influence of climate, Arbuthnot drew on 
Hippocratic theories to demonstrate the effect of air on the ‘fibres’ of the body, a 
physiological explanation Montesquieu would later develop in the L’Esprit des Lois.97 It 
is to this particular line of argument that Hume refers when defining physical causes as 
‘those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the 
temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving it a particular 
                                                 
93 At this point Hume later inserted the sentence: ‘It is a maxim in all philosophy, that causes, which do 
not appear, are to be considered as not existing.’ Cf. Essays, p. 203, 629. 
94 ‘Of National Characters’, Essays, pp. 200-204.  
95 In his reply to Hume’s first letter, Montesquieu appears to be referring to the essay ‘Of national 
characters’ when writing about ‘une belle dissertation, où vous donnez beaucoup plus grande influence 
aux causes morales qu’aux causes physiques’. Montesquieu to Hume, 19 May 1749, OC, iii, 1230.  
96 Cf. Roger B. Oake, ‘Montesquieu and Hume’, in Modern Language Quartertly, 2 (1941), 25-41 and 
225-248, esp. 234-237; and Chamley, ‘The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume’, pp. 285-6.  
97 Cf. John Arbuthnot, An Essay concerning the Effects of Air on Human Bodies (London: J. Tonson, 
1733), pp. 150-154. Cf. Shackleton, Montesquieu, p. 308: ‘That Arbuthnot greatly influenced 
Montesquieu in the development of his climatic theory cannot be doubted.’  
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complexion’. Yet he does so without specific reference to either Arbuthnot’s or 
Montesquieu’s theories of fibres.98 In fact, Hume’s essay is rather vague with regard to 
the kind of theory it seeks to refute and appears to refer to commonplace arguments 
about the influence of ‘air, food, or climate’ rather than to Montesquieu’s specific 
insistence on climate as the major determining factor.99 Thus, Hume’s fairly general 
statements could equally well have been written before the publication of the L’Esprit 
des Lois as they do not necessarily constitute a specific reply to the theory of climatic 
determinism Montesquieu had outlined in that work.   
     This would mean that Hume’s earliest extant written statement on Montesquieu does 
not consist in his 1748 essay ‘Of National Characters’, but rather in the letter he sent to 
Montesquieu in May 1749 after having perused L’Esprit des Lois, either shortly before 
his departure from Turin at the end of November 1748 or during his residing in London 
in the spring of 1749. This should lead us to reconsider Hume’s actual engagement with 
L’Esprit des Lois, which took place in the context of a wider reception of that work in 
Scotland, a reception which Hume himself did much to encourage and promote. We 
shall first look at Hume’s role in that wider reception as reflected in his correspondence 
with Montesquieu, before seeking to identify those features of L’Esprit des Lois that 
Hume picked up on, and finally considering the form that this critique took in a number 







                                                 
98 I do not mean to argue that Hume drew on Arbuthnot’s rather than Montesquieu’s work. I have found 
no evidence for this, even though Hume’s manner of ending his essay in a series of consecutively 
numbered examples is reminiscent of the structure of Arbuthnot’s book. Instead, I simply wish to stress 
that there are other sources on which Hume could have drawn for his essay ‘Of National Characters’ and 
to argue that Hume’s essay is more likely to have been a response to any or all of these sources rather than 
a specific attempt to refute the climatic determinism allegedly expounded in L’Esprit des Lois.  
99 Roger B. Oake has made the claim that Hume’s choice of examples – an alleged propensity to 
‘drunkenness’ in northern and to promiscuity in southern regions – was necessarily influenced by 
Montesquieu’s examples; cf. Oake, ‘Montesquieu and Hume’, p. 236. This does not appear conclusive to 
me as there are no specific textual parallels between L’Esprit des Lois and ‘Of National Characters’.  
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1. 3. Hume’s Engagement with Montesquieu’s New System, 1749-1755 
 
Hume and his fellow literati were by no means the first to take notice of Montesquieu’s 
magnum opus when De l’Esprit des Lois was published at Geneva in the autumn of 
1748. In France, Montesquieu’s fellow philosophes unanimously congratulated him on 
his achievement, while the public response took a more critical form as reviews and 
replies castigated the author for his alleged defence of heterodox opinions and immoral 
practices.100 The work was quite differently received in England, unsurprisingly so given 
the praise Montesquieu had lavished on Britain as a model state that exemplified his 
vision of a free and commercial society. In 1749 Hume reported to Montesquieu that the 
latter’s work was already being cited during a debate in the House of Lords, and the 
following year Horace Walpole called the work ‘the best book that ever was written’.101 
Yet it was among Scottish men of letters that the work was to have its most profound 
and lasting impact.102 The extent of their appropriation of the work is apparent from the 
series of lectures that Adam Smith delivered in Edinburgh during the years 1748-51, in 
particular the lectures on jurisprudence which clearly illustrate both the extent of his 
engagement with the substance of L’Esprit des Lois and the debt he owed to the wealth 
of information and observations contained in that work.103 Over the following decades 
                                                 
100 Helvetius spoke for his fellow philosophes when calling it ‘le plus grand, le plus bel ouvrage du 
monde’. Cf. Shackleton, Montesquieu, p. 356. This may have been an attempt to compensate for his initial 
criticism, since Helvetius later told Hume that he and the dramatist Bernard-Joseph Saurin initially sought 
to dissuade Montesquieu from publishing L’Esprit des lois and felt their advice was justified by its 
eventual decline in reputation. Cf. Hume to Hugh Blair, 1 April 1767, HL, ii, 133.  
101 Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, HL, i, 137-8. See also the Président Barbot to Montesquieu, 7 
April 1749, OC, iii, 1216. Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, 10 January 1750, quoted in Shackleton, 
Montesquieu, p. 357. 
102 Cf. Peter Gay’s statement that ‘Scotland must rank first’ among all the countries in which the ideas 
expounded in Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois exerted an influence; quoted in Sher, ‘From Troglodytes to 
Americans: Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment’, p. 371.  
103 There are four direct references to Montesquieu and many more indirect ones in Adam Smith’s 
Lectures on Jurisprudence. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, v, ed. 
R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, P. G. Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), esp. pp. 128, 154-5, 200, cf. pp. 
443-4. In addition, one direct reference to the author of L’Esprit des Lois can be found in Smith’s Lectures 
on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, iv, 
ed. J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 198. Hume may well have been present when these 
two series of lectures were first delivered in Edinburgh in 1748-51. Though both lecture series remained 
unpublished in Smith’s lifetime, the lectures on jurisprudence exerted an enormous influence on 
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the Scottish literati developed an intense preoccupation with the theory outlined in this 
work, which took the form of both a sustained critique and a sophisticated appropriation 
of Montesquieu’s groundbreaking theories. In the process of their engagement with 
L’Esprit des Lois the Scots thus laid the foundations of their own far-reaching enquiries 
into the fields of society, politics, and culture.104  
     This extraordinary reception of Montesquieu’s ideas in Scotland can partly be 
accounted for by taking into consideration his previous reputation as the author of the 
popular Lettres Persanes as well as by his business ties with Scotland.105 As a member 
of Bordeaux’s aristocratic and commercial elite, Montesquieu owned extensive 
vineyards and was heavily involved in the wine trade. He traded with several members 
of the Scottish literary circle and their patrons, in particular Patrick Murray, Lord 
Elibank and James Douglas, Earl of Morton, and their business correspondence afforded 
ample opportunities for discussing literary matters.106 It was by way of one such 
business contact – the wine merchant John Stewart of Allanbank – that Montesquieu 
first made contact with Hume by sending him a copy of L’Esprit des Lois.107 This gift 
initiated a correspondence which reveals that Hume himself appears to have played an 
important part in Montesquieu’s success story in Scotland. He facilitated the wider 
                                                                                                                                                
succeeding generations of Scottish thinkers from William Robertson to John Millar. For the background of 
the lectures see Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 81-96.  
104 This interpretation was first formulated by Dugald Stewart in his ‘Account of the Life and Writings of 
Adam Smith, LL.D.’ and ‘Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson, D.D.’, read before the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1793 and 1796, respectively. Cf. ‘Account of Smith’, reprinted in Essays 
on Philosophical Subjects. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, iii 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 294, note 24. See Meek, Ignoble Savage, pp. ; Phillipson, ‘Providence 
and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of William Robertson’, pp. 58-9; Oz-Salzberger, 
‘The political theory of the Scottish Enlightenment’, pp. 170-2.  
105 The first English translation of Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes (1721) was Persian letters. Translated 
by Mr. Ozell (London: J. Tonson, 1722).  For early Scottish editions of Montesquieu’s works see Alison 
K. Howard, ‘Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau in eighteenth-century Scotland; a check list of editions 
and translations of their works published in Scotland before 1801’, in The Bibliotheck, 2 (1959), 40-63. 
This list does not include the first edition of Ozell’s translation published in 1722.  
106 Scottish wine merchants had traded with Montesquieu for some time prior to 1748 and the success of 
L’Esprit des Lois might have been promoted by this trade, while Montesquieu clearly believed that the 
success of the book helped the sales of his claret: ‘Le succès que mon livre a eu dans ce pays-là contribue, 
à ce qui’il paroît, au succès de mon vin.’ Montesquieu to the Abbé de Guasco, 4 October 1752, OC, iii, 
1440. For the winetrade see also Montesquieu to Guasco, 16 March 1752, OC, iii, 1426; and James 
Douglas, 14th Earl of Morton to Montesquieu, 29 October 1754, OC, iii, 1517-8.  
107 The Stewarts of Allanbank were Hume’s neighbours in Berwickshire (information provided by 
Professor David Raynor).  
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reception of Montesquieu’s ideas in Scotland by helping to convince an Edinburgh 
publishing house, Hamilton & Balfour, to produce a revised edition of the L’Esprit des 
Lois, prepared from late 1749 onwards and published the following year.108 Thus 
Edinburgh stood alongside Paris and London as one of only three places in which 
Montesquieu chose to bring out a new and corrected edition of his magnum opus.109 In 
addition to this two volume edition of the complete French text, Hamilton & Balfour 
published an English translation of the two famous chapters on the British constitution in 
the form of a short pamphlet or booklet, evidently designed to meet the widespread 
public demand for Montesquieu’s eulogy on the British constitution.110  
     What Hume thought about this eulogy becomes clear when we consider his first letter 
to Montesquieu, which gives us important clues as to how he read L’Esprit des Lois. 
Upon hearing that Montesquieu had just sent him a copy of that work, Hume replied 
with a letter in which he sets out to ‘communicate to you some reflections I have made 
upon reading your work, most of which in the main serve to confirm the principles on 
which your system is founded’.111 Hume’s meticulous comments on ten passages of 
                                                 
108 Anon. [Montesquieu], De l’Esprit des Loix. ... Nouvelle Edition, avec les dernieres Corrections & 
Illustrations de l’Auteur (2 vols, Edinbourg [sic]: G. Hamilton & J. Balfour, 1750). That this edition was 
at least in part financed by subscription is suggested by the following statement in the ‘Avis au Lecteur’ 
‘Nous rendons graces aux Messieurs qui nous ont encouragés par leurs souscriptions.’ Cf. L’Esprit des 
Loix (Edinburgh, 1750), [no pagination]. An indication of Hume’s involvement in the preparation of this 
edition is given in Montesquieu’s reply to Hume’s first letter to him. Montesquieu writes that a certain 
Pierre Le Monnier ‘m’a parlé de l’honneur qu’on veut faire à mon livre en Écosse de l’y imprimer & m’a 
dit ce que vous m’avez déjà appris par votre lettre. Je suis très-obligé à vous, Monsieur, & à M. 
Alexandre, de la peine que vous avez prise.’ Montesquieu to Hume, 3 September 1749, OC, iii, 1255.  
109 Cf. Montesquieu to Hume, 3 September 1749, OC, iii, 1255.  
110 Anon. [Montesquieu], Two Chapters of a Celebrated French Work, Intitled, De L’Esprit des Loix, 
Translated into English. One, Treating of the Constitution of England; Another, of the Character and 
Manners which Result from this Constitution (Edinburgh: Hamilton and Balfour, 1750). The 
‘Advertisement’ to the work states that it was designed for those who may ‘have curiosity to see the 
opinion of so eminent a Frenchman concerning the British constitution’. Hume was well aware of the 
widespread acclaim of these chapters on the British constitution, cf. Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, 
HL, i, 138. He may well have had a hand in the preparation of this translation, but it is equally possible 
that this was due to the publishers’ own initiative. It is generally supposed that this translation is the work 
alluded to in Montesquieu’s letter (Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 229, 232), but it appears clear to me that 
Montesquieu is referring to the complete French edition of L’Esprit des Lois. In addition, the translation 
itself, which differs from Thomas Nugent’s famous translation appearing in London the same year, does 
not appear to be Hume’s with regard to style, vocabulary, or even spelling. 
111 Hume’s letter was written in French: ‘Permettez-moi plutôt de vous communiquer quelques réflexions 
que j’ai faites en lisant votre ouvrage, dont la plupart servent à confirmer de plus en plus les principes sur 
lesquels votre système est fondé.’ Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, HL, i, 133 (translation mine).  
 51 
L’Esprit des Lois range from legal and historical to economic and political matters and 
suggest that Hume had attentively perused at least the first two-thirds of the work.112 The 
most topical of Hume’s observations was a remark on the abolition of hereditary 
jurisdiction in the Scottish Highlands, which had been effected by Parliament just two 
years previously, following the Jacobite Rising of 1745. Hume’s remarks on paper 
money, the balance of trade, and public credit foreshadowed his line of argument in the 
economic essays which were to make up the bulk of the Political Discourses, published 
three years later in 1752.  
     From the point of view of the modern reader these detailed ‘reflections’ contained in 
Hume’s first letter to Montesquieu are somewhat disappointing since they do not reveal 
his views on the conceptual framework and theoretical substance of L’Esprit des Lois. 
Even so, the very last point he makes in the letter does offer an interesting glimpse of a 
disagreement with Montesquieu’s account of the mixed British constitution. 
Commenting on the popularity of Montesquieu’s depiction of Britain as a model of a 
free government, Hume offers a more critical view that betrays a strong sense of 
scepticism about the durability of this type of government:  
Our compatriots [the English] are highly vain about the approbation you give 
to their form of government, of which they are, and with some reason, very 
enamoured. Yet one cannot fail to observe that while simple forms of 
government are by their very nature liable to abuse since they do not have any 
inbuilt counterbalance, complex constitutions, in which one party suppresses 
the other, are like complicated machines, prone to be deranged by the contrast 
and opposition of parties.113 
                                                 
112 There are no references to books 22-31 of L’Esprit des Lois in Hume’s letter, apart from the final point 
he makes concerning the Latin quotation in the very last sentence of the work. It is clear however, that 
Hume read and cited books 23 (on population) while working on his essay ‘Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations’ and he would have also been interested Montesquieu’s treatment of religion in books 24 
and 25. There is no evidence to suggest that he read the last quarter of the work (books 27-31) which the 
title of the first edition described as ‘recherches nouvelles sur les loix Romaines touchant les successions, 
sur les loix Francoises, & sur les loix feodales’. Indeed, there is nothing in his Political Discourses of 
1752 to suggest that Hume had until that time developed anything more than a passing interest in feudal 
government.  
113 ‘Nos compatriotes sont fort vains de l’approbation que vous donnez à leur forme de gouvernement, 
dont ils sont, & avec quelque raison, si amoureux. Mais ne peut-on pas remarquer que, si les formes 
simples de gouvernement sont par leur nature sujettes à l’abus, parce qu’il n’y a aucun contrepoids, d’un 
autre côté les formes compliquées où une partie réprime l’autre, sont, comme les machines compliquées, 
sujettes à se déranger par le contraste et l’opposition des parties.’ Hume to Montesquieu, 10 April 1749, 
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It is worth considering this statement in some detail. Hume clearly disagrees with 
Montesquieu’s eulogy on the British constitution. The reasons for his disagreement are 
merely hinted at, yet become apparent upon a close reading of the passage. First, 
Hume’s vantage point as a Scottish man of letters enabled him to take a more detached 
view of the British constitution than that held by Montesquieu’s English readership. 
Underlying this statement about ‘their form of government’ is the conviction that the 
modern British constitution was essentially an ‘English’ constitution adopted for the new 
British state that came into being with the Act of Union of 1707. Second, the perspective 
afforded by his treatment of different forms of government within the framework of his 
political science allowed for a more sceptical evaluation of the future prospects of the 
mixed British constitution. This in turn rests on a deep-seated conviction, which Hume 
shared with a number of ancient and modern critics of mixed constitutions, that this was 
an inherently unstable form of government in which the delicate balance between 
authority and liberty was constantly in danger of being upset by the ever-present spectre 
of factionalism capable of throwing the government into either of the two extreme forms 
of government, tyranny or anarchy.  
     Montesquieu was clearly grateful for Hume’s detailed and thoughtful comments on 
numerous passages of L’Esprit des Lois, which he found ‘pleine de lumière & de bon 
sens’, and even used some of these for the preparation of the revised edition of the work 
published in 1750.114 The correspondence was picked up by the older man of letters and 
continued until two years before Montesquieu’s death in 1755. As a friend of both, the 
wine-merchant John Stewart continued to be a link between the two men of letters and 
through him Montesquieu took notice of Hume’s more recent writings, including the 
essay ‘Of National Characters’. Following his return to Ninewells in the summer of 
1749 and during the ensuing period of intense literary activity, Hume formulated what 
                                                                                                                                                
HL, i, 138 (translation mine). ‘Nos compatriotes’ seems to me to denote the English as Hume specifically 
writes about ‘their’ not ‘our’ government.  
114 Montesquieu caused the following note to be written onto Hume’s letter: ‘Lettre de M. David Hume, 
qu’il faut copier dans le Spicilège [Montesquieu’s notebook]. Elle est pleine de lumière et de bon sens. Il y 
a quelques remarques qui pourront être utiles pour ma dernière édition de l’Esprit des lois, et je puis dire 
que, d’une infinité de papiers qui ont été écrits là-dessus, c’est peut-être celui qui a autant de sens. Je 
porrai ôter quelques endroits inutiles.’ Cf. OC, iii, 1217 note (a).  
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can be taken to constitute a comprehensive critique of L’Esprit des Lois. As this critique 
lies buried in footnotes and passing references of his Enquiry concerning the Principles 
of Morals (1751) and his Political Discourses (1752), its recovery requires a more 
detailed and more thorough reconstruction than has hitherto been attempted. This, in 
turn, requires us to set Hume’s remarks alongside those statements of L’Esprit des Lois 
which best illustrate the aspect of Montesquieu’s complex theory picked up, developed 
or critiqued by Hume as well as other Scottish literati. The complex structure of 
Montesquieu’s work demands that we begin this reconstruction by considering two 
crucial assertions made in the first book of L’Esprit des Lois, which contains the agenda 
for Montesquieu’s entire enterprise.  
     The shortest and most concise summary of Montesquieu’s central argument can be 
found in the full title of the first edition of L’Esprit des Lois, which reads De l’Esprit des 
Loix ou du Rapport que les Loix Doivent Avoir avec la Constitution de Chaque 
Gouvernement, les Mœurs, le Climat, la Religion, le Commerce, &c.115 This title 
contains a list of some of the most central terms and concepts of this vast opus and thus 
a condensed version of the conceptual core of the work elaborated in book one and then 
developed in the ensuing books. The key concepts mentioned in the title – namely loix, 
rapports, esprit, climat, mœurs, and commerce – to which Hume made direct reference 
in his extended critique of Montesquieu’s work, form the backdrop before which Hume 
developed his own conceptual apparatus for his revised political science as well as the 
ideas, including the idea of an ‘esprit’ or spirit of an age and the relationship between 
commerce and manners, which underpin both his Political Discourses of 1752 and his 
later grand narrative of English political history. In the following, we shall look at 
Montesquieu’s definition of lois and l’esprit des lois, as well as his treatment of 
government, climate and commerce and contrast these with Hume’s criticism or, where 
that is not available, Hume’s own stance on these matters. We need to begin with the 
notion of rapport which is the central linking element in both the title and the overall 
argument of L’Esprit des Lois.  
                                                 
115 The title continues: ‘a quoi l’Auteur a ajoute des Recherches nouvelles sur les Loix Romaines touchant 
les Successions, sur les Loix Francoises, & sur les Loix Feodales.’ (2 vols.; Geneva, Barrilot & Fils, 
1748).  
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     In the first sentence of the programmatic first book of L’Esprit des Lois, Montesquieu 
defines laws as rapports, a term he had already employed in a similar context over 
twenty-five years earlier in his Lettres Persanes (1721). That work’s main protagonist, 
the Persian traveller Usbek, had defined justice as ‘a relation of suitability [un rapport 
de convenance], which actually exists between two things’.116 This definition of justice 
echoed in Montesquieu’s treatment of laws at the outset of L’Esprit des Lois: 
Laws, taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary relations [les rapports 
nécessaires] deriving from the nature of things; and in this sense, all beings 
have their laws: the divinity has its laws, the material world has its laws, the 
intelligences superior to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man 
has his laws. … There is, then, a primitive reason; and laws are both the 
relations that exist between it and the different beings, and the relations of 
these various beings to each other.117 
This definition of laws as actual and immutable rapports was immediately regarded as 
highly unusual and appears idiosyncratic when seen in the wider natural law context in 
which much of L’Esprit des Lois can be situated. Indeed, the opening chapter was to 
prove one of the most controversial parts of the work.118  
     Hume was one of the first to comment on Montesquieu’s definition of the laws when 
he came to deal with several accounts of justice in the context of his own treatment of 
social virtues in the framework of his moral philosophy as presented in the Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals of 1751. Speaking of Montesquieu’s work, Hume 
stresses that while much of the former’s treatment of the laws in their social context was 
                                                 
116 ‘Justice is a relation of suitability, which actually exists between two things. This relationship is always 
the same, by whatever being it is perceived, whether by God, or by an angel, or finally by a man.’ 
Montesquieu, Persian Letters, tr. C. J. Betts (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p. 162. Cf. Lettres 
Persanes, ed. Jean Starobinski (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), p. 198: ‘La justice est un rapport de convenance, 
qui se trouve réellement entre deux choses: ce rapport est toujours le même, quelque être qui le considère, 
soit que ce soit Dieu, soit que ce soit un ange, ou enfin que ce soit un homme.’ There may be a hint of 
irony here, as much of the Lettres Persanes seeks to demonstrate the utter relativity of laws, manners, and 
mores.  
117 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, tr. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), p. 3. Cf. De L’Esprit des Loix (reprint of 1758 edn.), OC, i, 1-2: ‘Les 
Loix, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des 
choses; &, dans ce sens, tous les êtres ont leurs loix, la divinité a ses loix, le monde matériel a ses loix, les 
intelligences supérieures à l’homme ont leurs lois, les bêtes ont leurs loix, l’homme a ses loix. … Il y a 
donc une raison primitive; & les loix sont les rapports qui se trouvent entre elle & les différens êtres, & les 
rapports des ces divers êtres entre eux.’  
118 Cf. Shackleton, Montesquieu, pp. 244ff.  
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groundbreaking, it was preceded by a highly problematic assertion contained in 
Montesquieu’s initial definition of laws at the outset of L’Esprit des Lois:  
This illustrious Writer, however, sets out with a different Theory, and supposes 
all Right to be founded on certain Rapports or Relations; which is a System, 
that, in my Opinion, never will reconcile with true Philosophy. Father 
Malebranche, as far as I can learn, was the first, that started this abstract 
Theory of Morals, which was afterwards adopted by Dr. Clarke and others; 
and as it excludes all Sentiment, and pretends to found every Thing on Reason, 
it has not wanted Followers in this philosophic Age.119  
From the point of view of Hume’s own utilitarian account of justice and other social 
virtues in the second Enquiry, Montesquieu had gone wrong by resorting to an essential 
and metaphysical definition of justice and rights.120 Hume contended that, far from 
consisting in necessary relations deriving from the nature of things, justice was in fact a 
social virtue, which meant that all its manifestations were necessarily dependent on the 
contingencies of the particular societies in which they occurred.  
     In his own treatment of justice in the second Enquiry, Hume thus put himself firmly 
in opposition to Montesquieu by making the extraordinary claim that ‘public utility is 
the sole origin of justice’. Once this definition was accepted, it would follow that the 
laws possessed no intrinsic value other than that which they derived from their 
usefulness for the society for which they had been framed. This must consequently be 
their exclusive reference point and sole justification. Hume was well aware that this was 
a novel and contentious claim, far removed from the metaphysical definitions of justice 
given by Nicolas Malebranche, Samuel Clarke and Ralph Cudworth, which 
Montesquieu had echoed at the outset of L’Esprit des Lois.121 Hume was not the only 
commentator to argue that Montesquieu had started his commendable enterprise on the 
wrong foot by giving a definition of the laws that was rather eccentric and sat uneasily 
                                                 
119 Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (London: A. Millar, 1751), p. 55 note. In later 
editions of his second Enquiry, Hume was to mention Ralph Cudworth as a further exponent of ‘this 
abstract Theory of Morals’, cf. ed. EPM, p. 93.  
120 It is not clear whether Hume here refers to the Lettres Persanes or to L’Esprit des Lois, or both. When 
he says that Montesquieu ‘sets out with a different theory’, he could either refer to Montesquieu’s earlier 
definition of justice given in the Lettres Persanes, or to his initial definition of the laws given at the outset 
of L’Esprit des Lois as opposed to the different approach adopted later on in the first book of that work. 
121 Shackleton, Montesquieu, p. 244ff discusses these authors as possible influences on Montesquieu.  
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with the main argumentative thrust of the rest of the work.122 Only once Montesquieu 
had moved away from this initial misguided definition of justice, Hume implied, was he 
beginning to lay the theoretical foundations for what Hume considered as an outstanding 
contribution to political science.  
     Montesquieu did indeed quickly move away from this initial metaphysical 
definition of justice to arrive at the crucial statement of what he meant by the term 
l’esprit des lois, the central concept underpinning the entire work. This definition is 
given towards the end of the first book and is worth quoting in full:  
Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of the government that is 
established or that one wants to establish, whether those laws form it as do 
political laws, or maintain it, as do civil laws.  
They should be related to the physical aspects of the country; to the climate, be 
it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and 
extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or 
herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can 
sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their 
number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are 
related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to 
the order of things on which they are established. They must be considered 
from all these points of view. 
This is what I undertake to do in this work. I shall examine all these relations 
[rapports]; together they form what is called THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
[l’ESPRIT DES LOIX].123 
This passage highlights Montesquieu’s major concerns and sets the agenda for the rest of 
the work. The first important thing to note here is this passage hints at a conceptual 
tension that permeates the whole book. Montesquieu speaks first of the relationship that 
laws ought to have with constitutions, climate, and a number of other factors, then of 
those that they actually have with these wider circumstances. His account is thus 
ostensibly descriptive, yet, in fact, at least in part prescriptive and he frequently switches 
from one mode of analysis to the other. Second, Montesquieu makes it clear that l’esprit 
                                                 
122 In his influential Commentaire sur L’Esprit des lois de Montesquieu, first published in 1806 and 
translated into English by Thomas Jefferson in 1811, Destutt de Tracy bluntly summed up this criticism: 
‘Une loi n’est pas un rapport et un rapport n’est pas une loi.’ Quoted in Shackleton, Montesquieu, p. 245.   
123 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, pp. 8-9 (the italics are Montesquieu’s). The text continues: ‘I have 
made no attempt to separate political from civil laws, for, as I do not treat laws but the spirit of the laws, 
and as this spirit consists in the various relations that laws may have with various things, I have had to 
follow the natural order of laws less than that of these relations and of these things.’ Cf. L’Esprit des Loix, 
OC, i, 9:  
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des lois is not something distilled from the laws themselves, but is rather the sum of the 
rapports that they have with all aspects of society. It is thus the ‘esprit’ of the laws, as it 
highlights all the connections the laws have or ought to have with the general 
circumstances of the society to whose advantage they are geared. The laws are thus both 
interconnected with and referential to other aspects of culture and it is this web of 
interconnections that Montesquieu terms l’esprit des lois. The stress on the interrelations 
between the laws on the one hand and climatic conditions as well as social, cultural and 
economic factors on the other hand was probably Montesquieu’s most original idea and 
testifies to just how far his account of legal and political systems had moved beyond the 
earlier jurisprudential writers, such as Grotius and Pufendorf. What was new and 
exciting about his work was the notion that laws, while principally connected with the 
form of government, evolved by a gradual process by which laws and their interplay 
with sets of circumstances present in any given society. The laws ought therefore to be 
referential to all these various circumstances of society. This novel idea of legal 
evolution was to become the work’s first great contribution to eighteenth-century legal, 
social and political thought.124  
     We are now in a position to appreciate the extent of Montesquieu’s contribution to 
political science and can begin to see what Hume found so appealing about his work. 
Being himself engaged in a similar project, Hume was in a good position to appreciate 
the extent and originality of that contribution. In his above-mentioned discussion of 
justice in the second Enquiry, Hume draws his readers’ attention to Montesquieu’s 
remarkable achievement:  
The Laws have, or ought to have, a constant Reference to the Constitution of 
Government, the Manners, the Climate, the Religion, the Commerce, the 
Situation of each Society. A late Author of great Genius, as well as extensive 
Learning, has prosecuted this Subject at large, and has establish’d, from these 
Principles, the best System of political Knowledge, that, perhaps, has ever yet 
been communicated to the World.125 
                                                 
124 An older view of Montesquieu’s achievement and influence is summed up in Meek, Science, who 
stresses the economic dimension and Stein, Legal Evolution, who traces Montesquieu’s influence on the 
legal thought of the Scottish literati. 
125 Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751 edn.), p. 54-5.  
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This is clearly glowing praise, which draws attention to the innovation and 
erudition underpinning Montesquieu’s ‘System of political Knowledge’. Hume was 
to temper his assessment later on as we shall see in due course. For now, it is worth 
noting that, while Hume echoed and endorsed Montesquieu’s notion that the laws 
ought to be considered in their various contexts, this passage hints at the fact that 
the two disagreed about the relative importance that should be assigned to the 
study of each of these contexts. This is evident from the differences between their 
respective lists of factors. As we have seen, Montesquieu mentioned government in 
the first place, followed by physical causes such as climate. For Hume, government 
was followed by manners. In order to see whether this is really an accurate 
indication of the relative importance that each of these factors occupied in 
Montesquieu’s and Hume’s systems, we need to compare their respective stances 
on these matters. After having done so, we shall briefly consider the way in which 
Hume’s overall assessment of Montesquieu’s work – best expressed in the passage 
just quoted – changed from 1751 onwards.  
     Both the passage from L’Esprit des Lois and that from the second Enquiry suggest 
that among all the relations or rapports that constituted l’esprit des lois, forms of 
government ranked first. Montesquieu makes this very clear in the paragraph that 
follows the ones cited above:  
I shall first examine the relations that laws have with the nature and the 
principle of each government, and, as this principle has a supreme influence on 
the laws, I shall apply myself to understanding it well; and if I can once 
establish it, the laws will be seen to flow from it as from their source. I shall 
then proceed to other relations that seem to be more particular.126  
Montesquieu consequently explores this in the first quarter of L’Esprit des Lois. For 
Montesquieu, as for Hume, constitutions provide the prime object of study for the 
political scientist as well as the most important explanatory principle from which most 
political, social, economic and cultural phenomena can be deduced. The form of 
                                                 
126 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 9. Cf. L’Esprit des Loix, OC, i, 9: ‘J’examinerai d’abord les 
rapports que les loix ont avec la nature & avec le principe de chaque gouvernement: &, comme ce principe 
a sur les loix une suprême influence, je m’attacherai à le bien connoître; &, si je puis une fois l’établir, on 
en verra couler les loix comme de leur source. Je passerai ensuite aux autres rapports, qui semblent être 
plus particuliers.’  
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government was the most important factor, as both this statement and the structure of 
L’Esprit des Lois revealed.127 Both thinkers disagreed with the often-quoted line from 
Pope’s Essay on Man (1732-34): For forms of government let fools contest, Whate’er is 
best administer’d is best.128 In contrast to this, Hume as well as Montesquieu sought to 
reaffirm the central importance of forms of government. They were however to disagree 
over the classification of constitutions, especially with regard to republics.129 More 
importantly, their disagreement extended over the other factors that were held to exert a 
profound influence on the development of any given polity. In order to fully grasp the 
terms of that disagreement, we need to explore what can be regarded as the centrepiece 
of Montesquieu’s political theory, the idea of un esprit général.  
     As the L’Esprit des Lois moves from the first and foremost of all circumstances, the 
legal and political, via climate to the cultural, it becomes clear that l’esprit des lois is 
itself only one, though an essential, constituent of a general and all-encompassing spirit 
of an age or nation, which Montesquieu terms un esprit général. We need to have a 
closer look at this idea, another central concept of the work distinct from, yet related to 
the idea of l’ esprit des lois, which is Montesquieu’s other great contribution to 
eighteenth-century historical discourse. Montesquieu had begun to develop this idea 
more than twenty years previously and had first used the term un esprit général in his 
Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains of 1734, where it had been 
employed to denote the ultimate foundation of political power in any nation.130 By the 
time Montesquieu composed L’Esprit des Lois, the idea had taken on a more concrete 
form, which found its ultimate expression in book 19 of that work. It is in the attempt to 
                                                 
127 Montesquieu’s discussion of governments occupies books 2-8 and book 11 of L’Esprit des Lois.  
128 Quoted by Hume in ‘That Politics may be reduced to a Science’ (1741), Essays, p. 14 note 1.  
129 While their respective classifications of forms of government deviated from the threefold standard 
scheme derived from Aristotle and Polybius, both Montesquieu and Hume showed a particular interest in 
the role of aristocracies in modern polities. For Hume’s insistence on the primacy of political institutions 
see Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics and David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political 
Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), chapter 7.  
130 ‘Il y a, dans chaque nation, un esprit général, sur lequel la puissance même est fondée; quand elle 
choque cet esprit, elle se choque elle-même, & elle s’arrête nécessairement.’ Considérations sur les causes 
de la Grandeur des Romains, et de leur decadence (reprint of 1758 edn.), in OC, i, 519. For 
Montesquieu’s thought on this subject as see Shackleton, Montesquieu, pp. 316-19. There is no evidence 
that Hume had read this work before 1753-4, when he inserted added a footnote reference to the 
Considérations to his earlier essay ‘Of Parties in General’, first published in 1741. Cf. Essays, p. 610.  
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define this esprit général in this book, that Montesquieu’s most concise and lucid 
statement on moral and physical causation occurs. The very brief but crucial fourth 
chapter of that book reads: 
Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the 
government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit [un 
esprit général] is formed as a result. 
To the extent that, in each nation, one of these causes acts more forcefully, the 
others yield to it. Nature and climate almost alone dominate savages; manners 
govern the Chinese; laws tyrannize Japan; in former times mores set the tone 
in Lacedaemonia; in Rome it was set by the maxims of government and the 
ancient mores.131  
This highly condensed section makes two related points of central importance to the 
understanding of Montesquieu’s enterprise: First, l’esprit général is here used to denote 
the multitude of causes that shape human societies. Laws and their esprit are a part of 
this all-encompassing esprit général, though they are by no means the dominant among 
a multiplicity of factors. This stress on the multiplicity of factors, and some highly 
suggestive indications of the respective influence that each of these factors has on 
different types of societies. Thus, un esprit général is constituted by a multiplicity of 
factors, of which the laws and l’esprit des lois is but one and not necessarily the 
predominant one. As one modern commentator has noted, the ‘assembly of causes is one 
of the most important ideas of L’Esprit des Lois’.132  
     Second, the passage quoted above is also one of Montesquieu’s most concise and 
lucid statements on moral and physical causation and would as such have attracted 
Hume’s attention. We have already had occasion to consider Hume’s views on 
causation, which – as I have sought to argue – he had arrived at before reading 
Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois. As we have seen, Hume had developed a different and 
contrary notion of the relationship between moral and physical causes, and had come to 
                                                 
131 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 310. Cf. L’Esprit des Lois, OC, i, 412 (‘Ce que c'est que l'esprit 
général.’): ‘Plusieurs choses gouvernent les hommes, le climat, la religion, les loix, les maximes du 
gouvernement, les exemples des choses passées, les mœurs, les manières; d’où il se forme un esprit 
général qui en résulte. A mesure que, dans chaque nation, une de ces causes agit avec plus de force, les 
autres lui cèdent d’autant. La nature & le climat dominent presque seuls sur les sauvages; les manières 
gouvernent les Chinois; les lois tyrannisent le Japon; les mœurs donnoient autrefois le ton dans 
Lacédémone; les maximes du gouvernement & les mœurs anciennes le donnoient dans Rome.’ 
132 Shackleton, Montesquieu, p. 316. 
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the conclusion that the latter’s influence on the shaping of national characters was in fact 
negligible. Yet there is more in Montesquieu’s statement than Hume deals with on this 
occasion. Drawing on the second part of the passage just quoted, we are now in a 
position to enquire whether Montesquieu was really as preoccupied with physical 
causation as his critics generally presupposed him to have been. This will in turn allow 
us to ascertain whether Hume’s criticism did justice to Montesquieu’s account of 
causation as presented in L’Esprit des Lois. Montesquieu’s statements on classical and 
contemporary civilizations, namely Sparta, Rome, China and Japan, reveal that physical 
causes in general and the influence of climate in particular, while always exerting a 
considerable influence, do not exercise that influence on all societies in equal measure. 
Instead, the actions of lawgivers and the influence of manners and mores can gradually 
replace the impact of climate on the esprit général of human societies.  
     This brief statement is highly suggestive in another respect, as it clearly indicates that 
physical causation in general and climate in particular are by no means necessarily the 
decisive factors. To be sure, Montesquieu does state in the same book that ‘[t]he empire 
of climate is the first of all empires’ and this has often been taken as an assertion of the 
universal and all-pervasive influence of climate on human affairs.133 Yet climate is 
termed the ‘first empire’ for the reason that it completely dominates primitive societies 
before the onset of civilization and afterwards continues to be the most basic underlying 
condition of all societies. With the development of more sophisticated codes of manners 
and sets of laws, however, the ever-present influence of climate can be mediated and 
even to a large degree suspended, if never entirely overcome. This is an important 
qualification, which proves that Montesquieu’s account of physical causation cannot 
strictly speaking be termed ‘deterministic’. It is important to note in this context that 
Hume never directly accused Montesquieu of physical or even climatic determinism, the 
belief that climate or other physical factors such as the quality of the air or the ground 
should be considered the sole or main factor determining basic living conditions in any 
given society. Yet a comparison of their statements shows that Hume considered the role 
                                                 
133 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 316, cf. L’Esprit des Lois, OC, iii, 421: ‘[l]’empire du climat est le 
premier de tous les empires’.  
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that Montesquieu had assigned to physical causes as excessive. Like his fellow Scottish 
literati Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, Hume consequently went to great lengths to 
downplay the role of climate and other physical causes in his own social theory in favour 
of ‘moral and political Causes’.134  
     The other major difference between Montesquieu’s and Hume’s list is that the latter 
mentions commerce, which is in Montesquieu’s list of factors relevant to l’esprit des 
lois, but is curiously absent from those constituting the esprit général. Nevertheless, 
Montesquieu devoted two books of L’Esprit des Lois to the nature of commerce and its 
history. The first chapter of book 20, entitled Du commerce, contains his most incisive 
statement on the subject:   
Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that 
everywhere there are gentle mores [mœurs], there is commerce and that 
everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores. 
     Therefore, one should not be surprised if our mores are less fierce than they 
were formerly. Commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations 
everywhere; they have been compared to each other, and good things have 
resulted from this.135  
This is Montesquieu’s most striking profession of faith in the civilizing force of 
commerce, underlining the fact that commerce is at the core of his account of the 
civilizing process. As one commentator put it, ‘Montesquieu considered the 
prioritisation of commerce the chief distinguishing feature of modernity’.136 As we shall 
see, this is a notion that Hume himself fully endorsed. Yet Montesquieu goes further 
when stressing the connections between commerce and mœurs, even if it is not clear 
                                                 
134 The engagement of the Edinburgh literati with Montesquieu’s theories, and in particular the debate 
over the prevalence of moral or physical causation, is reflected in the minutes of the Select Society for the 
meeting held on 4 December 1754 and presided over by Hume: ‘The Question named by the President 
[Hume] and allowed by the Society for he subject of the ensuing Night’s Debate was; Whether the 
Difference of national Characters be chiefly owing to the Nature of different Climates, or to moral and 
political Causes.’ SCRAN image of the minutes of the Select Society, 4 December 1754, National Library 
of Scotland, Adv.MS.23.1.1, p. 33.  Cf. www.scran.ac.uk.  
135 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 338. Cf. L’Esprit des Lois, OC, i, 445: ‘Le commerce guérit des 
préjugés destructeurs: & c’est presque une règle générale que, par-tout où il y a des mœurs douces, il y a 
du commerce; & que, par-tout où il y a du commerce, il y a des mœurs douces. Qu’on ne s’étonne donc 
point si nos mœurs sont moins féroces qu’elles ne l’étoient autrefois. Le commerce a fait que la 
conaissance des mœurs de toutes les nations a pénétré par-tout: on les a comparées entr’elles, & il en a 
résulté de grands biens.’  
136 David W. Carrithers, ‘Introduction: Montesquieu and the Spirit of Modernity’, in Carrithers and Patrick 
Coleman (eds.), Montesquieu and the Spirit of Modernity (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2002), p. 18.  
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from this statement whether only commerce is capable of creating gentle manners or 
whether the latter ought to be considered as a necessary precondition for the rise of the 
former. This is a problem that Hume would address at length in his Political Discourses 
and it is in response to this problem that he would formulate his most sophisticated 
account of the interrelation between commerce and industry on the one hand and 
manners and mores on the other hand. Hume’s account stresses the point made by 
Montesquieu, namely that commerce facilitated the spread of knowledge and that the 
consequent comparison of different sets of manners led to a general increase in 
‘humanity’. Yet, as we shall see further below, the theory Hume was to develop in his 
Political Discourses and was later to apply in his History of England was a far more 
complex one, taking in additional elements not developed at any length by Montesquieu, 
such as a positive conception of luxury, an emphasis on industry, and a novel theory of 
money.  
     Montesquieu illustrated his point about commerce and esprit in the same book in a 
short chapter entitled Esprit de l’Angleterre sur le commerce, which resumes his 
discussion of Britain in two earlier chapters of the work and culminates in his 
assessment of English civilization:  
This is the people in the world who have best known how to take advantage of 
each of these three great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and 
liberty.137 
By the time Hume read these lines, he was about to embark on an extended exploration 
of these same three dimensions of English civilization. While he had dealt at length with 
the conditions and limitations of political liberty in his earlier political essays, his in-
depth analysis of the culture of commerce and his sustained critique of the historical 
causes and consequences of religion were composed during the years following this 
initial reception of the L’Esprit des Lois. La religion, le commerce & la liberté or, in 
Hume’s case liberty, commerce and religion can be seen as the three interpretative 
pillars on which both Hume’s analysis of English civilization and his grand narrative of 
English constitutional history rest. These were of course common preoccupations in 
                                                 
137 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 343. Cf. L’Esprit des Lois, OC, i, 452: ‘C’est le peuple du monde 
qui a le mieux sçu se prévaloir à la fois de ces trois grandes choses, la religion, le commerce & la liberté.’  
 64 
mid-eighteenth-century Europe, yet Montesquieu had put them on the agenda as 
constitutive elements of un esprit général, itself the conceptual centrepiece of an 
integrated analysis of civilizations. In so doing, he had laid the theoretical foundation for 
a new mode of historical enquiry, which was to find its expression in a number of 
‘philosophical’ histories published in the mid- and late-eighteenth century. Like Voltaire 
and later Edward Gibbon, Hume was both an acute student and an exacting critic of 
Montesquieu. In fact, he may be credited with having been one of the first to perceive 
the full potential of Montesquieu’s groundbreaking venture. Hume dealt with the 
subjects of commerce and religion in the years following his initial encounter with 
L’Esprit des Lois and developed them in a fashion similar to that of Montesquieu, yet at 
greater length and in greater depth, in his Political Discourses (1752) and his Natural 
History of Religion (1757), both of which had been conceived and to a large extent 
composed during his time at Ninewells 1749-51, a time when Hume was corresponding 
with Montesquieu and digesting the multiple implications of latter’s groundbreaking 
work.  
     Lastly, it is now time to consider how Hume’s views changed subsequent to the years 
in which he corresponded with Montesquieu. Following Montesquieu’s death in 1755, 
Hume changed the reference to L’Esprit des Lois in the next edition of his Essays and 
Treatises, published in 1758. What Hume had formerly called ‘the best System of 
political Knowledge, that, perhaps, has ever yet been communicated to the World’ now 
became ‘a system of political knowledge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant 
thoughts, and is not wanting in solidity’.138 While this is still high praise, Hume’s final 
phrase betrays his perception that while not being altogether absent, ‘solidity’ is not 
necessarily the greatest strength of Montesquieu’s system.139 Less than ten years later, in 
April 1767, Hume would write to his friend, the Edinburgh clergyman and man of letters 
Hugh Blair, giving an assessment of the current reputation of L’Esprit des Lois among 
                                                 
138 The first edition to include this change is a one-volume edition of Hume’s collected works entitled 
Essays and treatises on several subjects. A new edition (London and Edinburgh: A. Millar, A. Kincaid and 
A. Donaldson, 1758), p. 415. This text remained unchanged from then on and still forms the basis for 
modern editions, cf. EPM, p. 93.  
139 Cf. Chamley, ‘The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume’, p. 298.   
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French men of letters. The following lines from his letter constitute Hume’s final 
recorded statement on Montesquieu’s work:  
[Even though] the Esprit des loix be considerably sunk in Vogue, & will 
probably still sink farther, it maintains a high Reputation, and probably will 
never be totally neglected. It has considerable Merit, notwithstanding the Glare 
of its pointed Wit, and notwithstanding its false Refinements and its rash and 
crude Positions.140  
This statement reveals the extent of what Hume had over the years come to consider as 
the shortcomings of Montesquieu’s system, some of which can be detected even in his 
earlier statement despite the glowing praise he had lavished on L’Esprit des Lois back 
then. In fact, a careful reading reveals that this explicit statement in his letter to Hugh 
Blair does little more than restate and reinforce Hume’s earlier and more circumspect 
criticism of the work as being more brilliant than solid. It should be noted, however, that 
despite the critical points raised in 1767, Hume appears to have maintained his earlier 
conviction that L’Esprit des Lois ought to be regarded as a groundbreaking work and 
that he proceeded to defend it at a time when it had to some extent fallen out of fashion 
with the philosophes. 
     In the course of the following chapters, we shall have occasion to trace the impact of 
Montesquieu’s work on Hume’s subsequent writings, and the gestation of his own 
mature thought on the nature of history. In the next section, we need to return to the late 
1740s and Hume’s literary sojourn at Ninewells and continue our analysis of Hume’s 
intellectual preoccupations and literary pursuits during that period. In this context we 
will have to deal with a final important argument Hume picked up from L’Esprit des 
Lois, namely its author’s forceful historical case for a decline in European population 
figures since antiquity. While population development was by no means the main theme 
of that work, it was this aspect that triggered Hume’s most immediate and extended 
criticism of L’Esprit des Lois, which took the form of a critique of how Montesquieu 




                                                 
140 Hume to Hugh Blair, 1 April 1767, HL, ii, 133.  
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2. Towards a Cultural History of Antiquity 
 
2. 1. Hume’s Reading of the Classics at Ninewells, 1749-51 
 
Having assessed Hume’s response to Montesquieu, we need to consider another crucial 
but neglected aspect of his intellectual preoccupations in the period 1749-51, his 
extensive reading of the Classics. In the early 1750s Hume engaged in an intensive 
reading of a substantial amount of classical literature, a reading that involved going back 
to works he had encountered earlier as well as reading ones with which he was yet not 
familiar. This reading was to result in his longest and most learned essay, entitled ‘Of 
the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, published in 1752, as well as impact on a number 
of major and minor works written during this period. In the following we shall seek to 
reconstruct the extent and depth of Hume’s reading of the Classics, as well as the uses – 
scholarly, philosophical and polemical – to which he put the information gathered in the 
course of this reading. This takes us back to the years 1749-51, the last of a number of 
extended periods that Hume spent in literary retreat at his family home, Ninewells in 
Berwickshire, and a time of intense studies and literary activity. The importance of these 
spells of literary activity in the retreat at his elder brother’s estate is underlined by the 
fact that even while he was considering to accompany General St Clair on a military 
campaign in Flanders in the spring of 1747, Hume envisaged a return to ‘Books, 
Leizure, & Solitude in the Country’ to pursue ‘my Studies at Ninewells’, as he states in 
two letters to his friend and kinsman Henry Home.141 These letters also provide us with 
an important clue as to the nature of his reading and the extent of the library available to 
him at Ninewells. Weighing the different options available to him, Hume shows himself 
inclined to resume his study of the Classics – he specifically mentions ‘my Xenophon or 
Polybius’ – but in reflecting back on previous times at Ninewells admits that ‘I felt the 
Solitude in the Country rather too great, especially as I was so indifferently provided of 
a Library to employ me’.142  
                                                 
141 Hume to Henry Home, [January 1747]; Hume to Henry Home, [June 1747], NHL, pp. 24-5. 
142 Hume to Henry Home, [January 1747]; Hume to Henry Home, [June 1747], NHL, pp. 24, 26.  
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     In order to find out what exactly Hume was up to in his reading during this period, 
we need to have an even closer look at his correspondence with his friends. An 
important clue is provided by a letter he wrote to John Clephane in April 1750: 
You would perhaps ask, how I employ my time in this leisure and solitude, and 
what are my occupations? Pray, do you expect I should convey to you an 
encyclopedia, in the compass of a letter? The last thing I took my hand from 
was a very learned, elaborate discourse, concerning the populousness of 
antiquity; not altogether in opposition to Vossius and Montesquieu, who 
exaggerate that affair infinitely; but, starting some doubts, and scruples, and 
difficulties, sufficient to make us suspend our judgement on that head.143  
Again we find Hume referring to the ‘leisure and solitude’ of his life at Ninewells – 
perhaps an allusion to the Stoic ideal of literary pursuit in the leisurely retreat of the 
countryside, a notion which had received its classic expression in the letters of Hume’s 
favourite among the ancient authors, Cicero.144 Furthermore, this letter hints at a range 
of diverse literary activities so wide as to justify the whimsical remark that they could 
only be subsumed in the form of an encyclopaedia. Hume specifically mentions ‘a very 
learned, elaborate discourse, concerning the populousness of antiquity’, a piece that was 
still on his mind in February 1751, as a letter to his friend and critic Gilbert Elliot of 
Minto reveals:  
I have amus’d myself lately with an Essay or Dissertation on the Populousness 
of Antiquity, which led me into many Disquisitions concerning both the public 
& domestic Life of the Ancients. Having read over almost all the Classics both 
Greek and Latin, since I form’d that Plan, I have extracted what serv’d most to 
my Purpose….145 
From this letter as well as the previous we can infer that Hume had been working on his 
essay on populousness for at least ten months, while at the same time being engaged in 
the composition of a number of other works mentioned in his correspondence. This 
provides us with an indication of the amount of preparatory work required by the 
specific task Hume had set himself. Hume claims to have ‘read over almost all the 
Classics both Greek and Latin, since I form’d that Plan’, an astonishing statement which 
                                                 
143 Hume to John Clephane, 18 April 1750, HL, i, 140.  
144 This concept is epitomized in Cicero’s Letters to Atticus of which Hume possessed an edition, cf. 
Norton and Norton, David Hume Library, p. 82. For Hume’s reading and use of Cicero see Peter Jones, 
Hume’s sentiments: their Ciceronian and French context (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1982), pp. 29-41.  
145 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 18 February 1751, HL, i, 152-3.  
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poses a number of questions concerning the extent and significance of his reading of the 
Classics.  
     The extent of the reading of the Classics Hume undertook at Ninewells in the late 
1740s and early 1750s has repeatedly been questioned and its significance has been 
downplayed on the ground that it would have been to a large extent a re-reading of texts 
Hume had already encountered in the 1740s or at an even earlier date. This interpretation 
is largely founded on the evidence of surviving sets of manuscript reading notes in 
Hume’s hand, commonly referred to as the ‘early memoranda’. This set of manuscript 
notes bears no date and there is as yet no established consensus among Hume scholars as 
to the exact date of composition of the notes. In the present context it is intriguing to 
note that these reading notes contain a considerable amount of classical material, some 
of which bears directly on the question of populousness.146 On the basis of this material, 
Hume’s biographer and the first editor of the ‘early memoranda’, Ernest C. Mossner, 
assumed that ‘the reading of the classics in 1750 was, at the very least, a second 
reading.’147 Mossner’s argument has however been challenged on various grounds and 
will have to be reconsidered in the following. In addition to the somewhat uncertain 
dating, there are two main problems attending Mossner’s argument concerning the 
relationship between the ‘early memoranda’ and the 1752 essay ‘Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations’.  
     First, it is important to note that Hume’s ability to read Greek texts considerably 
improved during the 1740s, that is, between the most likely date of composition of the 
‘early memoranda’ and the writing of the populousness essay in the early 1750s. Hume 
tells us in his later autobiographical sketch that between 1742 and 1745, another period 
in which he was living with his family at Ninewells, he ‘recovered the knowledge of the 
Greek language, which I had too much neglected in my early youth’.148 Hume must here 
be alluding to his education at Edinburgh University, which Hume had entered at the 
                                                 
146 Ernest Campbell Mossner, ‘Hume’s Early Memoranda, 1729-1740: The Complete Text’, in Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 9 (1948), 492-518. See also E. C. Mossner, ‘Hume and the ancient-modern 
controversy, 1725-1752: A Study in Creative Scepticism’, in The University of Texas Studies in English, 
28 (1949), 139-153, esp. 141 note 5. 
147 Mossner, Life of Hume, p. 266. 
148 ‘My own life’, in Essays, p. xxxiv. 
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tender age of ten and at which he had attended Greek classes during his second year 
(1722-23).149 There is reason to doubt that he attained a good reading knowledge of the 
language either at university or at any other point before the mid-1740s.150 This is 
significant, as it would mean that Hume attained a reading knowledge of Greek only 
after he had compiled his early reading notes. It is this capacity to read Greek which 
would have enabled him to peruse important sources for his populousness essay such as 
Strabo’s Geographika ‘either in the original Language or even in a good Translation’ as 
he writes in the above-quoted letter to Elliot.151  
     A second and more important problem consists in the fact that Mossner appears 
to have overestimated the extent to which the list of works quoted in the ‘early 
memoranda’ and those cited in the Political Discourses (1752), including ‘Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations’, overlap. In fact, the texts cited in the earlier 
document present only a fraction of the material Hume used in the later volume as 
will become evident once we have fully reconstructed the extent of Hume’s reading 
in the early 1750s.
152
 To this end I have drawn up a list of the classical citations in 
Hume’s ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’ (see Appendix). These amount to 
over a hundred classical works ranging over a variety of fields from philosophy to 
history, geography to religion and written in a number of different genres such as 
historical narrative, treatise, commentary, dialogue, play, public oration, epigram, 
and letters. This list thus comprises Greek as well as Latin authors, spanning all 
periods and most genres of ancient literature. The first thing that appears striking 
when we consider this list is that the majority of these works are only cited once 
and a few of these are merely alluded to without any reference to specific chapters 
                                                 
149 For the curriculum at Edinburgh University in the 1720s, see M. A. Stewart, ‘Hume’s Intellectual 
Development, 1711-1752’, in Impressions of Hume, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and Peter Kail (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 11-58, esp. pp. 16-25. 
150 M. A. Stewart, ‘The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts’, in The Scottish Enlightenment: Essays in 
Reinterpretation, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000), pp. 267-314, in 
particular pp. 280-85. 
151 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 18 February 1751, HL, i, 153. We need to keep in mind that ‘a good 
Translation’ does not necessarily mean an English translation, since in eighteenth-century editions the 
original Greek text is often interfaced with a Latin, rather than a modern language translation.  
152 This has led Professor M. A. Stewart to conclude: ‘What we have in the memoranda is less the actual 
research for any particular project than preparatory research’. Cf. Stewart, ‘The Dating of Hume’s 
Manuscripts’, pp. 287-8.  
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or pages. This presents us with an interpretative problem, which stems from the 
fact that we cannot easily ascertain whether these are in fact citations from works 
that Hume actually read or whether they represent second-hand citations he may 
have culled from works of erudite scholarship. While earlier Hume scholars 
sometimes worked with the assumption that by and large ‘a citation by Hume 
carries its own guarantee that he was actually reading the work named’,
153
 more 
recent scholarship has demonstrated that this view cannot be upheld. Recent 
research on the reading underpinning Hume’s early memoranda has revealed that 
what seems like excerpts from a number of works does not necessarily stem from 
his own reading of these works, but sometimes from summary accounts provided 
by works like Bayle’s Dictionnaire.
154
 It is of course possible that Hume might have 
abandoned this practice of citing works at second-hand by the late 1740s, but the 
limits imposed on him by the lack of access to major libraries in the 1749-51 period 
makes it unlikely that he had consulted a copy of each and every one of the works 
he cites or alludes to in his populousness dissertation. Since we cannot ascertain 
this with any certainty, it seems best to confine our observations to works that he 
cites more than once and pay particular attention to those of which he makes 
frequent use, since the likelihood of him having read these works appears greater.  
     The classical works Hume cited more than merely once or twice in his 
populousness dissertation fall into three distinct groups. First and foremost, there 
are the great works of biography and history. Here we find the famous narratives 
of the classical historians, which were so widely read and admired in the eighteenth 
century. It is little surprising to find that Hume draws on Plutarch’s Lives as well 
as the four most famous Greek historians – Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and 
Polybius – and their Roman counterparts Sallust, Caesar, Livy and Tacitus. Yet 
Hume makes equally good use of less-well known or less acclaimed historical works 
                                                 
153 Ernest Campbell Mossner, ‘Hume’s Early Memoranda, 1729-1740: The Complete Text’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 9 (1948), 492-518, esp. 496.  
154 The results of recent enquiries into these matters are summed up and judiciously evaluated in M. A. 
Stewart, ‘The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts’, in The Scottish Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation, 
ed. Paul Wood (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000), pp. 267-314, esp. pp. 276-88.  
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such as Appian’s Roman History and Dionyisus of Halicarnassus’ Roman 
Antiquities, Herodian’s History of the Empire and the multi-authored Historia 
Augusta. Perhaps the most surprising find is that the most often cited work of all is 
Diodorus Siculus Bibliotheca Historica. Hume considered Diodorus Siculus ‘a good 
writer’ and his extensive and wide-ranging compilation of information concerning 
the geography and history of the classical world provided Hume with a wide 
variety of facts and observations, especially with regarded to the non-Greek and 
Roman world.
155
 This underlines the fact that for the purpose of the populousness 
essay Hume did not rate the classical historians according to their literary merit, 
but instead considered them mainly as source texts, to be employed in accordance 
with their reliability and the extent to which they yielded the kind of information 
he required in order to build up his argument.  
     The range of sources Hume read for his populousness dissertation, as we have 
seen, extends far beyond works of history and biography and the list of citations 
reveals two other main categories of sources on which he drew for this dissertation. 
First, Hume makes extensive use of public orations, especially those of 
Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Cicero.
156
 This reflects the high regard he expressed 
for Demosthenes’ orations, which he considered to be among the ‘most authentic 
pieces of all GREEK history’.
157
 The reason for Hume’s interest in this kind of 
source should become clear when we come to consider his practice of extracting 
information from classical texts. Second, he derives a number of facts and 
observations from works of ancient geography and treatises on agriculture. Here 
he makes extensive use of Strabo’s Geography, a multi-volume compendium of 
geographic and ethnographic information about the ancient world. We shall later 
have occasion enquire how Hume obtained a copy of Strabo’s work, when he read 
it and how he put this text to use in his writings of this period. For now it is 
sufficient to observe that the two most often cited works are those of Diodorus 
                                                 
155 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, E, p. 422 note.  
156 In compiling the list I have followed Hume’s practice of citing each of the orations of Cicero and 
Demosthenes and Isocrates as individual works.  
157 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, E, p. 422 note.  
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Siculus and Strabo, followed by Thucydides’ History.
158
 On the whole, the list of 
classical citations in ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’ underlines the extent 
and variety of the reading Hume undertook in preparation for this erudite 
dissertation, while centring on the ‘historians, orators, and philosophers’ on which 
Hume drew as ‘authorities’ in support of the argument he advanced in his 
demographic dissertation.
159
 Insofar as they contain a large number of titles and 
comprise a representative cross-section of classical literature, Hume’s citations thus 
partly bear out his claim to have ‘read over almost all the Classics both Greek and 




     An important question remains to be explored: namely, how Hume could have read 
or at least consulted such a considerable number of classical texts at a time mostly spent 
in the rural surroundings of his family’s country estate in Berwickshire. Unfortunately, 
we do not have a contemporary catalogue of the books available to him at his Ninewells 
home or at the local parish library of the nearby village of Chirnside.161 In his 1747 letter 
to Henry Home, Hume showed himself inclined to ‘return to my Studies at Ninewells’ 
and at the same time complained about being ‘so indifferently provided of a Library to 
employ me’.162 This should prompt us to consider the available evidence pertaining to 
Hume’s personal library. Hume had in fact been collecting books since the 1720s and his 
library was growing during the years between 1747 and 1753.163 The best indication we 
have of the size of his personal library during the last period he spent at Ninewells is his 
statement in a 1751 letter that he possessed ‘£ 100 worth of Books’, which has been 
                                                 
158 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’ features 33 citations of Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheca 
Historia, 19 of Strabo’s Geographika and 13 of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. It is thus 
the Greek historians and geographers of whom Hume makes most extensive use, though these are closely 
followed by Roman writers on history, biography, natural history and agriculture. 
159 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 414 note 100.  
160 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 18 February 1751, HL, i, 152-3.  
161 See Norton and Norton, David Hume Library, 13ff. For the Chirnside parish library M. A. Stewart, 
‘Hume’s Intellectual Development, 1711-1752’, in Impressions of Hume, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and 
Peter Kail (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 11-58, esp. p. 17.  
162 Hume to Henry Home, [June 1747], NHL, pp. 25-6.  
163 See in particular Hume’s statement in a letter written in 1753 to the effect that he then possessed more 
books than he could use. Hume to John Clephane, 5 January 1753, HL, i, 170.  
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estimated to equal about four-hundred books.164 While these certainly included some 
editions of the Classics alongside books of modern philosophy, literature and history, we 
cannot assume that it would have provided him with the more obscure texts or those that 
were only available in expensive scholarly editions.  
     This is well illustrated by the case of a particular classical text, which was crucial for 
Hume’s argument, namely Strabo’s Geographika, the most extensive surviving 
geographical and historical survey of the classical world.  In this case we possess enough 
evidence to reconstruct in some detail how Hume procured and used this text. As he did 
not possess an edition of Strabo, Hume turned to his friend Gilbert Elliot of Minto for 
help, writing in February 1751 that 
I have not a Strabo, & know not where to get one in this Neighbourhood. He is 
an Author I never read. I know your Library (I mean the Advocates’) is 
scrupulous of lending Classics; but perhaps that Difficulty may be got over. I 
shou’d be much oblig’d to you, if you coud procure me the Loan of a Copy, 
either in the original Language or even in a good Translation.165 
This statement is significant for several reasons. First, Hume’s remark that he could not 
get hold of an edition of Strabo ‘in the Neighbourhood’ might allude to the practice of 
borrowing books from friends and acquaintances which was common among Scottish 
border families.166 Second, Edinburgh gentlemen, especially members of the Faculty of 
Advocates such as Elliot, could arrange to borrow books from the Advocates’ Library, 
which had extensive holdings of ‘Greek and Roman historians’.167 Elliot did indeed 
manage to send Hume a copy of Strabo’s Geographika.168 The extensive use Hume 
made of that work is reflected in twenty-one references to it in ‘Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations’, another one in an different essay of the Political Discourses, a further 
one in an earlier essay he revised and republished in his Essays and Treatises on Several 
                                                 
164 Norton and Norton, David Hume Library, pp. 13-4.  
165 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 18 February 1751, HL, i, 153. 
166 With regard to this point I have profited from discussions with Professor M. A. Stewart and Mr Mark 
R. M. Towsey.  
167 The holdings of the Advocates’ Library went far beyond the legal and jurisprudential texts to be 
expected in such a library. Cf. A Catalogue of the Library of the Faculty of Advocates, Edinburgh (3 vols., 
Edinburgh, 1742-1807), i (1742).  
168 As there is a gap in the Advocates’ borrowing records from 1724-54, we cannot establish with any 
certainty whether the copy of Strabo’s Geographika sent to Hume by Elliot did in fact come from the 
Advocates’ or possibly from Elliot’s own extensive family library. Dr. Brian Hillyard and Helen Vincent 
of the National Library of Scotland have kindly made their expertise in these matters available to me.  
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Subjects of 1753-54, and finally two more in the Natural History of Religion, published 
in 1757.169 Hume’s use of Strabo, and of classical texts in general, can most clearly be 
seen in his essay ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, the piece for which he 
originally undertook his extensive reading of the Classics.  
     While reading the Classics with the populousness essay in mind, Hume had 
‘extracted what serv’d most to my Purpose’ as he wrote in his 1751 letter to Elliot. This 
statement taken together with the systematic way in which he appears to have ploughed 
through multi-volume works like Strabo’s Geographika or Diodorus Siculus’ 
Bibliotheca Historia suggests a specific manner of reading the Classics, which I believe 
can be reconstructed as follows.170 While reading – or at the very least skimming 
through – a substantial number of classical texts, either in the original language or in a 
reliable translation, Hume would have scanned these texts for all kinds of facts and 
arguments that could conceivably be used to build up a coherent argument about aspects 
of the classical world relevant to the population question. In the process of doing so, he 
would have taken what must have been extensive reading notes in the form of extracts 
from the texts, possibly similar to those that make up the ‘early memoranda’, though 
probably considerably more extensive given the breadth and depth of his use of classical 
sources in the populousness essay.171 Drawing on such notes Hume would have been 
able to ‘collect all the lights afforded us by scattered passages in ancient authors’,172 
which in turn would have provided him with a secure foundation on which to rest his 
densely argued case against the superior populousness of antiquity. This he did in ‘Of 
the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, which is perhaps his most serious exercise in 
historical scholarship and which will be discussed in some detail in the following two 
sections.  
                                                 
169 See Essays, pp. 202, 350, 388-461, and NHR, pp. 22, 64. Hume even drew on his reading of Strabo for 
an elaborate joke in a letter to a friend, Hume to Jean Dysart of Eccles, 19 March 1751, HL, i, 159-60.  
170 Hume’s reading of Strabo is well documented, cf. HL, i, 153, 157, 159. ‘Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations’ contains more than thirty references to Diodorus Siculus, cf. Essays, pp. 403-464. 
171 Since no record or even the slightest trace of such material appears to have survived, the very existence 
of such extended reading notes is of course a hypothesis, albeit one that is suggested by the very nature of 
Hume’s research for the populousness essay and supported by his remark to Elliot that he ‘extracted what 
serv’d most to my Purpose’.  
172 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 437.  
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     In his letter to Elliot, Hume stated that the research for his populousness essay led 
him ‘into many Disquisitions concerning both the public & domestic Life of the 
Antients’. Hume’s populousness essay does indeed contain numerous digressions on the 
political conditions and cultural practices prevalent in classical Greece and Rome, most 
notably an in-depth discussion of ancient slavery. The broad range of subjects Hume 
dealt with in this essay testifies to his conviction that demographic development was not 
solely determined by social and political circumstances, but was moreover contingent on 
a wide variety of factors including political convictions, religious beliefs, moral codes, 
social customs and sexual mores. These were reflected in common practices and shared 
attitudes which characterized ancient societies yet were more often hinted at rather than 
directly expressed in the classical texts. Though difficult to detect, such allusions and 
casual asides could reveal a lot about the underlying cultural assumptions and moral 
values that ancient authors and orators shared with their contemporary audiences. This 
explains the emphasis Hume put on the value of public orations as the most useful 
sources and the fact that he considered the orations of Demosthenes to be among the 
‘most authentic pieces of all GREEK history’.173 He paid particular attention to facts 
that were merely implied or even deliberately omitted in ancient texts and had thus 
eluded previous modern commentators who wrote about the populousness question. 
From Hume’s painstakingly constructed argument we can thus infer that he read the 
Classics against the grain in order to extract from them meanings that their authors may 
not even have intended to convey. Hume’s remarkable sensitivity as a reader in picking 
up on these undertones and uncovering their significance for our understanding of the 
classical world is clearly exhibited in the essay ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient 






                                                 
173 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 422 note.  
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2. 2. Hume’s Historical Dissertation on the Populousness of Antiquity  
 
2. 2. 1. The ‘Enquiry concerning Causes’: Political Science and the Study of History 
 
Hume’s use of classical texts is most conspicuously displayed in the long essay for 
which he originally undertook this extensive reading, the essay entitled ‘Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations’ and published in his Political Discourses of 1752. 
While this is by far the longest of all of Hume’s essays, it has so far received only 
cursory treatment in Hume scholarship and its importance as a weighty piece of 
historical research has rarely been recognized.174 The significance of this essay has 
partly been obscured by the fact that the demographical debate to which it is a 
contribution now seems obscure and of merely antiquarian interest. Yet Hume thought 
that the population question was ‘the most curious and important of all questions of 
erudition’ and he recognized its far-reaching implications the science of politics. At the 
beginning of the populousness essay he states: 
In general, we may observe, that the question, with regard to the comparative 
populousness of ages or kingdoms, implies important consequences, and 
commonly determines concerning the preference of their whole police, their 
manners, and the constitution of their government.175  
This question is thus potentially capable of tipping the scales in favour of either ancient 
or modern civilizations. The population essay can consequently be seen as Hume’s most 
weighty intervention in the so-called ‘battle of the books’ or querelle des anciens et des 
modernes, the long-standing controversy about the comparative merits of ancient and 
modern civilizations and their respective ways of life.176 The comparative assessment of 
ancient and modern achievements in a variety of fields gave rise to wider questions 
                                                 
174 But see the lucid remarks in David Wootton, ‘David Hume, the historian’, in CCH, p. 288.  
175 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 381. The reason Hume gives for this is that since 
‘wise, just, and mild’ governments are usually the most conducive for population growth, a high rate of 
population does in turn provide a clear indication of good government and wise institutions, cf. Essays, p. 
382. 
176 This is the view of Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Forgotten Hume: Le bon David (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1943), chapter 5; and Yasuo Amoh, ‘The ancient-modern controversy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in The Rise of political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Sakamoto and 
Tanaka, pp. 69-85. For the ancient-modern controversy see David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990), chapter 2.  
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concerning the possibility, or indeed inevitability, of historical progress.177 We shall 
later have occasion to consider the ancient-modern controversy and establish Hume’s 
place in it. For now it is sufficient to point out that Hume shared the general conviction 
of eighteenth-century men of letters that demographic data provided a yardstick with 
which the success of government and the general happiness of the people in any given 
polity could be measured.178 The ancients were still largely deemed to have been more 
successful in terms of their political systems and this belief in the superiority of classical 
commonwealths appeared to be confirmed by the high population estimates given in 
supposedly authoritative ancient texts. The strength of Hume’s case for the superiority 
of modern, commercial society, developed at length and with great sophistication in the 
Political Discourses, thus depended to a large degree on his ability to build up a 
convincing historical case that would effectively undermine prevailing notions about the 
greater population density of the classical world.  
     One of the most influential statements of this position had been made by 
Montesquieu in his Lettres Persanes (1721), in which a main character, Rhédi, asserts 
that ‘there is scarcely a fiftieth of the number of men on earth that there was in ancient 
times’. Like previous authors, Montesquieu maintained that Europe, especially Greece 
and Italy, were much less populated now than in classical times.179 As we have seen, in 
his 1750 letter Hume claimed that he had written his ‘Essay or Dissertation’ partly in 
order to refute the exaggerations of Vossius and Montesquieu. At the beginning of his 
Populousness essay he picks up on this passage in the Lettres Persanes as well as on 
                                                 
177 This theory of progress was developed in opposition to a widely held belief in a steady decline in 
human affairs, which could be traced back to antiquity itself, and was described by Hume, following 
Malebranche, as firmly rooted in human nature.  
178 ‘But if every thing else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that, wherever there are most happiness and 
virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most people.’ ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient 
Nations’, Essays, 382. On the significance of the eighteenth-century population controversy see Sylvana 
Tomaselli, ‘Moral Philosophy and Population Questions in Eighteenth Century Europe’, in Population 
and Development Review, 14, Supplement: Population and Resources in Western Intellectual Traditions 
(1988), 7-29. 
179 ‘Après un calcul aussi exact qu’il peut l’être dans ces sortes de choses, j’ai trouvé qu’il y a, à peine, sur 
la terre la cinquantième partie des homes qui y étaient dans les anciens temps.’ In the 1758 edition this 
passage was amended to read ‘a fiftieth part’ rather than ‘a tenth part.’ Cf. Lettres Persanes, ed. Jean 
Starobinski (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), pp. 248, 438.  
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Montesquieu’s statements on this matter in L’Esprit des Lois.180 Hume clearly regarded 
these and similar assertions as exaggerated, even extravagant, and he specifically rejects 
the topos of a general decline in human affairs, an argument that was commonplace in 
early modern literature and had figured prominently in Rhédi’s account of European 
depopulation.181 This means that, unlike in his earlier ‘Of National Characters’, Hume 
directly engaged with Montesquieu’s theories in his learned dissertation of the 
populousness of the ancient world.  
     In the same letter Hume mentions the Dutch scholar, Isaac Vossius (1618-1689), 
whose erudite dissertation on the greatness of ancient Rome, published in 1685, was an 
influential and often-quoted contribution to the population controversy.182 The notion 
that Europe, especially Greece and Italy, were much less populated now than in classical 
times was still the prevailing view in the mid-eighteenth century. If he wanted to 
overturn this, Hume had to beat his opponents at their own game. He had to make use of 
the critical methods of textual scholarship when conducting painstaking philological 
research and collecting scattered pieces of evidence to build up a convincing case for his 
side of the argument. The product of this kind of labour was a showpiece of erudite 
scholarship with a conspicuous number of footnotes (over 250) that reflected the breadth 
and depth of Hume’s classical reading.183 Furthermore, it can be described as one of the 
                                                 
180 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 380. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, pp. 437-40.  
181 Hume rejects common assumptions of ‘any decay in human nature’ as an invalid arguments in the 
context of the population question, since these assumptions are not supported by any evidence: ‘As far, 
therefore, as observation reaches, there is no universal difference discernible in the human species; … we 
cannot thence presuppose any decay in human nature. To prove, therefore, or account for that superior 
populousness of antiquity, which is commonly supposed, by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world, 
will scarcely be admitted by any just reasoner. These general physical causes ought entirely to be 
excluded from this question.’ ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, 378.  
182 In his De antiquae Romae magnitudine Isaac Vossius had estimated the population of ancient Rome at 
14 million. This learned dissertation was the opening piece of Vossius’ Variarum observationum liber, 
published in 1685 and immediately reviewed by Pierre Bayle. Bayle’s review was later reprinted in 
Oeuvres diverses de Mr. Pierre Bayle (4 vols.; The Hague: P. Husson, 1727-1731). Cf. Joseph J. Spengler, 
French Predecessors of Malthus. A Study in Eighteenth-Century Wage and Population Theory (Durham, 
NC: Duke UP, 1942), p. 37. Hume probably possessed and certainly quoted from this particular edition of 
Bayle’s writings (see Norton and Norton, David Hume Library, p. 74) and may have learned about 
Vossius’ claims concerning the population of ancient Rome through Bayle’s review and critique of De 
antiquae Romae magnitudine.  
183 The preparation of the forthcoming two-volume edition of Hume’s Essays, edited by T. L. Beauchamp 
and M. Box, which will form part of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, has finally 
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first of Hume’s pieces that is predominantly historical in character. For although Hume 
arguments in this essay resembled those of his other writings on political economy, the 
specific case he makes largely rests more on historical research than on philosophical 
conjecture. For the first time historical evidence provides the basis of one of Hume’s 
essays rather than a mere reference point for Hume’s own philosophical or political 
arguments. Since the populousness essay allows us to see Hume the historian in action, 
we need to consider in some detail the structure and argument of this important piece, 
which will in turn enable us to reconsider and revaluate a number of commonly held 
views concerning Hume’s historical method and practice.   
     At the outset of his essay on the populousness of antiquity, Hume defines his 
objective and sets out his own views on the relationship between historical fact and 
philosophical argument in a programmatic statement on the aim and methodology of 
this erudite dissertation: 
How can we pretend to calculate [the numbers of inhabitants] of ancient cities 
and states, where historians have left us such imperfect traces? For my part, the 
matter appears to me so uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together some 
reflections on that head, I shall intermingle the enquiry concerning causes with 
that concerning facts; which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be 
ascertained with any tolerable assurance. We shall, first, consider whether it be 
probable, from what we know of the situation of society in both periods, that 
antiquity must have been more populous; secondly, whether in reality it was 
so. If I can make it appear, that the conclusion is not so certain as is pretended, 
in favour of antiquity, it is all I aspire to.184  
Here an important distinction is being drawn between two different types of historical 
analysis, which Hume labels ‘enquiry concerning facts’ and ‘enquiry concerning 
causes’. The former is concerned with the collection of evidence and the establishment 
of historical data, while the latter only come into play in cases where the veracity of 
facts cannot be ascertained with any certainty, which is the case with the question of 
whether ancient or the modern Europe was more densely populated. ‘Enquiries 
concerning causes’ are therefore conducted in order to supply the lack of facts by means 
of inferences deduced from the general rules of the science of politics. This is done in 
                                                                                                                                                
forced Hume scholars to confront the accumulated scholarship contained in the footnotes to the 
populousness dissertation.  
184 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 381 (Hume’s italics).  
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the first half of the essay, which sets the scene for the second half of Hume’s 
dissertation, ‘the ‘enquiry concerning facts’, which consists of a more detailed 
examination and discussion of the surviving evidence pertaining to demographic 
matters. Taken together, these two halves of the essay thus presents a sustained 
argument in which the insights of Hume’s political science are combined with those of 
his historical research in order to serve his self-declared aim of shaking the foundations 
on which the prevailing idea of the greater demographic density of the classical world 
rests.  
     In order to settle the populousness question, Hume deems it necessary ‘to compare 
both the domestic and political situation’ of ancient and modern Europe.185 He proceeds 
to discuss two widespread ‘domestic’ customs of the ancient world, the prevalence of 
slavery and the practice of infanticide. Drawing on a wide range of sources from legal 
texts and orations to letters and histories, Hume seeks to reconstruct the extent to which 
slavery reflected as well as determined the moral outlook and the social stratification of 
classical societies. His self-declared aim is to consider these phenomena only insofar as 
they can be taken to have had a considerable impact on the demographic development of 
these societies. In the process of doing so, however, Hume clearly goes beyond this 
immediate objective of the populousness dissertation, seeking to expose the true nature 
of the moral and cultural standards prevailing in antiquity and question the suitability of 
these standards as exemplary codes of behaviour for the modern world. Comparing the 
ancient word with the modern does not simply serve as an aid to understanding the 
former, but furthermore as a way of discrediting it. Domestic slavery and widespread 
infanticide illustrate the fundamental inhumanity of moral practices common in classical 
antiquity, the former giving rise to and perpetuating ‘the severe, I might say, barbarous 
manners of ancient times’ by accustoming men to submission, flattery and cruelty.186 
Slavery is thus the paradigmatic example of the ancients’ lack of regard for civil liberty. 
Due to its dissemination and severity, it far outweighs any superior liberties that ancient 
citizens might have had compared to modern ones and provides a clear indication that 
                                                 
185 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 383. 
186 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 384. For infanticide as ‘the barbarous practice of 
the ancients’, see Essays, p. 399. 
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‘human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at present, in the most arbitrary 
government of EUROPE, than it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient 
times’.187  
     Hume then goes on to paint a broad canvas of the political scene of the classical 
world, sketching the outlines of political life in antiquity with broad brushstrokes and 
highlighting its distinguishing features by contrasting them with the modern European 
state system. He does so by ‘talking pro and con’, taking corresponding features of the 
ancient and modern world and comparing them as a means of establishing and weighing 
up the relative advantages and disadvantages of the ancient world with regard to those 
features which might have been conducive to population growth. In the process of doing 
so Hume evokes an idyllic view of a classical world before the rise of the Roman 
Empire, a world composed of small agrarian republics in which power was shared 
among free and equal citizens.188 With regard to civil liberty and equality of fortune as 
well as population growth such ideal republics would indeed seem more advantageous 
than the ‘great monarchies’ that made up much of modern Europe. There were, 
however, additional circumstances, which darkened this ideal picture and acted as a 
severe check on the population growth that could have otherwise been expected in such 
small agrarian republics. Due to the close proximity of these small republics, their 
mutual emulation and the martial spirit of the ancients, the republics of the classical 
world were in a state of almost perpetual war with one another. Small states and their 
populations were greatly affected by war, which in many cases must have been 
‘destructive to human society’.  
     The internal politics of these republics was hardly more peaceful than the external 
ones, largely due to the seemingly advantageous degree of political liberty in the ancient 
                                                 
187 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 383. 
188 Here Hume clearly speaks the language of classical republicanism: ‘Where each man has his little 
house and field to himself, and each county had its capital, free and independent; what a happy situation of 
mankind! How favourable to industry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of 
men, were it to act in its full extent, without that restraint which poverty and necessity imposes on it, 
would double the number every generation: And nothing surely can give it more liberty, than such small 
commonwealths, and such an equality of fortune among the citizens.’ ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient 
Nations’, Essays, 401. This passage is discussed in Sher, ‘From Troglodytes to Americans: Montesquieu 
and the Scottish Enlightenment’, pp. 385-6; and J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume III: The 
First Decline and Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), p. 383. 
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polities, which tended to give rise to unchecked and destructive factionalism. Hume 
comments sardonically that ‘[t]hese people were extremely fond of their liberty; but 
seem not to have understood it very well’.189 The city republics of ancient Greece were 
destabilized by violent factionalism, their regimes overthrown in frequently revolutions, 
their citizens decimated in the proscriptions and massacres which invariable followed 
every change of regime.190 As revolutions were ‘frequent in such violent governments, 
the disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity, which must prevail, are not easy for us to 
imagine in this age of the world’.191 In ’talking pro and con’, Hume thus points out that 
the greater degree of political liberty enjoyed by citizens of the ancient republics was 
outweighed by their practice of slavery as well as by the factionalism and internal 
instability of their democratic city states.  
     The disadvantages of ancient as compared to modern polities thus sprung from the 
very fact that the former were small, free and agrarian. Hume specifically mentions two 
features that the ancient world lacked; namely an established aristocracy and a law of 
primogeniture. It is of course no coincidence that these were characteristic features of 
the societies Hume and his contemporaries inhabited and which Hume sought to defend 
against those who extolled ancient virtue as the only proper foundation of politics. He 
implies that an established aristocracy could have acted as a check on the seditions of 
the people, while the law of primogeniture would have helped to establish security of 
property, which was ‘rendered very precarious by the maxims of ancient 
                                                 
189 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 408.  
190 Hume paints a vivid and bleak picture of the inhumane practices resulting from the rage of faction in 
classical republics: ‘In ancient history, we may always observe, where one party prevailed, whether the 
nobles or the people (for I can observe no difference in this respect) that they immediately butchered all of 
the opposite party who fell into their hands, and banished such as had been so fortunate as to escape their 
fury. No form of process, no trial, no pardon. A forth, a third, perhaps near half of the city was 
slaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the 
mischief possible to their fellow-citizens; till fortune put it into their power to take full revenge by a new 
revolution.’ ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 407. 
191 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 407. This did not change when the Roman 
republic entered, indeed the history of their civil wars written by the historian Appian contains ‘the most 
frightful picture of massacres, proscriptions, and forfeitures, that was ever presented to the world. … The 
maxims of ancient politics contain, in general, so little humanity and moderation, that it seems superfluous 
to give any particular reason for the acts of violence committed at any particular period.’ ‘Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 414. 
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government’.192 This was a restatement of a point Hume had made earlier on in the 
Political Discourses, in a short essay entitled ‘Of Remarkable Customs’. After 
elaborating on a legal problem of the Athenian constitution, he sums up his view with 
regard to the direct democracies of the classical world:  
The ATHENIAN Democracy was such a tumultuous government as we can 
scarcely form a notion of in the present age of the world. The whole collective 
body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, 
without any distinction of rank, without controul from any magistracy or 
senate; and consequently without regard to order, justice, or prudence.193  
     There was, however, a further advantage of the moderns over the ancients, one that is 
repeatedly highlighted in the economic and political essays that make up the Political 
Discourses. This was the fact that the ancients had only a rudimentary knowledge of 
navigation, manufacture, industry, trade and commerce. In all these fields great 
advances had been made by the moderns and according to Hume these ‘improvements 
and refinements’ must have contributed to the encouragement of population growth.194 
Hume concludes his comparison of the social, political and economic state of ancient 
and modern Europe by weighing up their respective advantages and disadvantages: 
Thus, upon comparing the whole, it seems impossible to assign any just 
reason, why the world should have been more populous in ancient than in 
modern times. The equality of property among the ancients, liberty, and the 
small divisions of their states, were indeed circumstances favourable to the 
propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and destructive, 
their governments more factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures 
more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular. 
These latter disadvantages seem to form a sufficient counterbalance to the 
former advantages; and rather favour the opposite opinion to that which 
commonly prevails with regard to this subject.195  
     Having thus cautiously stated his opposition to the prevailing view of a greater 
population density in ancient times as well as indicated his general preference for the 
modern world, Hume moved from the ‘enquiry concerning causes’ to that concerning 
                                                 
192 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 411. ‘One general cause of the disorders, so 
frequent in all ancient governments, seems to have consisted in the great difficulty of establishing any 
Aristocracy in those ages, and the perpetual discontents and seditions of the people, whenever even the 
meanest and most beggarly were excluded from legislature and from public offices.’ Essays, p. 415. 
193 ‘Of Some Remarkable Customs’, Essays, pp. 368-9. 
194 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, pp. 419-20. This ties in with the overall argument of 
Hume’s political economy as outlined in the Political Discourses.  
195 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, pp. 420-1. 
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‘facts’ in accordance with his initial distinction between these two kind of historical 
enquiry. In so doing, he ventured onto the main field of combat on which this particular 
battle between the partisans of the ancients and those of the moderns was to be decided. 
All his elaborate previous arguments were just ‘small skirmishes and frivolous 
rencounters’ that were ultimately incapable of deciding the outcome of the contest, since 
an ‘enquiry concerning facts’ could effectively disprove any ‘conjectures’ Hume had put 
forth in the first half of his populousness dissertation. In stating that ‘there is no 
reasoning … against matter of fact’,196 Hume admitted that with regard to historical 
controversies erudite scholarship took precedence over political science. In principle 
historical enquiry thus had the potential to render philosophical reflections obsolete. In 
the case of the controversy over the relative population density of the ancient as 
compared to the modern world, however, philosophical reflections were by no means 
rendered obsolete. It had been necessary to resort to a discussion of a multitude of 
factors that could act as ‘causes’ of population development in antiquity due to the fact 
that it was impossible to gather precise demographic data from the surviving sources, as 
Hume made clear when turning to his ‘enquiry concerning facts’.  
 
 
2. 2. 2. The ‘Enquiry concerning Facts’: Erudition and the Art of Source Criticism  
 
Hume commences his ‘enquiry concerning facts’ by stating that ‘[t]he facts, delivered by 
ancient authors, are either so uncertain or so imperfect as to afford us nothing positive in 
this matter’. This difficulty stems from the fact that ‘all kinds of numbers are uncertain 
in ancient manuscripts, and have been subject to much greater corruptions than any other 
part of the text’.197 What is needed therefore, is an enquiry into the truthfulness and 
reliability of ancient authors as well as a careful and critical reading of their texts. Any 
serious historical enquiry must consequently begin with a thorough and rigorous critique 
of the sources. A modern historian needs to question the accounts of his ancient 
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197 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 421. 
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predecessors, accounts that have assumed an authority beyond their actual merit and are 
all too often taken to represent the literal truth. Hume questions the reliability of specific 
sources and their dubious statements on population figures and discusses at length an 
often-quoted passage in Plutarch’s On the Decline of the Oracles.198 It was this passage 
on which Montesquieu had partly based his assertion in his L’Esprit des Lois that 
population figures had been in decline since the establishment of the Roman Empire.199 
It is important to note that Hume chose the field of erudite scholarship rather than that of 
political science when seeking to refute Montesquieu’s thesis that the establishment of 
extensive and absolute governments had a detrimental effect on population development.  
     Hume’s comparative assessment of ancient and modern Europe as well as his critique 
of classical historians posed anew some of the most vital issues of the so-called ancient-
modern controversy. The ‘controversy about ancient and modern learning’ could not fail 
to have profound implications for the writing of history, implications of which Hume 
was acutely aware. Questions about the knowledge and writing of history underpinned 
the debate about the advancement of learning and literary composition, yet this was by 
no means the most important ground of engagement of the French Querelle. The issue 
came to the foreground in late seventeenth-century Britain with the prolonged public 
dispute between the statesmen turned historian, Sir William Temple, and the young 
scholar, William Wotton, who took the sides of the ancients and moderns respectively. 
While insisting that the ancients held the historical pre-eminence in the field of narrative 
history, Temple had conceded that the moderns might have surpassed them in 
antiquarian learning, yet he considered the latter a dull and decidedly un-gentlemanly 
exercise in amassing facts that were ultimately not worth knowing. Antiquarian 
scholarship found its expression in erudite commentaries that did not substantially 
contribute to the understanding of ancient texts and were largely irrelevant for the 
modern politician or man of letters. Wotton’s initial response to Temple’s insistence on 
the superiority of the ancients is contained in his Reflections upon ancient and modern 
learning (1694), a work that has been called ‘the most comprehensive and fair-minded 
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contribution to the war [between ancients and moderns] that appeared in either France or 
England during the seventeenth century’.200 It was also one of the last substantial 
contributions to a controversy, which had largely abated by the mid-eighteenth century, 
but of which Hume and his contemporaries were none the less acutely aware.201 It is 
worth having a closer look at Wotton’s sophisticated argument, since it reveals the full 
force of the ‘modern’ position that Hume was to adopt and integrate into the sceptical 
framework of his own historical outlook.  
     William Wotton’s most astonishing and controversial claim was that the moderns 
had superseded the ancients in their knowledge of antiquity. In other words, modern 
scholars knew the classical world better than the ancient authors who had inhabited it. 
Yet Wotton’s statement is more complex and more qualified than that, hinging as it did 
on the assumption that the decisive difference between the ancients and the moderns 
consisted in the invention of printing, which allowed a greater circulation of knowledge 
and did much to prevent the loss or corruption of important texts: 
Wherefore if one reflects upon the Alteration which Printing has introduced 
into the State of Learning, … it will not seem ridiculous to say, That Joseph 
Scaliger, Isaac Causabon, Salmasius, Henricus Valesius, Selden, Usher, 
Bochart, and other Philologers of their Stamp, may have had a very 
comprehensive View of Antiquity, such a one as Strangers to those Matters, 
can have no Idea of; nay a much greater than, taken altogether, any of the 
Ancients themselves ever had, or indeed, could have. Demosthenes and 
Aristophanes knew the State of their own Times better than Causabon or 
Salmasius: But it is a Question whether Boëthius or Sidonius Apollinaris knew 
the State of Demosthenes’s Time so well; yet these also are Ancients to us, and 
have left behind them Writings of very estimable Value. Literary Commerce 
was anciently not so frequent as now it is….202 
Against Temple, Wotton thus defended the useful contribution made by 
antiquarian scholars. In so doing he questioned the authority of those ancient 
writers who had written their accounts based on second-hand knowledge and who 
had been surpassed in their knowledge of their own time by the great erudite 
scholars of the seventeenth century. Hume, who had drawn on some of these 
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antiquarian scholars to build up his own case in the populousness essay, made a 
similar point, though in his argument the significance of the invention of printing 
lay not so much in the fact that it had prevented the loss or corruption of works, 
but rather in that it had obliged historians to be more truthful and accurate than 
they might otherwise have been: 
In general, there is more candour and sincerity in ancient historians, but less 
exactness and care, than in the moderns. Our speculative factions, especially 
those of religion, throw such an illusion over our minds, that men seem to 
regard impartiality to their adversaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakness: 
But the commonness of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern 
historians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. 
DIODORUS SICULUS is a good writer, but it is with pain I see his narration 
contradict, in so many particulars, the two most authentic pieces of all GREEK 
history, to wit, XENOPHON’S expedition, and DEMOSTHENES’S orations. 
PLUTARCH and APPIAN seem scarce ever to have read CICERO’S 
epistles.203  
Hume, it is implied, read them all and was thus in a position to appreciate the 
contradictions inherent in the body of classical literature. This was the domain of the 
‘critic’, whose task it was to evaluate the reliability of each source and draw fine 
distinctions between more or less reliable authors, sometimes even between more or less 
reliable parts of a given work.  
     At this point, we must return once more to Wotton’s Reflections. Discussing ‘the 
Historical Exactness of the Ancients, compared to that of the Moderns’, Wotton pointed 
out that there were instances which tended  
to justify those Modern Writers, who have, with great Freedom, accused some 
of the Greatest of the Ancients, of Carelessness in their Accounts of Civil 
Occurencies, as well as of Natural Rarities; and who have dared to believe in 
their own Reason, against the positive Evidence of an old Historian, in Matters 
wherein one would think that he had greater Opportunities of knowing the 
certain Truth, than any Man that has lived for several Ages.204 
The modern historian was thus not only entitled, but even obliged, to question the 
authority of his ancient predecessors, even in matters in which the ancients could be 
assumed to have had inside information. Hume was one of those who ‘dared to believe 
in their own Reason’ even against the authority of the ancients and the exercise of his 
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critical faculty is brilliantly displayed in the populousness essay. This was the domain of 
what Hume called ‘the critical art’, which he defends in terms similar to those employed 
by Wotton: 
The critical art may very justly be suspected of temerity, when it pretends to 
correct or dispute the plain testimony of ancient historians by any probable or 
analogical reasonings: Yet the licence of authors upon all subjects, particularly 
with regard to numbers, is so great, that we ought still to retain a kind of doubt 
or reserve, whenever the facts advanced depart in the least from the common 
bounds of nature and experience.205  
Hume proceeded to ‘give an instance with regard to modern history’, incidentally drawn 
from Wotton’s adversary, Sir William Temple, whose own historical work is made to 
appear at least as unreliable as those of the ancients he had defended. Hume further 
illustrates his point by reference to Temple’s one time secretary and protégée, Jonathan 
Swift. According to Hume, relying on ancient satirists as historical sources was as 
misleading as taking Gulliver’s Travels as an accurate reflection of early Hanoverian 
Britain.  
     Discrediting certain ancient texts was something the Humanists had already done, yet 
‘moderns’ such as Wotton and Hume took matters further in not even exempting the 
classical texts beloved by Humanist writers, such as Livy’s monumental Ab urbe 
condita, the master-narrative of the establishment of the Roman republic and its rise to 
predominance in the Mediterranean. Discussing the early history of Rome and 
dismissing ‘the fabulous history of [Rome’s] ITALIC wars’, Hume asks whether there is 
one grain of truth in all of Livy.206 Since much of Livy’s account concerned the early 
ages of Rome for which his work was the only surviving source, the truthfulness of his 
narration could not be tested against other sources, such as public orations, memoirs or 
legal texts. In a long and somewhat discursive note to another of the Political 
Discourses, ‘Of the Balance of Power’ Hume sets out this problem and seeks to 
establish the criterion for ascertaining the veracity and accuracy of Livy’s narration. 
This note, which Hume later omitted from editions of his Essays and Treatises, seems to 
have been entirely overlooked by Hume scholars, yet it merits quotation in full, since it 
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reflects the thought-process by which Hume arrived at his sceptical standards of source 
criticism: 
There have strong suspicions, of late, arisen among critics, and, in my opinion, 
not without reason, concerning the first ages of the ROMAN history; as if they 
were almost entirely fabulous, ’till after the sacking of the city by the GAULS; 
and were even doubtful for some time afterwards, ’till the GREEKS began to 
give attention to ROMAN affairs, and commit them to writing. This 
scepticism, however, seems to me, scarcely defensible in its full extent, with 
regard to the domestic history of ROME, which has some air of truth and 
probability, and cou’d scarce be the invention of an historian, who had so little 
morals or judgment as to indulge himself in fiction and romance. The 
revolutions seem so well proportion’d to their causes: The progress of the 
factions is so conformable to political experience: The manners and maxims of 
the age are so uniform and natural, that scarce any real history affords more 
just reflection and improvement. Is not MACHIAVEL’S comment on LIVY (a 
work surely of great judgment and genius) founded entirely on this period, 
which is represented as fabulous. I wou’d willingly, therefore, in my private 
sentiments, divide the matter with these critics; and allow, that the battles and 
victories and triumphs of those ages had been extremely falsify’d by family 
memoirs, as CICERO says they were: But as in the accounts of domestic 
factions, there were two opposite relations transmitted to posterity, this both 
serv’d as a check upon fiction, and enabled latter historians to gather some 
truth from comparison and reasoning. Half of the slaughter which LIVY 
commits on the ÆQUI and the VOLSCI, would depopulate FRANCE and 
GERMANY; and that historian, tho’ perhaps he may be justly charged as 
superficial, is at last shock’d himself with the incredibility of his narration. The 
same love of exaggeration seems to have magnify’d the numbers of the 
ROMANS in their armies, and census.207 
This dense footnote illustrates Hume’s approach to sources and exemplified his 
sustained source criticism as practised in the populousness essay and its companion 
pieces in the Political Discourses. The problem is clearly raised by the earlier parts of 
Livy’s work, which were deemed ‘entirely fabulous’ by some critics. Could it be that all 
of Livy’s narration and, by extension, all of ancient history, is just such an unverifiable 
story, a fable which we have come to accept, but for which we have no external 
evidence? If so, how can we believe in the veracity of history at all? Hume does not go 
so far; indeed in writing that this kind of ‘scepticism … seems to me, scarcely 
defensible in its full extent’, he appears to be confronting the spectre of Pyrrhonism. 
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This is a distinctly philosophical problem not framed in Wotton’s polemic and one to 
which conventional arguments about the progress of learning offer no solution. Hume 
had to find a philosophical solution by stating the necessary preconditions for a belief in 
history. In doing so he can draws heavily on his own earlier accounts of belief, 
probability and sceptical suspense of judgement. This is evident from the assumption 
underlying his argument, namely that the criteria for evaluation Livy’s narration lie in 
the probability of what he narrates. The science of man in general and that of politics in 
particular thus provide the conceptual apparatus for Hume’s sophisticated exercise in 
source critique and reconstruction.  
     Hume almost goes so far as stating that Livy’s account must be true simply because 
Machiavelli could write an intelligent account loosely conceived as a commentary on 
the early parts his History, the Discourses on the first Decade of Titus Livius. Yet the 
point is important, since it highlights the fact that Hume approaches Livy’s political 
history from the point of view of a political philosopher, just as Machiavelli had done.208 
This perspective presupposes a sharp division between what we would now call foreign 
and domestic policy, a division first made by and echoed in Hume’s earlier political 
essays. Like Machiavelli’s great predecessor, the Greek politician turned historian 
Polybius, Hume maintained that the ‘we can lay down no fixed rule about the former, 
but the latter is a regular process’.209 According to this distinction, foreign policy could 
not be accounted for by general laws, as it depended on the caprice of a few statesmen. 
Hume’s Science of Politics as laid out in these earlier essays was largely an attempt to 
account for the phenomena of the political world by reference to the most fundamental 
determining factor, the constitution of a polity. This is what made the ‘science of 
politics’ such an exact science, capable of being developed into a classificatory system 
with fixed ‘rules’ and ‘axioms’. Having developed this system, Hume could now judge 
the probability of Livy’s account of the internal revolutions, the ‘progress of the 
factions’ and the ‘manners and maxims’. As far as the ‘fabulous history’ of Rome’s 
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wars was concerned, the improbability of Livy’s account was too self-evident – even, it 
appears, to the ancient historian himself – to merit any further refutation. There was 
evidently a ‘love of exaggeration’ in the ancient historians, which allowed Hume to 
question the veracity and accuracy of the dubious demographic figures they provided 
and on which modern antiquaries had largely based their view of the superior 
populousness of ancient nations. 
     Yet there is more to Hume’s approach that is highlighted in this passage than a 
straightforward application of the conceptual apparatus of his political science. In 
addition to this, Hume discusses the kinds of sources that had been preserved and 
were available to historians of this period. While ‘the battles and victories and 
triumphs of those ages had been extremely falsify’d by family memoirs’ as Hume 
maintains following Cicero, in the case of ‘the accounts of domestic factions, there 
were two opposite relations transmitted to posterity, this both serv’d as a check 
upon fiction, and enabled latter historians to gather some truth from comparison 
and reasoning’. Ancient party historians – like those of the modern era – had to be 
careful in order to avoid the contradictions arising from rival accounts of the same 
events. While single surviving accounts of one event forced the modern historian to 
accept or reject such accounts wholesale, the fact that more than one text had 
survived meant that the insights could be gained ‘from comparison and reasoning’. 
This would be highly useful for Hume’s narrative of Stuart history where he was 
confronted with both kinds of sources, namely the memoirs of protagonists and the 
party histories in which the events of the Civil Wars had been enshrined.  
     For now it is worth noting that even the most unreliable sources, such as Xenophon’s 
Cyropedia, which Hume regarded as ‘altogether a romance’ with regard to the facts 
related therein, could yield important and revealing information concerning ‘the 
prevailing notion[s] of ancient times’.210 This leads us to enquire just how Hume, ‘the 
critic’, read his sources and extracted from them the information he required to build up 
his case. By drawing on a wide range of sources and seeking to ‘collect all the lights 
afforded us by scattered passages in ancient authors’, Hume thus sought to avoid 
                                                 
210 ‘Of the Balance of Power’, Essays, p. 332. 
 92 
overgeneralizations and arrived at a sceptical and balanced conclusion.211 The broad 
range of subjects Hume dealt with in his populousness dissertation testifies to his 
conviction that demographic development was not solely determined by social and 
political circumstances, but was moreover contingent on a wide variety of factors 
including political convictions, religious beliefs, moral codes, social customs and sexual 
mores. These were reflected in common practices and shared attitudes which 
characterized ancient societies yet were more often hinted at rather than directly 
expressed in the classical texts. While the population question provided the guiding 
principle and overriding criterion for Hume’s reading and research, the very process of 
that research necessarily led him to collect data on a wide range of cultural information 
and thus in effect build up a database which he could utilize for other literary and 
philosophical projects in which he was engaged during this period. The breadth of 
Hume’s reading meant that the classical sources gathered in the process of it could be 
used for any number of philosophical and polemical purposes, extending far beyond the 
populousness discourse for which the reading was originally undertaken. 
 
 
2. 3. Hume’s Fragmentary History of Classical Civilizations 
 
This is probably best exemplified by the companion pieces to the populousness essay in 
the Political Discourses of 1752 as well as by another work probably composed in the 
early 1750s, the Natural History of Religion, later published as part of Hume’s Four 
Dissertations of 1757. In the following I shall briefly survey these and some further 
works for the light they collectively shed on Hume’s use of his classical reading. This 
will in turn allow a broader assessment of the breadth, nature and significance of 
Hume’s varied uses of the information gathered in the course of his classical reading that 
went beyond the immediate purpose of his reading, the population dissertation.  
     The breadth of Hume’s reading and the various uses to which he put this reading are 
clearly reflected in the numerous and sometimes extensive citations made in the 
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economical and political essays that taken together comprise the Political Discourses of 
1752.212 Of the twelve essays that comprise this collection, only the last two have no 
classical citations.213 The remaining essays all feature numerous references to classical 
authorities. While such references to classical authorities are occasioned by the historical 
nature of the populousness dissertation and two essays on Greek and Roman as well as 
British political usages, ‘Of the Balance of Power’ and ‘Of Some Remarkable Customs’, 
it is harder to account for the frequency with which they occur in the seven remaining 
essays, which are concerned with economical issues such as trade, money and taxes. 
Taken together, these latter essays present Hume’s sophisticated and influential analysis 
of commercial society, which, according to Hume, was a modern phenomenon of which 
the ancients were largely unaware. Hume’s depiction of classical antiquity is used as a 
kind of foil against which contemporary commercial society can be portrayed in a way 
that allows Hume to accentuate what he considered to be the essentially modern nature 
of commercial society. While the peculiar and advantageous nature of modern 
commercial society could have been equally well illustrated by contrast with the much 
better documented economic conditions of medieval Europe, these essays contain only 
the sketchiest of outlines of the feudal order and dwell instead at length on the political, 
social and economic conditions of the ancient world.   
     While the Political Discourses provide what is probably the most interesting use of 
classical sources, Hume’s use of these sources goes far beyond this work. Even before 
the Political Discourses went into their third edition, Hume was concerned with 
republishing this set of essays together with his earlier Essays and Enquiries in a 
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collection of his post-Treatise writings entitled Essays and Treatises on Several 
Subjects. This was the kind of format in which most of Hume’s essays would continue to 
appear and be read during his lifetime and, due to its success, numerous editions of this 
collection were produced. Hume used the opportunity afforded by successive reissues of 
his works to make sometimes substantial alterations to his earlier essays.214 This is 
particularly apparent in the first, four-volume edition of the Essays and Treatises (1753-
4) for which Hume added numerous classical references to his older essays, sometimes 
to great effect.215 This is well illustrated by a note added at to the essay ‘Of the Original 
Contract’, initially published as part of the three essays issued in 1748 and written, as 
Hume stated in a letter to Lord Elibank, to counter the party ideologies. Hume’s point in 
this essay is that the idea of an original contract, on which legitimate government was 
supposed to have been founded, ran contrary to both the nature of politics and all records 
of history. At the end of the essay we find a final note, which provides an unexpected 
and rather curious reference to a famous passage in Plato’s dialogue, Critias, which 
deals with the final days and last reflections of Socrates: 
The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to 
government is ascribed to a promise, is in PLATO’S Crito: where SOCRATES 
refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promised to obey the 
laws. Thus he builds a tory consequence of passive obedience, on a whig 
foundation of the original contract.216  
Whig and Tory party ideologies is here presented through the spectrum of Plato’s 
dialogues, which provide an unexpected twist at the end of this essay. Here, as 
elsewhere, classical literature is used as an alienation device, which allows an over-
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familiar notion to be seen through the prism of classical literature. This note also reflects 
the fact that Hume thought he had sufficiently combed classical literature.217   
     Yet during these years, Hume prepared his two major works on religion, the 
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and the Natural History of Religion. Despite the 
fact that the former was not published during Hume’s lifetime, and the latter was only 
published in 1757 as part of the Four Dissertations, we have enough evidence to suggest 
that they were both works of the period Hume spent in literary retreat at Ninewells 
between 1749 and 1751.218 Whereas the Dialogues are of course in a large measure 
modelled on a key classical text on the philosophy of religion, Cicero’s De natura 
deorum. Nevertheless, they contain only a handful of specific references to classical 
authorities, a fact which is easily accounted for by the literary form and the 
philosophical nature of this work. The Natural History of Religion, on the other hand, 
contains what Hume described to his publisher as ‘a good deal of Literature’ in the form 
of numerous and sometimes discursive footnotes,219 which testify to the essentially 
historical character of this piece (though what exactly Hume understood as ‘natural 
history’ will be discussed in a later section). In these footnotes we again encounter the 
texts Hume had perused at Ninewells and employed to such great effect in his 
populousness dissertation, that is, authors such as Strabo, Xenophon, Livy, Tacitus and 
especially Diodorus Siculus.220  
     Yet, on closer examination, there appears to be a noticeable difference in the way 
Hume used these and other classical authorities. Whereas he still uses them as 
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illustrations, he also invokes ‘[t]hese wise heathens’ as an authoritative voice that lends 
support and credibility to his own, frequently heterodox arguments about religion.221 
Thus, he draws a striking parallel between two exponents of religious thinking in late 
antiquity: 
The learned, philosophical Varro, discoursing of religion, pretends not to 
deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances. Such was his good 
sense and moderation! But the passionate, the zealous Augustin, insults the 
noble Roman on his scepticism and reserve, and professes the most thorough 
belief and assurance. A heathen poet, however, contemporary with the saint, 
absurdly esteems the religious system of the latter so false, that even the 
credulity of children, he says, could not engage them to believe it.222 
The polemic nature of this passage is unmistakable. By contrasting the ‘learned, 
philosophical Varro’ with ‘the passionate, the zealous Augustin’, Hume clearly reveals 
where his own sympathies lie. In the light of his evident sympathy for what he 
considered as the less dogmatic spirit of Greek and Roman paganism, the last sentence 
about the ‘heathen poet’ Rutilius Claudius Namatianus, and his pagan critique of 
Christianity is blatantly ironic insofar as Hume’s dismissal of the Roman poet’s notions 
as absurd barely conceals his endorsement of the pagan poets’ scathing verdict on the 
Augustinian brand of Christian theology.223  
     This brief survey of the varied uses to which Hume put his classical reading reveals 
that they served a multiplicity of purposes, ranging from providing illustrative examples 
to allowing Hume to express opinions and pass judgements through the medium of 
classical literature. As we have seen, however, at Ninewells Hume had read classical 
texts primarily for the relevant historical evidence they yielded. This use of the Classics 
as sources from which information concerning the political, legal, social, cultural and 
religious practices of the ancients could be extracted, is reflected both in the economic 
essays that make up most of the Political Discourses and in the Natural History of 
Religion, where the classical historians and orators feature next to the testimony of 
travellers into distant parts of the world. On the basis of these classical sources, Hume’s 
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Political Discourses and Natural History thus develop a distinctly historical argument, 
often built around a comparative perspective that contrasts ancient with modern usages, 
moral codes and political institutions.224 Written from such a comparative perspective, 
these give a full account of ancient manners, an account which highlights the essential 
otherness of classical civilizations and thereby emphasizes the cultural chasm which 
separates us from the past.225 In these pieces the past is approached not solely from the 
point of view of the moral philosopher and through the principle of sympathy, but 
moreover from a distinctly historical viewpoint which stresses the need for a detailed 
recreation of past manners and beliefs as a necessary prerequisite to understanding of 
past ages.  
     Once these scattered pieces are viewed from the perspective of the classical reading 
that informs them, they appear as fragments of a whole, in terms of their sources as well 
as their subject matter. Taken together, they can thus be seen to form a fragmentary 
history of ancient civilizations, comprising most of the fields of social culture / cultural 
endeavour (ranging from society and politics to customs and manners, to moral and 
religious beliefs). Following his survey of the political, social and economic conditions 
of the ancient world in his populousness dissertation and its companion pieces in the 
Political Discourses, Hume extended his enquiry into the field of culture and the history 
of manners and mores, mainly conducted in a short but dense piece entitled ‘A 
                                                 
224 This is sometimes done for overtly polemical reasons, such as when Hume uses aspects of the classical 
past as an ideal to be set in contrast with conditions of the modern world he seeks to castigate. This is 
certainly the case in the essay ‘Of Suicide’, composed some time in the early 1750s, which might have 
been inspired by a suicide of one of Hume’s companions in 1746. Hume’s immediate response to this 
suicide precipitates his statements on the permissibility of suicide in the later essay, cf. Hume to John 
Home of Ninewells, 4 October 1746, HL, I, 97-8. Hume’s use of the ancients as a counterfoil to his own 
time is particularly apparent in the highly topical dedication affixed to some 1757 editions of the Four 
Dissertations (1757; reprint Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1992), pp. i-vii. This took the form of an open 
letter to his friend John Home, elicited by the Edinburgh controversy over the latter’s play Douglas. For 
the background see Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate 
Literati of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, Edinburgh UP, 1985), pp. 65-92.  
225 For Hume’s philosophy of history see S. K. Wertz and Donald W. Livingston who have countered the 
all too common misrepresentation of Hume as a historical and cultural universalist, cf. Wertz, ‘Hume, 
History and Human Nature’, in Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975), 481-496; Livingston, Hume’s 
philosophy of common life (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 210-46. Mark 
Salber Phillips has identified this concept of ‘historical distance’ as a distinctive feature of eighteenth-
century historical discourse and writing, exhibited with particular clarity in Hume’s historical works, cf. 
Phillips, Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2000), chapter 2, esp. pp. 61-2, 77-8.  
 98 
Dialogue’ and to be examined in greater detail below. Finally, in the Natural History of 
Religion, he surveyed the ancients’ views of religion and toleration. These texts explore 
different aspects of that historical reality and contribute to the overall picture emerging 
from these pieces. These surveys include comments on the ‘spirit’ of antiquity, which is 
portrayed by Hume as having been more rustic, equal and martial than that of the 
moderns. These enquiries can also be shown to have been in a large measure based on 
the sources of the populousness dissertation, that is, the texts Hume perused in the 
period 1749-51. Hume’s reading of the Classics at Ninewells is thus a unifying element 
crucial to the understanding of the genesis of his mature works composed and published 
in this period, as it provides us with the missing perspective from which his diverse 
works composed at Ninewells can appear as a unity.  
     Hume thus appears as a thorough student of antiquity, something that does not seem 
to have been lost on his contemporaries. As we have seen, he even referred to passages 
from his reading in his correspondence and the same appears to have been true of his 
conversation. This is confirmed by a remark made by James Boswell after his first 
meeting with Hume in the summer of 1758. Boswell (always one to pick up on the 
essence of a conversation) comments that ‘Mr Hume … has apply’d himself with great 
attention to the study of the ancients, and is likeways a great historian’.226 Hume’s 
renown as an erudite scholar is here mentioned alongside, and even prior to his 
reputation as a historian, which was by then already well established.227 Hume’s 
growing acclaim as an historian of England did therefore not fully eclipse his interest in 
the study of classical civilizations. This leads to the question, whether Hume did in fact 
try to bring these capacities together in an attempt to combine his knowledge of the 
classical sources with his skill as a narrative historian. This question does not seem to 
have been asked by recent Hume scholarship, but it is posed in an interesting way by 
Hume’s nineteenth-century biographer, John Hill Burton. In the course of discussing 
Hume’s ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Burton goes on to remark that  
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In the perusal of this essay one is inclined to regret that Hume afterwards made 
a portion of modern Europe the object of his historical labours, instead of 
taking up some department of the history of classical antiquity. The full blown 
lustre of Greek and Roman greatness had far more of his sympathy than the 
history of his own countrymen, and their slow progress from barbarism to 
civilization. The materials were nearly all confined to the great spirits of 
antiquity, with whom he delighted to hold converse, instead of involving that 
heap of documentary matter with which the historian of Britain must grapple; 
acts of parliament, journals, writs, legal documents, &c. – all things which his 
soul abhorred.228  
This passage contains two interesting assertions. The notion that Hume would have been 
uniquely qualified to undertake a narrative history of classical antiquity is confirmed by 
our investigation into his knowledge and use of classical sources, even though Burton 
clearly overstates Hume’s admiration for classical civilizations and his alleged disregard 
for the great trajectory of English history. Burton goes further when asserting that this 
task would have been made easier and more enjoyable by the very absence of the dry 
source material out of which English constitutional history would need to be 
reconstructed. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, Hume was decidedly sceptical about the 
prospect of writing ‘some department of the history of classical antiquity’. The question 
remains whether Hume ever considered writing such a history. Hume did mention ‘my 
historical Projects’ and ‘some history’ in letters dating from the late 1740s, and these 
could well have included projects for a history of classical antiquity, a popular subject at 
the time, but we do not have any direct evidence from the late 1740s or early 1750s to 
corroborate such an assumption. There are, however, tantalizing statements he made in 
1759, which reflect his thoughts about the problem of writing classical history. They 
occur in the context of recommendations he made to William Robertson, who was then 
in search of a subject for a historical work to follow his History of Scotland, published 
that year. Hume discussed possible subjects with several of their mutual friends and 
came up with the following suggestion: ‘May I venture to suggest to you, the antient 
History, particularly that of Greece.’229 In a second letter Hume discourages Robertson 
                                                 
228 John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume (2 vols.; Edinburgh: William Tait, 1846), i, 
363. 
229 Hume to William Robertson, 8 February 1759, NHL, p. 47.  
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from pursuing his envisaged project of a History of the Reign of Charles V and discusses 
the problems involved in writing the history of ancient Greece:230 
The antient Greek History has several Recommendations, particularly the good 
Authors from which it must be drawn: But this same Circumstance becomes an 
Objection, when more narrowly considered: For what can you do in most 
places with these Authors, but transcribe & translate them? No Letters or State 
Papers from which you coud [sic] correct their Errors, or authenticate their 
Narration, or supply their Defects. Besides, [Charles Rollin’s Histoire 
ancienne] is so well wrote with respect to Style, that with superficial People it 
passes for sufficient.… I doubt not but such a work woud be successful, 
notwithstanding all these discouraging Circumstances. The Subject is noble, & 
Rollin is by no means equal to it.231  
Hume’s advice to Robertson is highly revealing and contains the outlines of an answer 
to Burton’s question. All this suggests that Hume had thought long and hard about the 
possibility of writing classical history. We do not, of course, know when Hume first 
formed these reflections about the possibility of writing narratives of Greek history. In 
their present form they can be assumed to reflect Hume’s opinion as presented in and 
shaped by the discussions among his fellow literati in Edinburgh, sparked off by 
Robertson’s search for a subject for his next historical work. There are, however, 
indications that Hume had begun thinking about these issues at a much earlier date. In 
his 1752 essay ‘Of the Balance of Power’, Hume observed that Greek history was far 
less familiar to his contemporaries than that of the Romans.232 Indeed, the idea that 
classical and especially Greek history could be rewritten for a modern audience was a 
relatively new one.233 Modern histories of Greece had just begun to appear and there was 
still a considerable gap in the market.234 The most renowned as well as influential 
attempt to rewrite the history of classical civilizations, including that of Greece, was 
                                                 
230 Robertson persisted in this undertaking and eventually published his History of the Reign of Charles V 
in 1769.  
231 Hume to William Robertson, 7 April 1759, NHR, p. 48.  
232 ‘The reason, why it is supposed, that the ancients were entirely ignorant of the balance of power, seems 
to be drawn from the ROMAN history more than the GRECIAN; and as the transactions of the former are 
generally more familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions.’ ‘Of the Balance of Power’, 
Essays, p. 335. 
233 So much so that several writers could claim to be the first to have undertaken a modern retelling of 
classical history, cf. Wootton, ‘Hume, the historian’, pp. 284.  
234 See Giovanna Ceserani, ‘Narrative, Interpretation, and Plagiarism in Mr. Robertson's 1778 History of 
Ancient Greece’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 66 (2005), 413-436. 
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Charles Rollin’s Histoire ancienne (1730-38).235 Hume appears to have possessed an 
edition of this work and there is a critical reference to Rollin’s discussion of Greek 
history in his Treatise.236 The two letters to William Robertson suggest that Hume’s 
awareness of the limitations of Rollin’s work, which he admired only for ‘a certain 
Facility & Sweetness of Narration’, seem only to have increased over the years.237 In 
Hume’s eyes, the Frenchman’s popular success and widespread renown did not therefore 
present an insurmountable obstacle for any aspiring historian of Greek antiquity.  
     Instead, Hume suggested that the main problem lay with the classical text themselves. 
Hume’s suggestion that the modern historian could do little more with these ‘good 
Authors’ than ‘transcribe & translate’ their narrations could be read as an endorsement 
of conventional wisdom, if the reasons which led him to this positions did not differ so 
widely from those of his predecessors. These had held that the narratives written by 
classical historians were authoritative and could not be surpassed, for the reason that 
they had themselves witnessed the events they described or had at least had access to 
now lost primary sources.238 As we have seen, Hume had ceased to believe that the 
classical historians were the authoritative voice to which nothing new could be added. 
Following Wotton, Hume had made a case for the superior knowledge of the modern 
due to the critical tools available to them. Yet, this presupposed that a range of primary 
or non-narrative sources to be preserved, against which the narratives of classical 
historians could be checked. While this was evidently true for cultural history, which 
could be reconstructed from letters, orations, dialogues and a range of other sources, it 
was not true for political history and Hume regretted the absence of these types of 
sources. Thus, while Burton was correct in claiming that Hume ‘delighted to hold 
                                                 
235 Charles Rollin, Histoire Ancienne (13 vols.; Paris: Estienne, 1730-38). This was followed by a Histoire 
Romaine (7 vols.; Paris: Estienne, 1738-48). For Rollin’s influence on eighteenth-century historiography 
see Ceserani, ‘Narrative, Interpretation, and Plagiarism’, 416ff.  
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to have owned five volumes of the first edition of Rollin’s Histoire Ancienne, see Norton and Norton, 
David Hume Library, pp. 32, 125.  
237 ‘I think Rollin’s Success might encourage you, nor need you be in the least intimidated by his Merit. 
That Author has no other Merit, but a certain Facility & Sweetness of Narration; but has loaded his Work 
with fifty Puerilities.’ Hume to William Robertson, 8 February 1759, NHL, p. 47.  
238 Cf. Wotton, ‘Hume, the historian’, p. 284.  
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converse’ with the classical authors, he was inaccurate in stating this would have suited 
him better as it would not have involved ‘that heap of documentary matter with which 
the historian of Britain must grapple; acts of parliament, journals, writs, legal 
documents, &c. – all things which his soul abhorred’.239 The reason why Hume was 
sceptical about the prospects of writing ancient history was not despite, but precisely 
because, of the absence of such ‘documentary’ evidence in the form of ‘Letters or State 
Papers’. Matters were even worse when neither reliable narrations nor documentary 
evidence had been preserved for a given period, such as the early history of Rome.240 
Hume’s reading of the Classics had made him aware of this profound problem, 
essentially a problem of sources and source criticism, involved in any attempt to write 
narrative history on a classical subject.  
     It is therefore quite possible that Hume at some point intended to write a history of a 
classical subject such as the history of Greece that he discussed with his fellow literati 
and proposed to Robertson. In the above-quoted 1747 letter to Henry Home, Hume 
speaks of his return to study at Ninewells with ‘my Xenophon or Polybius in my Hand’, 
and we also find him alluding to ‘my historical Projects’. The following year he wrote to 
James Oswald of Dunnikier that ‘I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of 
composing some History’.241 These historical projects are not specified and we cannot 
therefore ascertain whether they might have included classical subjects or whether such 
an idea was formed during his study of the classics. Since Hume never followed through 
on any idea he may have had of writing a narrative of classical history, we need to turn 
once more to the kind of history he did write in this period. The latter did not take the 
form of a narrative and was thus not prone to the kind of problems Hume associated 
with the writing of classical history. Instead, this fragmentary cultural history took a 
form which Hume’s French contemporaries would have called a peinture of classical 
                                                 
239 Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, i, 363. 
240 Cf. Hume’s statement in ‘Of the Balance of Power’, first published in 1752: ‘There have strong 
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civilization in its manners, mores, etc., as opposed to a récit of its political and military 
transactions.242 Hume himself did not use these terms, nor did he define the undertaking 
suggested by and based on his reading of the Classics. In order to understand the 
conceptual assumptions underpinning this project we need to turn to a last piece 
suggested by his enquiries into ‘the public & domestic Life of the Ancients’. This is a 
short piece simply entitled A Dialogue, which contains Hume’s most lucid statements on 





















                                                 
242 See the French antiquarian Jean-Baptiste de La Curne de Sainte-Palaye’s use of these terms: ‘L’histoire 
d’un peuple consiste moins dans le récit de ce qu’il a fait que dans la peinture de ce qu’il a été’, quoted in 
J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume I: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-1764 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 155.  
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3. Hume’s New Concept of Philosophical History 
 
3. 1. ‘A Dialogue’: From Moral Philosophy to Cultural History 
 
Early in 1751 Hume wrote to his friend Gilbert Elliot of Minto asking him for critical 
advice on a short piece he had sent Elliot via a friend. This is the manuscript of A 
Dialogue, which Hume was to append to his Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals published later in the same year. It is clear from this letter that, while the 
Dialogue was from the outset connected to the projected second Enquiry, Hume wished 
Elliot to consider and assess it as a free-standing piece.243 There are clear indications that 
Hume considered this as among his best works both in terms of its literary quality and in 
terms of it being an effective literary vehicle for the presentation of a complex idea.244 
At the core of the work lies the cultural misunderstanding, which echoes the observation 
Hume made in Paris, where he had noted the mutual surprise of a Tunesian ambassador 
and a Capucin friar upon seeing one another. As we have seen, this had led Hume to 
reflect on the relativity of customs and fashions, and by extension on that of the ideas 
held by the Muslim and the Christian: ‘Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a 
dispute with these Franciscans, their reciprocal surprize had been of the same nature.’245 
The true significance of this episode does not appear to have been noted by 
commentators on Hume’s life and work, but I would like to suggest that some of 
Hume’s sentiments expressed of ‘A Dialogue’ might have been inspired or reinforced by 
such an encounter and that this highly crafted dialogue may be seen as representing 
something like the ‘dispute’ into which the ambassador and the monk might have 
entered. This gives rise to the interesting possibility Hume might have transferred his 
                                                 
243 Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 10 February 1751, HL, i, 145. Elliot replied only days later by 
enthusiastically praising the literary and philosophical qualities of the work and – with an eye on both the 
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diffident of.’ Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 10 February 1751, HL, i, 145.  
245 NHR, p. 75.  
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Parisian observation on the relativity of customs and the mutual misunderstanding to the 
sphere of history.  
     The first part of Hume’s ‘A Dialogue’ comprises a description of the manners and 
morals of the people of a land called Fourli given by the first interlocutor, a traveller 
named Palamedes. Palamedes is introduced to the reader by the first-person narrator of 
the Dialogue:   
My friend, Palamedes, who is as great a rambler in his principles as in his 
person, who has run over, by study and travel, almost every region of the 
intellectual and material world, surprized me lately with an account of a 
nation, with whom, he told me, he had passed a considerable part of his life, 
and whom, he found, in the main, a people extremely civilized and 
intelligent. 
There is a country, said he, in the world, called Fourli, no matter for its 
longitude or latitude, whose inhabitants have ways of thinking, in many 
things, particularly in morals, diametrically opposite to ours. When I came 
among them, I found that I must submit to double pains; first to learn the 
meaning of the terms in their language, and then to know the import of those 
terms, and the praise or blame attached to them.246 
Palamedes, who claims to have spent part of his life among the inhabitants of Fourli, 
recounts the essence of his conversations with his host, Alcheic, who is highly respected 
by his compatriots and regarded as ‘a perfect character’ on account of his actions that 
seem immoral to Palamedes.247 From these conversations there emerges a detailed 
picture of the manners and mores of this advanced civilization. The inhabitants of Fourli 
permit pederasty and incest, and they do not condemn parricide and infanticide. 
Plamedes notices with bewilderment that they applaud Alcheic’s murder of his friend 
and benefactor, Usbek, and his eventual suicide. Shocked by this drastic account, 
Palamedes’ interlocutor remarks that such ‘barbarous and savage manners’ were 
incompatible not only with a supposedly civilized nation, but furthermore with human 
nature itself. They are even more extreme than the most extravagant accounts sometimes 
given of the manners of primitive people.248  
     This last remark as well as the description of the strange customs of the inhabitants of 
‘Fourli’ has clear undertones of the travelogue tradition, in particular the sceptical uses 
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 106 
of travel accounts in the works of Hume’s literary and philosophical predecessors, 
especially Montesquieu and that other great thinker from the Bordelais, Michel de 
Montaigne (1533-1592). In his now classic study, La Crise de la conscience européene, 
Paul Hazard has summed up the significance of factual and fictional travelogues for 
intellectual history of the Early Enlightenment. In Hazard’s view travel meant 
‘comparing manners and customs, rules of life, philosophies, religions; arriving at some 
notion of the relative; discussing; doubting’.249 Travel accounts were capable of 
constituting a ‘School for Sceptics’ since they confronted the reader with the 
bewildering variety of human beliefs and customs, which in turn gave rise to sceptical 
doubts concerning supposedly ubiquitous characteristics of human societies and 
universal standards of morality. This notion of travel and travel writing as a ‘School for 
Sceptics’ dates back to the sixteenth century, which witnessed both the beginning of the 
Age of Exploration and the revival of ancient scepticism by thinkers such as Montaigne, 
whose widely read Essays, first published in 1580, draw on accounts of the New World 
as well as on his classical reading for his comparative assessment of human customs, 
beliefs and morality.250 We need to briefly consider these essays for the light they throw 
on Hume’s similar use of travel accounts to convey the relativity of customs and 
manners within the framework of a sceptical philosophy. 
     In his essay on custom (De la coustume) Montaigne contrasts the customs of ancient 
Greece with those of newly discovered countries which hold widely differing attitudes to 
chastity as well as to such practices as incest, parricide and infanticide.251 Europeans are 
apt to deride or condemn these practices, but they should realize the relativity of human 
manners and mores which are everywhere dependent on custom and fashion. Montaigne 
had put this case most forcefully in the most sceptical of all his essays, the apology for 
Raymond Sebond (Apologie de Raimond Sebond): 
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250 Among these were Francisco López de Gómara’s General History of the Indies (1552) and Girolamo 
Benzoni’s Historia del Mondo Nuovo (1565). 
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Nothing in all the world has greater variety than law and custom. What is 
abominable in one place is laudable somewhere else – as clever theft was in 
Sparta. Marriages between close relations are capital offences with us : 
elsewhere they are much honoured…. Murdering children, murdering 
fathers, holding wives in common, making a business out of robbery, giving 
free rein to lusts of all sorts – in short there is nothing so extreme that it has 
not been admitted by the custom of some nation or other.252 
Montaigne concludes that ‘there is nothing that custom may not or cannot do’. We have 
become so accustomed to our own views and values that we no longer realize how 
strange, irrational or immoral our own behaviour appears once it is seen through the eyes 
of a foreigner. By insisting on the relativity of manners and morals Montaigne 
effectively denies the universality of moral standards and questions the supposed moral 
superiority of Western civilization over the ‘barbarism’ of primitive societies. In his 
essay on the cannibals (Des Cannibales) Montaigne argues that these socities are indeed 
very different from ours which helps to account for the ‘amazing gulf between their 
souls and ours’.253  
     During the early Enlightenment, Montaigne’s brand of Renaissance scepticism and 
his use of travel writing to illustrate his notions of moral relativism had been taken to 
their sceptical extreme by another French philosopher, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706).254 In 
his famous Dictionnaire historique et critique, Bayle, whose considerable influence on 
the early formation of Hume’s philosophical thought is well attested, had asked for an 
account of Western nations written from the point of view of a Japanese traveller.255 
Eighteenth-century French and English literature abound in this kind of account in 
which Paris and London were visited on a regular basis by Turkish spies, Indian kings, 
Persian travellers and Chinese visitors.256 The most influential and enduring product of 
this eighteenth-century fashion are of course the Lettres Persanes, first published in 
                                                 
252 ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’ in Montaigne, Essays, p. 654f.  
253 ‘Of Cannibals’ in Montaigne, Essays, p. 239. 
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1721. In this highly-crafted work, Montesquieu succeeded in combining the two main 
perspectives of the travelogue by means of the exchange of 161 letters on a variety of 
different topics exchanged between three Persian travellers in France and their wives, 
eunuchs and friends back in Persia. Accordingly, the Lettres Persanes cannot strictly 
speaking be called a pure travelogue, but may be described as a ‘letter-travelogue’, 
since they represent a blend of two distinct eighteenth-century genres, the epistolary 
novel and the travel narrative.257 Montesquieu’s innovative work was extremely popular 
and highly influential, and it was reprinted and imitated throughout the eighteenth 
century, not least in Scotland.258  
     The complex structure of the work allows for multiple perspectives on French and 
Persian societies and reflects the character development of its main protagonist, Usbek, 
who becomes increasingly alienated from his own harem the more he associates himself 
with the ideas and values of his European host society.259 The work accentuates the 
fundamental cultural differences that separate Eastern and Western civilizations and one 
of its major themes is the stark contrast between the role and position of women in 
Persian and French societies. At the same time Montesquieu employs the effective 
literary device of hinting at the underlying parallels between East and West, which 
allow him to pass critical judgements on aspects of French society by describing the 
corresponding features of Persian society. Thus, Montesquieu’s criticism of European 
monasticism and absolute monarchy is reflected in his vivid depiction of the confined 
Persian harem and the arbitrariness of Eastern despotism. Moreover, Montesquieu’s 
protagonists often comment directly on issues, as in Usbek’s letter on suicide and his 
critical remarks on French laws and customs to his Persian correspondents.  
     Having thus concluded our survey of the sceptical and often subversive uses to which 
travel writing had been put by a line of philosophers from Montaigne to Montesquieu, 
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we now need to return to Hume’s ‘A Dialogue’. Palamedes defends himself for giving 
such a seemingly exaggerated account of the inhabitants of ‘Fourli’ by revealing that the 
outrageous morals and rustic manners he had described were actually those of the 
ancients, especially the Athenians, usually the object of the highest admiration and 
emulation. Thus, Alcheic’s highly-applauded murder of Usbek was an ‘exact 
counterpart’ of Caesar’s assassination by Brutus and his co-conspirators and the 
description of the banquet of philosophers was lifted directly from Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia. By changing the names and omitting some of the circumstances in his 
account, Palamedes had thus de-familiarized his interlocutor with the ancients to the 
effect that these highly revered people such as the Athenians now seemed barbarous and 
immoral. The narrator criticizes Palamedes for using this ‘artifice’ or literary device in a 
way that served to highlight the flaws of the ancients and resulted in a deeply unfair 
misrepresentation of their culture: 
Your representation of things is fallacious. You have no indulgence for the 
manners and customs of different ages. Would you try a GREEK or 
ROMAN by the common law of ENGLAND? Hear him defend himself by 
his own maxims; and then pronounce.260 
By imposing alien ethical norms on the ancients, we presumptuously seek to judge 
ancient customs by measuring them according to standards unknown to them. Whereas 
Montaigne had shown that such a method of evaluation is unjust when applied to non-
European societies, Hume now extended the argument to the past. In do doing, he made 
the potential of a rich literary tradition available to the writing of history. If accounts of 
foreign nations could be written from the detached and sceptical viewpoint of a 
philosopher, history might be written in a similar manner and with similar results. This 
has profound and significant implications for the proper understanding of Hume’s 
historical thought and writing, which do not seem to have been fully recognized.261 
Before we can proceed to point out some of these implications, we need to have a closer 
look at two particular aspects of Hume’s ‘A Dialogue’ which can be viewed as instances 
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of Hume’s direct engagement with the Lettres Persanes, and thus complement our 
findings about Hume’s response to Montesquieu during this period. 
     The most immediately recognizable parallel between A Dialogue and the Lettres 
Persanes is to be found in their respective main characters. Palamedes’ character is that 
of ‘a rambler in his principles as in his person’, a traveller of the intellectual and material 
world and it is as such that we may compare him to Usbek, the central figure of 
Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes. We have already noted that the name ‘Usbek’ is 
actually mentioned in A Dialogue which constitutes a direct reference to the Lettres 
Persanes, a work with which most of Hume’s contemporary readers would have been 
familiar.262 Usbek’s letters to his Persian correspondents revealed the sceptical doubts he 
has developed as a result of being confronted with European manners and morals which 
corroded his belief in the dogmatic teachings of the Islamic clergy. In a letter to his 
fellow traveller, Rhedi, he expresses his sceptical doubts about the universal validity of 
moral standards: ‘Shall I tell you what I think? - what is true at one time is false at 
another.’263 The parallels between Montesquieu’s and Hume’s main characters, Usbek 
and Palamedes, with regard to the notions of moral relativism they express extend to the 
examples they chose to explore and illustrate these notions. In his description of the 
morals, manners and sexual conduct of Alcheic, an Athenian ‘man of merit’, Palamedes 
mentions pederasty, incest and adultery. Having committed all of these, Alcheic is still 
held in the highest regarded by his compatriots, even after he has put an end to his own 
life.264 Montesquieu’s Usbek had also openly and without condemnation discussed the 
possible justification for suicide in a letter to an Islamic clergyman.265 In his essay ‘Of 
Suicide’, published posthumously but written in the early 1750s, Hume presents a 
strikingly similar case for the moral neutrality of suicide.266 
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     A second and equally striking parallel between A Dialogue and the Lettres Persanes 
lies in the similar depiction of the morals and fashions French society. In both works the 
description of the prevalence of adultery in contemporary French society and the 
careless attitude adopted by many French husbands towards their wives’ infidelity is 
contrasted with the restricted ‘commerce between the sexes’ and the rigid morality of the 
Persian harem (in the Lettres Persanes) and ancient Athens (in A Dialogue). This draws 
our attention to a common theme in the two works: the representation and critique of 
eighteenth-century French society. Montesquieu and Hume discuss French maxims of 
honour, the law of primogeniture, monasticism, and the role of women in society, and 
what is more, these are assessed in a similar way. Both authors condemn primogeniture 
as an unfair law, and both describe the ascendancy of women in France, whose influence 
has to be reckoned with in state affairs. In short, the depiction of modern French society 
in A Dialogue is akin to that which emerges from the Lettres Persanes. This suggests 
that Hume drew on Montesquieu’s social satire for his own critique of modern French 
society, even when we take into account that some of the observations were fairly 
commonplace at the time. Thus we can conclude that while Hume’s A Dialogue 
responds to the wider tradition of travel writing and the sceptical uses travel accounts 
have been put to by authors such as Montaigne and Bayle, Hume engages particularly 
closely with Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes with which A Dialogue shares a number of 
key themes and arguments.  
     Finally, we need to enquire about the lessons of Hume’s A Dialogue for the writing 
of history. Underlying the argument in this piece is Hume’s conviction that past 
civilizations seldom conform to the preconceptions of our own times and, if we judge 
them on that account, we deprive ourselves of the chance of understanding them. 
Instead, we need to judge them on their own terms. What is needed then is a truly 
historical understanding of past societies, which takes into account the cultural milieu 
and particular circumstances under which Greek manners and morals evolved and the 
practical problems which ancient laws sought to address. Seemingly unaccountable or 
immoral practices such as incest, pederasty and infanticide become intelligible and can 
be accounted for by reference to the particular historical circumstances and belief-
 112 
systems of antiquity. In pursuing this line of enquiry, Hume could draw on the extensive 
preparatory work for his scholarly dissertation on ancient demography, which supplied 
him with powerful material on which he could build a case for the ‘otherness’ of 
classical societies.  
     Our inquiry has given us important clues as to the philosophical concepts 
underpinning this cultural history of antiquity as well as to the biographical impulses and 
intellectual challenges in response to which Hume formulated this history. It is now time 
for us to sum up our findings with regard to the insights they might yield into the 
development of Hume’s historical thought during the early 1750s and the distinctive 
nature of his idea of philosophical history.   
 
 
3. 2. The Historian as Traveller: Hume’s Idea of Philosophical History 
 
So far we have traced Hume’s interest in classical history through his extensive reading 
to the composition and publication of a number of works that can be described as 
historical and in doing so we have arrived at a period when Hume was commencing to 
write his History of England, published between 1754 and 1762. We have seen that this 
monumental work, commonly regarded as Hume’s first and only historical work, can in 
an important sense be said to have been preceded by a fragmentary history of classical 
antiquity.267 This was the result of the extensive reading of the Classics at Ninewells, the 
research that Hume had undertaken for his erudite dissertation on the populousness of 
the ancient world, and the database on classical literature Hume must have built up in 
the process of that reading. Taken together the diverse pieces informed by this reading – 
a dissertation, several essays, two dialogues, and a ‘natural history’ – constitute the 
                                                 
267 The fame of Hume’s History of England was to eclipse his earlier efforts and obscure the seriousness 
and sophistication of the fragments of classical history that preceded it. We should, however, note that for 
Hume’s contemporaries Hume, the historian of England did not quite displace the erudite student of 
antiquity. When the young James Boswell first met Hume in Edinburgh in 1758, he commented that ‘he 
has apply’d himself with great attention to the study of the ancients, and is likeways a great historian’. 
Quoted in Mossner, Forgotten Hume, p. 171. 
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fragments of a history of classical civilization.268 These display Hume’s erudite 
scholarship – especially in the ‘enquiry concerning facts’ of the populousness essay – 
and belie the common misconception that by the standards of his time Hume was not a 
serious historical scholar.  This leads to the question of how Hume’s thinking on history 
developed and whether the traveller and the student of the ancients were useful to the 
historian of the English constitution. As a result of our investigations we are now in a 
position to give a fuller consideration to this question than has hitherto been attempted. 
Three inferences can be drawn from our consideration of Hume’s writings of the years 
1748-52 and their biographical and intellectual context.  
     Even though, by 1748, Hume was already inclined to reserve an important role for 
laws, custom and other ‘moral causes’ in the shaping of diverse societies in different 
ages and parts of the world, his commitment to this mode of explanation was reinforced 
by his travels through Europe. Upon his return from the Continent he was confronted by 
the challenge of Montesquieu’s powerful account of causation in L’Esprit des Lois, 
which presented a new and convincing theory to account for the ‘infinite diversity’ of 
human laws and mores. In response to this intellectual challenge, Hume built up an 
elaborate case for the relativity of moral standards, and the divergence between different 
sets of manners and mores, which can only be explained by reference to the social and 
cultural context of the societies or ages in which they evolved. Hume, the moral 
philosopher, thus requires the expertise of the historian in order to explain the origins of 
customs and moral standards, which cannot be judged without reference to the ‘maxims’ 
of the age in which they were practised. Hume’s case against Montesquieu’s alleged 
climatic determinism therefore took the form of an impassioned defence of the integrity 
and importance of history, and the irreducible complexity of historical reality. It is in the 
process of his intellectual engagement with Montesquieu on the field of ancient 
civilization that Hume formulated his own distinctive philosophy of history.  
                                                 
268 These have so far not been recognized as ‘history’ since none of these pieces took the form of a 
narrative of political deeds, such as the one provided by the classical historians themselves. For interesting 
reasons to be examined in the next chapter, Hume did not think it feasible to write such a narrative history 
on this topic and chose instead to write English constitutional history. 
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     The scattered fragments of his classical history took a different form, that of a 
‘philosophical’ history or what we might today call a cultural history in its widest sense, 
taking in all aspects of what for Montesquieu constituted the esprit of a people: their 
government and laws, their customs and manners, their social and sexual relations, their 
ideas of morality and honour, and finally their philosophical systems and religious 
beliefs. What had begun as a wide-ranging investigation of the comparative merits of 
ancient and modern civilization resulted in a truly ‘philosophical’ history, which took 
the form of a reconstruction of the moral and material culture of a past civilization. This 
reconstruction served to make a subtle and important philosophical point, akin to the one 
made in Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes. Like Montesquieu and his predecessors, Hume 
stressed the ‘otherness’ of different civilizations and the sheer distance that separated 
them from his own culture, which Montaigne’s had described as ‘the amazing gulf 
between their souls and ours’. Yet Hume illustrates his sceptical point about the 
relativity of manners, mores and standards of morals not by reference to non-European 
cultures or oriental societies, but by reference to a supposedly familiar European past. In 
A Dialogue Hume de-familiarizes the classical past and reveals it as a strange and 
profoundly different place. This implies a new attitude towards history: the past thus 
becomes a foreign country and its history has to be written in the form of a travelogue, 
which notes the strange customs and mores of civilizations.269  
     We are now in a position to reconsider the most commonly held view concerning 
Hume’s philosophy of history. For this purpose, it may be helpful to recall the most 
commonly-held view concerning Hume’s historical thought as expressed in a recent 
textbook: 
There is … one core difference that divides all historians into two groups: 
Those who believe that people in the past were essentially the same as us; and 
those who believe that they were essentially different. … David Hume thought 
                                                 
269 In this Hume was to be followed by his fellow literati Adam Ferguson who asked for a history of 
ancient Greece to be written from the viewpoint of a modern traveller: ‘It would, no doubt, be pleasant to 
see the remarks of such a traveller as we sometimes send abroad to inspect the manners of mankind, left, 
unassisted by history, to collect the character of the Greeks from the state of their country, or from their 
practice in war.’ An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1995), p. 185.  
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that all ‘men’ were so much the same in every age; L. P. Hartley suggested that 
the past is a foreign country where they do things differently from us.270 
In the light of Hume’s A Dialogue, which can be read as Hume’s extended contribution 
to this question of difference, this statement needs to be significantly modified if not 
entirely rejected. Hume’s argument in this piece directly contradicts the standard 
textbook account usually given of his philosophy of history. Far from denying cultural 
and anthropological diversity, Hume’s reflections are in fact a sophisticated precursor of 
L. P. Hartleys’ famous dictum.271 As we have seen, this attitude towards the past can be 
seen as an application of the popular travelogue genre to the field of history. A strong 
emphasis on difference or otherness implied in the conception of the past as a foreign 
country lies at the very core of Hume’s conception of philosophical history. By 
detaching the past from the present, Hume provides his readers with depth and 
perspective and makes them appear less absolute. Thus, history takes on a new, 
‘philosophical’ role: by providing knowledge about the past it promotes sound 
philosophical judgement. Implicit in Hume’s statements in these works of the Ninewells 
period is a fundamental change in the role of the historian, as well as a significant shift 
in the function of history. We can here perceive the grain of an idea of philosophical 
history that was to come to fruition once Hume began work on his History of England. 
This monumental historical enterprise, to which we must turn in the following chapter, 
was thus to be informed by the ideas Hume had formulated in the early 1750s and 










                                                 
270 John H. Arnold, History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 96.  





































4. Towards a History of Great Britain, 1747-56 
 
4. 1. ‘My Historical Projects’: Hume’s Intentions Reconsidered, 1747-52 
 
 
We now come to consider the origins and gestation of Hume’s History of England, the 
first instalments of which were published as a History of Great Britain in 1754-56. 
Much scholarly attention and ingenuity has recently been devoted to the origins and 
making of grand narratives in the eighteenth century. In the case of the most famous of 
these, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-88), written by Hume’s 
contemporary and correspondent Edward Gibbon, we now have several sophisticated 
accounts of the process whereby this work was conceived and took shape. Recent 
Gibbon scholarship has focused on three major avenues of enquiry which could also be 
fruitfully pursued in the study of Hume’s historical work: First, Peter Gosh and J. G. A. 
Pocock have reconsidered Gibbon’s ‘transformation of intentions’ from the initial idea 
of writing a history of the decline and fall of the city of Rome to the much wider canvass 
of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire including its successors states in Eastern 
and Western Europe.272 Second, David Womersley and particularly Pocock have traced 
the transformation of the Decline and Fall itself through six volumes published over a 
twelve-year period and spanning the civic and ecclesiastical history of the Western and 
Eastern Roman Empire from the second century A.D. to 1453.273 Finally, David 
Womersley has opened up a new line of enquiry by making a persuasive case for 
regarding the Decline and Fall as it now stands as the product of a ‘sequence of 
                                                 
272 P. R. Ghosh, ‘Gibbon's Dark Ages: Some Remarks on the Genesis of the Decline and Fall’, in The 
Journal of Roman Studies, 73 (1983), 1-23; and J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume I: The 
Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-1764 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 275-291 and 
Volume III: Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 381-402. Both Gosh 
and Pocock’s interpretations hinge on Gibbon’s statement that ‘my original plan was circumscribed to the 
decay of the City, rather than of the Empire’, cf. ‘Memoirs of my Life and Writings’, in The History of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. William Smith (8 vols., London: John Murray, 1862), i, 1-129, 
esp. 85-6.   
273 David Womersley, The Transformation of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1988); and J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume Three: The First Decline 
and Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 419-500. See also Karen O’Brien, Narratives of 
Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), pp. 
167-203.  
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interactions between the historian and his readership’.274 These diverse approaches have 
contributed to a more sophisticated view of eighteenth-century historical writing by 
enhancing our understanding of the role and status of authorship, genre, readership, the 
order of publication and similar factors in the production of multi-volume historical 
works in eighteenth-century Britain.  
     These recent developments in Gibbon scholarship are directly applicable to the study 
of Hume’s historical work. Both historians published what was essentially their first and 
only published work of narrative history over a number of years and in a series of 
instalments, before subsequently revising and correcting their magnum opus. In both 
cases the outcome of this process was a monumental work that traced well over a 
thousand years of history in a fast-flowing narrative. This would suggest that similar 
approaches might fruitfully be employed to explore both Gibbon and Hume’s historical 
works. Yet a comparison between Gibbon and Hume scholarship highlights the 
shortcomings and inadequacies of the approaches that have traditionally been used by 
Hume scholars to describe the comparable process of the gestation and composition of 
Hume’s History of England. This is all the more striking when we consider the material 
available for a reconstruction of both historians’ authorial intentions, the process of 
publishing their work in instalments and their interaction with their readers. Much of the 
pre-history of the Decline and Fall is lost in an ill-documented period often referred to 
as Gibbon’s ‘dark ages’, leading to much speculation and guesswork as to his original 
intentions as well as the transformation of these intentions prior to the publication of the 
first volume of the work in 1776.275 In contrast to this, there is a wealth of evidence for 
the composition of the History of England, consisting Hume’s extensive correspondence 
                                                 
274 Cf. David Womersley, Gibbon and the ‘Watchmen of the Holy City’: The Historian and his Reputation, 
1776-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 6. This interaction is best exemplified by the reception of 
Gibbon’s treatment of religion in the first volume of the Decline and Fall, which elicited widespread 
criticism that in turn prompted a noticeable change in strategy adopted by Gibbon in his treatment of 
religion in succeeding volumes of the work.   
275 The phrase was coined by P. R. Ghosh who notes that ‘[i]t is a striking fact that the years in Gibbon’s 
life about which we know least – the years 1765-72, between his return from the Grand Tour and the 
commencement of his History – are precisely those in which we are most interested, if we wish to study 
the genesis of his great book.’ Cf. ‘Gibbon's Dark Ages’, 1. See also J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and 
Religion, Volume I: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, pp. 275-291 and Volume Two: Narratives of 
Civil Government, pp. 381-396. 
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with his close friends, publishers and critics as well as the numerous reviews of the 
several instalments of this work. These mean that the genesis of the History over a 
period of ten years is far better documented than that of any other of Hume’s works. 
There is therefore an odd inverse relationship between the wealth of evidence pertaining 
to the inception and composition of Hume’s History and the limited nature of the 
accounts hitherto given of the gestation of that work.  
     Given the extensive secondary literature that has grown around Hume’s History of 
England, this conspicuous absence of several important and fruitful avenues of enquiry 
can only be explained by a neglect of certain lines of enquiry in favour of others. Hume 
scholars have almost exclusively devoted their attention to the philosophical nature, the 
political content or the narrative structure of the History of England, while the 
circumstances and process of the inception, composition, reception and revision of that 
work have been largely neglected and remain relatively understudied.276 To be sure, 
there have been attempts to reconstruct the process whereby the History of England took 
shape, yet none of these have utilized the wealth of material now available.277  In the 
following, I will attempt to fill this gap, focusing on the genesis of the earliest and in 
many ways most interesting part of Hume’s historical work, his two-volume Stuart 
history first published under the title The History of Great Britain in 1754 and 1756. In 
so doing, I will draw on the wealth of evidence now available consisting mainly in 
Hume’s correspondence with his friends and publishers, which presents us with a rich 
and insightful record of his thoughts during this period and which can be complemented 
with other documentation from this period such as statements by Hume’s friends and 
                                                 
276 See the trends of Hume scholarship discussed in the Introduction.  
277 On the composition of the History see Victor G. Wexler, David Hume and the History of England 
(Philadelphia: Philosophical Society, 1979), pp. 5-14; on the publication history of the work Ernest C. 
Mossner and Harry Ransom, ‘Hume and the “Conspiracy of the Booksellers”: The Publication and Early 
Fortunes of the History of England’, Studies in English, 29 (1950), 162-182; and Richard B. Sher, The 
Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 
Ireland, and America (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 50-58, 308f. The 
works’ reception in France is described in Laurence L. Bongie, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-
Revolution (first published 1965; new edn. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 2000). Hume’s extensive 
revisions to the text of the History are still largely uncharted, but see Frederic L. van Holthoon, ‘Hume 
and the 1763 Edition of His History of England: His Frame of Mind as a Revisionist’, in Hume Studies, 23 
(1997), 133-152.  
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publishers and contemporary reviews of his History.278 Such a wide range of evidence is 
available for few other major historical works of the Enlightenment and it makes 
possible an unusually close and detailed reconstruction of the process by which this 
work was conceived and took shape as well as various external circumstances impinging 
on that process. A close reading of this evidence is required in order to tackle three 
important but hitherto unresolved or even unaddressed questions so far inadequately 
addressed: First, when did Hume first consider writing a Stuart history and what was the 
precise significance of the Advocates’ Library in this process? Second, how did he 
initially conceive of his projected History of Great Britain? And last, what were his aims 
and aspirations as a historian of Britain? By closely considering these questions, none of 
which have so far been given the attention they require, we can hope to open up the 
period 1748-1756 from the point of view of Hume’s development as a historian.  
     Before embarking on our reconstruction, we need to consider briefly what has long 
been the most influential account of the pre-history of Hume’s History contained in the 
following passage from Ernest C. Mossner’s revised edition of his Life of David Hume:  
Hume’s intention to compose a national history arose out of his pervasive 
study of the “science of man”. The first trials in the actual composition of 
history were possibly made during the unhappy Annandale period, 1744-5, but 
could hardly have amounted to much. After Hume’s return from Turin in 1749, 
a second trial was presumably made. But even London had no public libraries 
before the opening of the British Museum in 1759 and Hume was always 
diffident of being rebuffed by the noble Whig families where the private 
historical collections were to be found. The happy circumstance of his being 
elected Keeper of the Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh in January 1752, “a 
genteel office, though of small revenue”, provided him with a library of some 
30,000 volumes and the long-sought-for opportunity of turning historian in 
earnest. The transition from philosopher proper to philosopher-historian was 
easily made.279  
                                                 
278 Since the appearance of HL in 1932 and NHL in 1954 that body of evidence has been slowly growing 
as numerous letters pertaining to the history have come to light and have been published in scholarly 
journals. In the following, I have sought to make as full use of these as possible though the task will be 
greatly eased by David Raynor’s eagerly awaited edition of Hume’s Correspondence. The task of 
reconstructing the reception of the History is now greatly aided by the exhaustive collection of 
contemporary British reviews, Early responses to Hume’s History of England, ed. James Fieser (2 vols.; 
Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002).  
279 Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume (2nd edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 301 
(italics mine). Cf. the first edition of Mossner’s biography (first edn. 1954; reprinted Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970), p. 301.  
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This account has become a standard reference point for discussions of Hume’s 
development as an historian, yet the first and last sentence of this paragraph indicates 
that Mossner seriously oversimplifies Hume’s complex development from philosopher 
to historian. As far as Mossner’s efforts to date of Hume’s first attempts at historical 
composition are concerned, it will become clear in the course of this section that every 
single sentence of the passage quoted above can, upon closer examination, be shown to 
contain an erroneous, inaccurate or insufficiently substantiated interpretative statement. 
Even so, this passage and the one that it replaces have largely been accepted and have 
long remained a major reference point for discussions of Hume’s History of England.280  
     Much of the problem with Mossner’s influential account of Hume’s development as 
an historian stems from the fact that this account was initially built on a shaky and 
ultimately untenable foundation; that is, Hume’s purported reading notes on English 
history, arranged chronologically according to the reigns of English monarchs from the 
Roman Invasion to Hume’s own day. While these notes were never deemed to be written 
in Hume’s own hand, they were endorsed by statements on coversheets that appeared to 
Mossner to be in Hume’s handwriting, with dates ranging from 1745/46 to 1755. By the 
time Mossner published his revised biography, these reading notes had already been 
exposed as nineteenth-century forgeries, forcing him to change much of the factual 
information in the revised 1980 edition of his Hume biography.281 Though Mossner 
modified his arguments he did not abandon the conclusions at which he had originally 
arrived on the basis of faulty evidence. He was well aware however that the basis for his 
inferences had vanished: ‘It is my speculation without factual evidence, that Hume’s 
first trials in the writing of history were made during the unhappy Annandale period 
                                                 
280 As such it forms the basis for another influential discussion in Donald W. Livingston, Hume’s 
Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984).  
281 The five manuscripts held in the National Library of Scotland and the Huntington Library in California 
are described in Ernest Campbell Mossner, ‘An Apology for David Hume, historian’, in Publications of 
the Modern Language Association of America, 56 (1941), p. 675f. In his ‘Preface 1980’ written in 1978, 
Mossner states that he was made aware of the fact that ‘the signed, dated, and place-named covers 
ostensibly in Hume’s hand of a series of historical notes were pronounced forgeries’. He states that he 
attempted to ‘straighten out’ his argument, yet a comparison between the 1954 and 1980 editions reveals 
that although the references to the reading notes have been dropped from the latter, Mossner’s 
interpretations which had originally been built on these notes was modified, but by no means entirely 
abandoned. Cf. Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. viii.  
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[1744-5].’282 Unsubstantiated conjectures of this kind mar Mossner’s work and the 
reliance of a generation of Hume scholars on his account, and on the forged reading 
notes on which it ultimately rests, has hindered our understanding of this subject.283  
     To clarify this we need to establish when Hume first considered writing a narrative 
account of any period of English or British history. The earliest piece of evidence we 
have for Hume’s intention to write any kind of history is a passing remark occurring in a 
letter written to his friend and kinsman, Henry Home, in January 1747, which was 
written while Hume was on his return journey from a military expedition against the 
coast of France in 1747, in which he had served as secretary to General St Clair. 
Pondering the possibilities suddenly opened up for him by the prospect of a permanent 
employment in the military, Hume wrote:  
I have an Invitation to go over to Flanders with the General, & an Offer of 
Table, Tent, Horses, &c; I must own, I shou’d have a great Curiosity to see a 
real Campaign …. Had I any Fortune, which cou’d give me a Prospect of 
Leizure & Opportunitys to prosecute my historical Projects, nothing cou’d be 
more useful to me; and I shou’d pick up more military Knowledge, in one 
Campaign, by living in the General’s Family & being introduc’d frequently to 
the Dukes, than most Officers cou’d do after many Years Service. But to what 
can all this Serve? I am a Philosopher, & so, I suppose, must continue.284  
Though revealing in other senses, this statement offers only the scantest hint at the 
nature of Hume’s plans and hardly justifies the inference that Hume referred here to a 
projected History of England as alleged by Mossner and by Donald Livingston. In fact, 
                                                 
282 Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 175. Cf. Life of Hume (1954 edn.), p. 175-6.  
283 Mossner’s interpretation made its way into the influential discussions of Duncan Forbes, Victor G. 
Wexler and Donald W. Livingston. Cf. Forbes, ‘Introduction’ to HGB, p. 9; Wexler, Hume and the 
History of England, pp. 9-10; and particularly Livingston, Hume’s philosophy of common life (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 212-3: ‘Hume’s remark in My Own Life that the 
plan of writing a history of England occurred to him in 1752 when he became librarian to the Faculty of 
Advocates … is only partially correct and certainly should not be taken as marking the date when he first 
became interested in history. During the period from 1745 to 1749, while he was very much engaged in 
writing philosophy, he produced four large manuscripts of notes on English history, chronologically 
arranged, and an abridgement of English history from the Roman invasion through the reign of Henry II. 
These early attempts at a history of England are no doubt part of the “historical projects” Hume was 
contemplating in a letter of 1747, and for which he thought a military expedition with St. Clair would be a 
benefit (Hume to Henry Home, [January 1747], NHL, p. 23).’ Livingston’s insistence on the reading notes 
is curious as his book appears four years after Mossner’s biography in which these had been exposed as 
nineteenth-century forgeries. Instead of ‘throwing light’ on Hume’s important letters of 1747/8, the 
fraught evidence of the notes distorts Livingston’s reading of the letters.  
284 Hume to Henry Home, [January 1747], NHL, p. 23 (italics mine).  
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once we discard the inadmissible ‘evidence’ of the reading notes on English history, it is 
clear that there remains no direct evidence to indicate what these ‘historical projects’ 
might have been. As will become clear in the following, it is highly misleading to read 
Hume’s post-1752 project back into this earlier period and conclude that he must have 
planned an English or British history by at least 1747/8 simply because he wrote one 
from 1752 onwards. Such interpretations have failed to take into account the significant 
changes in Hume’s situation that separate both periods and the evidence for a shift in his 
intellectual preoccupations in the years between 1748 and 1752.  
     If, on the other hand, we disregard for a moment Hume’s later interests and literary 
activities and consider only those of the period 1748-52 which we have explored in 
some detail in the preceding chapters, it will become strikingly clear that English or 
British history in whatever form was certainly not Hume’s main preoccupation in this 
period, even if we allow that he published two essays on Whig and Tory principles in the 
1748 editions of his Essays.285 As we have seen, there is plenty of evidence for Hume’s 
other interests, which consisted mainly in the composition of his mature works on moral 
philosophy, political economy, and the philosophy and sociology of religion. These 
included at least two works where historical in character, namely the erudite 
populousness dissertation and the ‘Natural History of Religion’, which was probably 
composed during this period.286 The ‘historical projects’ mentioned in the 1747 letter to 
Henry Home might therefore have consisted in pieces that were ‘historical’ in nature 
insofar as they entailed antiquarian excavations of social and economic circumstances or 
philosophical enquiries into past belief systems. Proper ‘History’ was considered as 
distinct from such undertakings and generally understood as a truthful record of civil and 
military transactions framed as a narrative of political and military events. Hume’s 1747 
statement is thus somewhat ambiguous as it does not allow us to establish with certainty 
                                                 
285 Hume’s two essays on the central tenets of Whig and Tory political thought, ‘Of the Original Contract’ 
and ‘Of Passive Obedience’, were first published in the Three Essays, Moral and Political of 1748 as well 
as in the ‘Third Edition, Corrected’ of the Essays, Moral and Political, which appeared the same year.  
286 The Natural History of Religion was published in 1757 as part of Hume’s Four Dissertations. I concur 
with those scholars who date the piece to the period 1748-52, the period in which Hume undertook his 
extensive reading of the classics and composed the first draft of his other major work on the philosophy of 
religion, the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. See the discussion above, part I, n. 218.  
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whether or not he was then considering a narrative account of civil history on a grand 
scale.287  
     ‘History’ in capital letters is first mentioned in a letter Hume wrote a year later, in 
January 1748, and in which he contemplates the prospect of accompanying St Clair on 
another mission:  
I got an invitation from General St Clair, to attend him in his new employment 
at the Court of Turin, which I hope will prove an agreeable if not a profitable 
jaunt for me. I shall have an opportunity of seeing Courts & Camps; & if I can 
afterwards, be so happy as to attain leizure and other opportunities, this 
knowledge may even turn to account to me, as a man of letters, which I 
confess has always been the sole object of my ambition. I have long had an 
intention, in my riper years, of composing some History; & I question not but 
some greater experience of the Operations of the Field, & the Intrigues of the 
Cabinet, will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with judgement upon 
these subjects.288 
This quotation contains in a nutshell the predicament Hume found himself in and the 
obstacles that were to be overcome before he could seriously think of commencing to 
write a major work of narrative history. In spelling out this predicament in a way that 
would be understood by his correspondent, Hume reflects the shared assumptions held in 
the eighteenth century about the status of history and the character of the historian. Two 
particular themes stand out since they have already occurred in Hume’s 1747 letter 
quoted above: the prospect of attaining ‘leizure & opportunities’ on the one hand and the 
stress on ‘military knowledge’ or ‘experience of the operations of the field’ on the other 
hand. While their direct connection to the writing of history might not be immediately 
                                                 
287 Hume’s insistence on the usefulness of ‘military Knowledge’, recurring in the 1748 letter and therefore 
discussed below, does however point into the direction of conventional narrative history and would have 
been much less relevant for an erudite dissertation on social and economic conditions, a cultural history of 
ancient manners or a natural history of religious belief systems.  
288 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 29 January 1748, HL, i, 109. Cf. Livingston’s discussion of the 
(inauthentic) reading notes which ‘throw light on Hume’s confession in a letter of 1748 that he had long 
“had an intention, in … [his] riper years, of composing some History” for which he “had treasured up 
stores of study and plans of thinking for many years” (L, I, 109).’ This is clearly a misreading of the letter. 
Livingston selective quotation from the letter suggests that Hume’s ‘stores of study and plans of thinking’ 
refer directly to the ‘intention … of writing some History’ mentioned earlier in the same letter. Yet these 
two statements do not occur in the same sentence and are not logically linked in the actual letter. Hume’s 
‘stores of study and plans of thinking’ could refer to any of the projects on which he embarked in the 
period 1749-51, including the second Enquiry, the Political Discourses and the Dialogues concerning 
Natural Religion.   
 125 
apparent, it becomes clear once we consider the prevailing views about the character of 
the historian.  
     Narrative history conceived as a record of civil transactions and military affairs was 
supposed to be written from a privileged vantage point, preferably by a retired statesman 
with experience in military affairs and first-hand knowledge of the major rulers and 
politicians.289 While such a person would traditionally have been a retired statesman, by 
the mid-eighteenth century an independent man of letters might also qualify for this role 
on condition that he had acquired a minimum of practical knowledge or experience 
through an involvement in military action or at the very least manoeuvre.290 By 1747 
Hume had seen action and by 1748 he could claim to have seen both ‘Courts & Camps’ 
on his tour of European Courts in the end-phase of the War of the Austrian Succession. 
He had thus acquired sufficient ‘experience of the Operations of the Field, & the 
Intrigues of the Cabinet’ and thereby fulfilled one of the criteria qualifying a man of 
letters to take up the role of historian. Nevertheless, Hume well knew that knowledge of 
courts and camps was only one, though an important, prerequisite for an historian. Such 
knowledge was to be complemented by reading and reflection enabling the historian to 
speak with experience and detachment about human affairs and it is before this 
background that we should read Hume’s passing comment that he intended to write 
history ‘in my riper years’. What was required above all was ‘leisure’, the opportunity to 
devote a number of years to the composition of large-scale historical narrative. Leisure 
was generally thought of as an outward expression of a certain amount of financial as 
well as political independence to be possessed by the serious historian.291 Yet most 
aspiring historians lacked at least one of these qualities and opportunities and this gave 
                                                 
289 Thucydides and Sallust were models among the ancients, Machiavelli and Guicciardini among the 
Humanists, Bacon and Clarendon in early modern Britain. For this tradition see Peter Burke, The 
Renaissance sense of the past (London: Edward Arnold, 1969); Hicks, Neoclassical History; Pocock, 
Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: Narratives of Civil Government, pp. 7-25; and for Hume’s 
appropriation of it see Phillipson, Hume, pp. 76-7.  
290 Thus Edward Gibbon’s could write with characteristic irony that  ‘[t]he discipline and evolutions of a 
modern battalion gave me a clearer notion of the phalanx and the legion; and the captain of the Hampshire 
grenadiers (the reader may smile) has not been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire.’ ‘Memoirs of 
my Life and Writings’, in Decline and Fall, ed. Smith, p. 72.  
291 See Joseph. M. Levine, The Battle of the Books. History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell UP, 1991), pp. 291-326; and in particular Hicks, Neoclassical History, chapter 2.  
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rise to the commonplace remark on the lack or deficiency of historical writing in 
England which, as Hume later remarked, ‘is notorious to all the world’.292  
     In the late 1740s, Hume had little prospect of fitting this role of narrative historian. 
Despite his various employments as tutor, secretary and aide-de-camp, Hume had a very 
small fortune. His letters of 1747/8 reflect his growing realization that he had become 
too old and disinclined to pursue a career in either the army or the church and that the 
role of tutor suited him little better. For the moment Ninewells offered a retreat and the 
possibility to pursue his studies, but there was yet no prospect of attaining permanent 
employment or even a sinecure that might afford sufficient leisure.293 The thought of 
turning historian would have seemed pleasing, even tempting, since history was after all 
the most prestigious as well as the most lucrative literary genre. If the prospect of 
turning historian may have seemed remote and Hume would have to bide his time and 
wait for a change of fortune that might allow him to embark on the composition of a 
large-scale historical narrative. For the moment he had no choice but to continue 
pursuing his career as a man of letters and an author of philosophical works. As he put it 
in his 1747 letter to Henry Home: ‘But to what can all this Serve? I am a Philosopher, & 
so, I suppose, must continue.’ If the chances of realizing his plan of ‘composing some 
History’ had seemed remote in 1747, the situation was not much altered after his return 
to Ninewells in 1749 following his eventful tour of European courts and during the 
following three years Hume assiduously furthered his career as both a moral philosopher 
and a man of letters.  
    It was only from the summer of 1751 onwards that a combination of events which 
Hume could not have possibly planned or even foreseen conspired to change his 
                                                 
292 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 28 June 1753, HL, i, 179. By the time Hume wrote the complaint 
had become widespread and few would have disputed Joseph Addison’s statement that ‘[o]ur Country, 
which has produced Writers of the first Figure in every other kind of Work, has been very barren in good 
Historians.’ The Freeholder (1716), quoted in Hicks, Neoclassical History, p. 23. Foreign commentators 
often ascribed this lack of good historians to the ‘Spirit of Party’ prevailing in Britain, see Voltaire, Letters 
concerning the English Nation, ed. Nicholas Cronk (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), pp. 110-1; and 
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 333.  
293 ‘I consider, that I am at a critical Season in Life; & that if I retire into a Solitude at present I am in 
danger of being left there, & of continuing a poor Philosopher for ever. On the other hand, I am not able to 
form any distinct Project of pushing myself in any particular Profession; the Law & Army is too late, the 
Church is my Aversion.’ Hume to Henry Home, [London, end of June 1747], HL, i, 25-6.  
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circumstances and fortunes. The first of these was the marriage of his older brother John 
Home in the spring of 1751, which led to Hume’s decision to move out of the Ninewells 
family home and eventually occasioned his permanent move to Edinburgh.294 Later that 
year the logic chair at Glasgow University fell vacant and his friends were trying to 
secure this position for him. Had they succeeded in getting him elected, the possibility of 
Hume turning historian would have become even more remote. Although their ‘project’ 
foundered due to the lack of patronage, it precipitated Hume’s success in an election to 
another post which fell vacant in January 1752.295 Hume’s election as the Keeper of the 
Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh appears to have been concerted by his Edinburgh 
friends and, at least in part intended as a means to compensate for the loss of the 
Glasgow professorship as well as to secure a living for him.296 Thus, almost exactly four 
years after Hume had written about the futility of his aims of writing history and the 
necessity of remaining ‘a philosopher’, an unexpected change of circumstances had 
brought with it the ‘leisure and opportunities’ he had longed for since at least 1747 and 
finally placed him in a position that would enable him to realize his plan of ‘composing 
some History’.  
     In ‘My Own Life’, an autobiographical sketch written shortly before his death in 
1776, Hume briefly comments on his election as Keeper to Scotland’s foremost library: 
In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office from 
which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a 
large library. I then formed the plan of writing the History of England….297  
                                                 
294 Hume later wrote in ‘My Own Life’: ‘In 1751, I removed from the country to the town, the true scene 
for a man of letters.’ (reprinted in Hume, Essays moral, political, and literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), p. xxxvi). Yet there was nothing inevitable about Hume’s move 
away from Ninewells as this later statement makes clear: ‘I lived several years happy with my brother at 
Ninewells, and had not his marriage changed a little the state of the family, I believe I should have lived 
and died there.’ Quoted in Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 240.  
295 Hume ascribed the lack of success mainly to the Duke of Argyll’s unwillingness to actively back his 
candidacy for the professorship; cf. Hume to John Clephane, 4 February 1752, HL, i, 164. For the political 
background see Roger L. Emerson, ‘The “affair” at Edinburgh and the “project” at Glasgow: the politics 
of Hume’s attempts to become a professor’, in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M. A. Stewart and John 
P. Wright (Edinburgh: EUP, 1994), pp. 1-22, esp. pp. 14ff.  
296 For Hume’s election and Keepership see Michael H. Harris, ‘David Hume: Scholar as Librarian’, in 
Library Quarterly, 36 (1966), 88-98; and Brian Hillyard, ‘The Keepership of David Hume’, in For the 
Advancement of Learning: Scotland’s National Library 1689-1989, ed. P. Cadell and A. Matheson 
(Edinburgh: HMSO, 1989), pp. 103-109.  
297 ‘My Own Life’, Essays, p. xxxvi.  
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Hume thus claims that his decision to write a ‘History of England’ did not precede but 
was in fact made subsequent to his election as Keeper of the Advocates’ Library. This 
statement has generally been treated with suspicion and scepticism, and regarded as 
dubious and ‘misleading about Hume’s debut as a historian’.298 Yet we have seen that 
once the forged reading notes are discounted, there remains no evidence to indicate that 
Hume had any concrete plans for writing a ‘History of England’ prior to 1752. There is 
therefore no reason to dismiss out of hand Hume’s account that it was only once he 
found himself in ‘command of a large library’ that he formed the plan to write a history 
of England.299 Once Hume’s statement has been accepted, it does however throw up a 
number of questions concerning the precise nature of the possibilities that opened up as 
a result of Hume’s election as Keeper of the Advocates’ Library; questions that have so 
far not been posed or thoroughly pursued. What exactly was it about the Advocate’s 
Library that allowed Hume to contemplate undertaking a large-scale historical work on 
English history and could he have conceivably undertaken this work if he had not been 
elected Keeper in 1752? In order to explore these questions we need to consider how 
Hume conceived of his new post and the nature of the opportunities it offered to a man 
of letters in search of an historical subject.  
                                                 
298 Wexler, Hume and the History of England, p. 9. Cf. Livingston, Hume’s philosophy of common life, p. 
212: ‘Hume’s remark in My Own Life … is only partially correct’. Duncan Forbes notes: ‘It has even been 
suggested that the History of England was the result of an accident: the fact that in 1752 Hume found 
himself, as the Librarian of the Faculty of Advocates, in charge of a great collection of books.’ Forbes 
vehemently rejected this interpretation in the ‘Introduction’ to HGB, p. 9. While ‘accident’ may indeed be 
too strong a word, the role of contingency and the shaping influence of external circumstances have been 
either neglected or underestimated in scholarly accounts of Hume’s transition from philosopher to 
historian.   
299 Cf. Hume to Matthew Sharp of Hoddam, 25 February 1754, HL, i, 184-5: ‘I have not been idle. I have 
endeavoured to make some use of the library which was entrusted to me, and have employed myself in a 
composition of British History, beginning with the union of the two Crowns.’ Yet this and the statement 
from ‘My Own Life’ need to be contrasted with a letter Hume wrote to the Dean and Faculty of 
Advocates’ in November 1754: ‘When I stood Candidate for the Office of Library keeper, I had in my 
Intention to attempt a literary Work, which I have since, in a great measure, executed. As soon as it is 
entirely finish’d, and probably sooner, I shall resign the Office, with thanks for the Advantage, which I 
have receiv’d from the Use of your Books.’ J. C. Hilson, ‘More Unpublished Letters of David Hume’, in 
Forum for Modern Language Studies, 6 (1970), 315-326, esp. 322f. While it is no doubt true that Hume 
immediately grasped the possibilities that would be afforded by the Keepership, he does not state what 
kind of ‘literary work’ he may have had in mind in January 1752, although by the time he wrote this letter 
in November 1754 he was clearly referring to the History of Great Britain, the first volume of which was 
just about to be published.  
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     In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a more ideal opportunity both in terms of time and 
materials required for the composition of a large-scale historical narrative than being 
Keeper of the impressive collections of learned books held in Scotland’s foremost 
library.300 In addition to unrestricted use of the existing collection, Hume had the option 
of buying books for the Advocates’, although the right to do so without previous 
authorization from the curators was to be withdrawn in November 1754.301 All evidence 
indicates that Hume was quick to realize, seize upon, and exploit the unique opportunity 
offered to him by a post he appears to have regarded as at least in part a sinecure, a paid 
office with little work attached to it. In a letter to his friend, the physician and classical 
scholar John Clephane, he describes it as ‘a genteel office, though of small revenue’, 
thus indicating that it was not so much the financial benefits which made this office 
attractive to Hume, but the long sought-after recognition he had finally gained in 
Edinburgh.302 A friend of Hume later commented that ‘it was not for the Sallary, that he 
accepted this Employment; but that he might have Easy access to the Books in that 
Celebrated Library’.303 The Keepership offered Hume sufficient leisure to pursue his 
                                                 
300 ‘At the time of Hume’s election, the Advocates’ Library was the greatest library in Scotland.’ Harris, 
‘Hume as Librarian’, 92. Cf. Charles Benson, ‘Libraries in University Towns’, in The Cambridge History 
of Libraries in Britain and Ireland, vol. II: 1640-1850, ed. Giles Mandelbrote and K. A. Manley, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 102-121, esp. 119f. On the Advocates’ use by the Edinburgh literati 
see Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, p.112. The Advocates’ meant that Edinburgh surpassed even 
London in terms of the resources required for the composition of historical works, at least until the 
opening of the British Museum in 1759, cf. Hume’s letter to [William Strahan], 25 May 1757, HL, i, 251; 
and Andrew Millar, 18 December 1759, HL, i, 317.  
301 Harris, ‘Hume as Librarian’, 94-97; Hillyard, ‘The Keepership of David Hume’, pp. 104ff. Hume’s 
confrontation with the curators of the library was occasioned by objections raised by books Hume had 
ordered from London bookseller in April 1754 which included three works of libertine French literature: 
La Fontaine’s Contes, Bussy-Rabutin’s L’Histoire amoureuse des Gaules and Crébillon’s L’Ecumoire. 
For Hume’s defence see his letter to the Lord Advocate Robert Dundas, 20 November 1754, HL, i, 210ff. 
The significance of this episode has been insufficiently recognized and seems to me to lie in Hume’s 
awareness and defence of three classic texts of the genre of ‘philosophical literature’. Such works, often 
deemed to be politically or morally subversive, were among the most widely read texts of Enlightenment 
France, cf. Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New York and 
London: Norton, 1995).  
302 Hume to John Clephane, 4 February 1752, HL, i, 164. Susan Manning refers to Hume’s Keepership as 
a ‘near-sinecure’ while Brian Hillyard describes Hume’s attitude towards the appointment as ‘selfish’. Cf. 
Manning, ‘Hume’, The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Literature, ed. Steven R. Serafin and Valerie 
Grosvenor Myer (New York and London: Continuum, 2003), p. 495; and Hillyard, ‘The Keepership of 
David Hume’, p. 106.  
303 The clergyman and socialite Alexander Carlyle in his Anecdotes and Characters of the Times, ed. and 
intro. James Kinsley (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973), p. 140.  
 130 
literary projects while he lived in Edinburgh and participated in its manifold social and 
intellectual activities. At the age of forty, having moved from his family estate into town 
and subsequently been elected Keeper of the Advocates’ Library, Hume had thus finally 
solved the dilemma he had been confronted with during the previous decade and was 
now in a position that would allow him to pursue at his leisure his long-held intention of 
‘composing some History’ in ‘my riper years’.  
     Yet Hume had made clear in his 1747/8 letters that the composition of a large-scale 
historical work did depend on more than ‘leisure’ and that ‘other opportunities’ were 
required. The materials for the composition of such a work were hard to come by, even 
if we take into account the fact that eighteenth-century histories were often based 
predominantly if not exclusively on printed rather than manuscript sources. It is 
therefore doubtful whether Hume would have made the decision to commence an 
historical work in 1752 or would moreover have been in a position to compose the first 
volume of his History in a relatively short period of time, had he not been in charge of 
the Advocates’ Library. This made a wealth of material available to Hume and he 
immediately grasped the extent of the resources now at his disposal when he boasted in 
his letter to John Clephane that he had become ‘master of 30,000 volumes’.304 It is 
noteworthy that even though the Advocates’ was primarily the working library of the 
Advocates’ Faculty, it contained a large section of historical works which was at least as 
strong as the holdings of legal texts.305 We need to have a closer look at the nature of the 
historical works available in the library at the time when Hume assumed the Keepership 
to see whether these contain volumes on the historical subjects that Hume was proposing 
to write about.  
     The earliest catalogue of the Advocates’ states that the library ‘abounds in Greek and 
Roman historians’, which means that for the first time in his life Hume had unfettered 
access to an extensive collection of scholarly editions of all the major classical 
                                                 
304 Hume to John Clephane, 4 February 1752, HL, i, 167.  
305 A comparison of the ‘History and Travel’ sections in the 1692, 1742 and 1776 catalogues of the 
Advocates’ reveals that due to the curators’ acquisition policy historical works had by 1742 outnumbered 
the law books in the library. Cf. Alex M. Cain, ‘Foreign Books in the 18th-Century Advocates’ Library’, in 
For the Advancement of Learning: Scotland’s National Library, ed. Cadell and Matheson, pp. 110-118.  
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authors.306 The library also had extensive holdings of works on modern history in 
French, Latin and English. There was a large section on English and Scottish history and 
the Copyright Act of 1710 ensured that works published after that date were 
automatically acquired by the Advocates’ Library. Thus, Hume commanded an 
extensive collection of books which included a considerable amount of printed historical 
works on as well as manuscript documents pertaining to Scottish and English history and 
a numismatic collection. In the absence of any direct evidence as to when or how Hume 
determined to write English or British history, it is important to note that British history 
was not the sole or even the main subject matter among the historical holdings of the 
library. In fact, the Advocates’ would have equally well provided Hume with the 
resources required to write on other historical subjects. For instance, there would have 
been sufficient material to enable him to compose a narrative history on a subjects from 
either classical antiquity or the modern European state system, both of which he had 
explored in some depth in his latest work, the Political Discourses, published shortly 
before his election as Keeper. We shall therefore have to draw on the hints provided in 
his letters of this period in order to reconstruct in as much detail as possible how Hume 
arrived at the decision to write English or British history.  
 
 
4. 2. The Transformation of Hume’s History of Great Britain, 1752-59 
 
Having endeavoured to reconstruct the process whereby Hume ‘formed the plan of 
writing the History of England’, we now need to turn to the second part of his statement 
                                                 
306 In his Oratio to the 1692 catalogue of the Advocates’ Library, Sir George Mackenzie stated that 
‘[t]hree branches of learning are the handmaidens of Jurisprudence, namely, History, Criticism and 
Rhetoric; for this reason our catalogue abounds in Greek and Roman historians….’ By the time of Hume’s 
Keepership the library held multiple editions of the Greek and Roman classics; according to the 1742 
catalogue there were ten different editions of Livy alone. Cf. Cain, ‘Foreign Books in the 18th-Century 
Advocates’ Library’, pp. 110, 114. We have seen that Hume was well aware of this collection during the 
time when he was working on his populousness dissertation at Ninewells and had to rely on friends who 
were members of the Advocate’s faculty to borrow editions of the classics for him as ‘the Advocates’ … is 
scrupulous of lending Classics’. Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 18 February 1751, HL, i, 153.  
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in My Own Life. As we have seen, he wrote that once he was in ‘command of a large 
library’,  
I … formed the plan of writing the History of England; but being frightened 
with the notion of continuing a narrative through a period of 1700 years, I 
commenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, an epoch when, I 
thought, the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place.307  
Unlike the first part of Hume’s statement, this part has generally been accepted. 
Nevertheless, we need to approach it with care and consider the situation in at the time 
Hume wrote this autobiographical piece. By 1776 the History of England had appeared 
in numerous editions, and several reviewers had expressed their puzzlement about 
Hume’s ‘retrogressive progress’, his unusual way of composing his History by working 
his way backwards from the Stuarts to the Tudors and finally the history of Roman and 
medieval England.308 This meant that the separate instalments had initially appeared in 
the reverse order to that in which they were published from 1762 onwards. As My Own 
Life was from the first to be attached to editions of Hume’s collected works, it offered in 
fact the first and last public statement Hume made about the order in which his historical 
work had originally appeared. In accounting for the overall course his literary career had 
taken, Hume needed to give a clear rationale for his decision to commence his History 
with the Stuarts and subsequently work his way backwards. We need to take this into 
account when assessing the reliability of Hume’s reasons and why the explanation he 
gives for this somewhat unusual way of proceeding does sound slightly apologetic. This 
1776 statement cannot thus be taken for granted, but must instead be carefully compared 
with the evidence of Hume’s letters of the early 1750s.  
     The notion that Hume set out by planning a complete History of England is rendered 
doubtful by the fact that no such plan is mentioned or even hinted at in his letters of the 
relevant period, which instead suggest that Hume from the start focused on Stuart 
                                                 
307 ‘My Own Life’, Essays, p. xxxvi.  
308 The phrase ‘retrogressive progress’ occurs in an anonymous review in The Critical Review of January 
1762. Critics and reviewers who have commented on the order in which Hume composed and published 
the volumes include Richard Hurd in his Moral and political dialogues (1759) and Tobias Smollett in The 
Critical Review of April 1759. Cf. Early responses to Hume’s History of England, ed. Fieser, i, 175, 182, 
291.  
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history. This is evident from the first letter that mentions Hume’s ongoing work on a 
history. Writing to Adam Smith on 24 September 1752, Hume states  
I confess, I was once of the same Opinion with you, & thought that the best 
Period to begin an English History was about Henry the 7th. But you will 
please to observe, that the Change, which then happen’d in public Affairs, was 
very insensible, and did not display its Influence till many Years afterwards. 
Twas under James that the House of Commons began first to raise their Head, 
& then the Quarrel betwixt Privilege & Prerogative commenc’d. The 
Government, no longer opprest by the enormous Authority of the Crown, 
display’d its Genius; and the Factions, which then arose, having an Influence 
on our present Affairs, form the most curious, interesting, & instructive Part of 
our History. … I confess, that the Subject appears to me very fine; & I enter 
upon it with great Ardour & Pleasure. You need not doubt of my 
Perseverance.309  
This often-quoted statement makes clear that Hume early on settled for the Stuart Age as 
a proper subject for his history. His response to Smith’s advice to begin his history with 
the first Tudor monarch is interesting, yet it does not allow us to establish whether or not 
Hume actually seriously pondered writing a Tudor history in 1752. All he states in this 
letter to Smith is that he was ‘once’ of the same opinion about the proper period at which 
‘an English History’ ought to commence (italics mine). It is by no means clear when and 
for how long Hume had held this opinion on the best way to start a History of England 
and when he changed it. Thus, we cannot infer from this quote a direct indication of 
whether or not he actually contemplated to begin his History with the Tudors. In any 
case, by September 1752 he appears to have been firmly convinced that Stuart history 
held by far the greatest attraction for him as he considered it ‘the most curious, 
interesting, & instructive Part of our History’. Hume was therefore not inclined to follow 
Smith’s advice, though he later had occasion to regret not having done so.  
     Having established that Hume is unlikely to have contemplated writing a ‘complete 
History’ of England at any point in the early 1750s and that he had early on decided on 
Stuart history as the most appealing subject, we should now consider the form that this 
history was to take. Here the most important hint is given in a letter to John Clephane, 
written when Hume was already considerably advanced in his Stuart history: 
                                                 
309 Hume to Adam Smith, 24 September 1752, HL, i, 167-8.  
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As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work which will 
employ me several years, and which yields me much satisfaction. Tis a History 
of Britain, from the Union of the Crowns to the present time. I have already 
finished the reign of King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that 
they don’t flatter me), that I have succeeded.310 
Here Hume first mentions the eventual title of the work, which appeared from 1754 to 
1756 as The history of Great Britain. From January 1753 onwards Hume employed 
terms like a ‘History of Britain’ or ‘British History’ in his correspondence and it is 
therefore clear that throughout the period 1753-56 he was engaged in composing a 
‘History of Great Britain’ rather than a ‘History of England’.311 It is surprising to note 
that this overwhelming evidence has been almost completely overlooked in the older 
scholarship, in which Hume’s Stuart history as it was published in 1754-56 is commonly 
and incorrectly referred to as a ‘History of England’.312 In recent years, commentators 
have shown increasing awareness of and sensitivity to the original title of Hume’s work 
and have begun to explore some of its implications, but we still do not possess a full and 
convincing account of Hume’s choice of title.313  
     Underlying this lack of attention to the title of Hume’s works seems to be the 
unspoken assumption that there was nothing particularly unusual about Hume’s choice 
                                                 
310 Hume to John Clephane, 5 January 1753, HL, i, 170.  
311 Cf. Hume to Matthew Sharp of Hoddam, 25 February 1754, HL, i, 184; and the Abbé Le Blanc, 12 
September 1754, HL, i, 193. It is initially puzzling to notice that Hume used the word ‘an English History’ 
in his letter to Adam Smith, whereas in his letter to John Clephane and subsequent letters he consistently 
employed the terms ‘History of Britain’ or ‘British History’. This is explained, however, by the context of 
the Smith letter in which Hume discusses the history of the Tudor and Stuart period. For reasons discussed 
below a history of the Tudors could not be entitled a ‘History of Great Britain’, whereas that of the Stuarts 
could be written either as an English or as a British history.  
312 It has long been common to commence a discussion of Hume’s History with some such sentence: ‘The 
first volume of Hume’s History of England, dealing with the early Stuarts, appeared in 1754.’ David 
Wootton, ‘David Hume, the historian’, in CCH, pp. 281-312, esp. p. 281. Ernest C. Mossner, David 
Wootton and Philip Hicks fail to mention the original title, the last framing his discussion as if Hume had 
from the outset worked on a ‘general history of England’. Cf. Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), pp. 301-
318; and Hicks, Neoclassical History, p. 177. Forbes and Phillipson mention the original title only once, 
but then employ the title History of England in their discussions of Hume’s Stuart history. See Forbes, 
‘Introduction’ to HGB, p. 7; and Phillipson, Hume, chapter 5, esp. p. 77. Even where the correct title is 
used throughout, commentators have long failed to discuss its implications, see f. e. Wexler, Hume and the 
History of England, pp. 14-45.  
313 This change took place in the mid-1990s, possibly under the impact of the ‘New British History’ 
propagated by scholars such as J. G. A. Pocock and Colin Kidd. Cf. Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: 
Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British identity, 1689-c.1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1993), p. 210; O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, p. 57; Pocock, Barbarism and 
Religion II: Narratives of Civil Government, pp. 199ff.  
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of title because it is assumed to have been a common title for seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century histories. This was certainly not the case; on the contrary, the title 
‘History of Great Britain’ had rarely been used by the time Hume started work on his 
History, even though it became far more widely used after the 1750s, perhaps in part 
because of the eventual success of Hume’s work. Before 1754 the term ‘Great Britain’ 
does occur – though not very frequently – in titles of histories written during or 
concerned with the early Stuart period, especially the British civil wars or ‘troubles of 
Great Britain’.314 Prior to the publication of Hume’s work there were in fact only two 
works that bore the words ‘The History of Great Britain’ in their title, neither of which 
covered exactly the same ground as Hume’s projected work, though the first was a 
history of the life and reign of James VI and I.315 The title Hume chose fairly early on in 
his work on the History had thus never before been used as the title of an overall History 
of the Stuart Era. Hume’s unusual choice of title has still not been fully accounted for 
and requires to be explained. It is worth considering the different options available to 
him in some detail which should allow us to provide a more comprehensive explanation 
of the meaning of the title History of Great Britain. 
     What then made this unusual title appropriate for Hume’s projected Stuart history? 
First, with the Union of the Crowns of 1603, the political histories of England and 
Scotland became intertwined in a way that made it impossible to write an English 
history without reference to Scotland, and to a lesser degree Ireland, especially as the 
                                                 
314 Cf. Anon., Britannia triumphalis; a brief history of the vvarres and other state-affairs of Great Britain. 
From the death of the late King, to the dissolution of the last Parliament (London: Samuel Howes, 1654); 
John Davies, The civil warres of Great Britain and Ireland· Containing an exact history of their occasion, 
originall, progress, and happy end. By an impartiall pen (London: Philip Chetwind, 1661); Robert 
Menteith, The history of the troubles of Great Britain: containing a particular account of the most 
remarkable passages in Scotland, from the year 1633 to 1650 [English translation of the Histoire des 
troubles de la Grand' Bretagne] (London: G. Strahan and R. Williamson, 1735). This and the information 
in the following note is derived from the English Short Title Catalogue (ESTC).  
315 Arthur Wilson, The History of Great Britain being the life and reign of King James I (London: Richard 
Lownds, 1652), a title appropriate for a history of the reign of a king who had done so much to encourage 
the use of the term ‘Great Britain’ following the Union of the Crown in 1603. The other work is Thomas 
Salmon, The history of Great Britain and Ireland; from the first discovery of these islands to the Norman 
conquest, (2nd edn., London: John Wyat, 1725). The first edition of this compiled history was entitled 
Historical collections, relating the originals, conversions, and revolutions of the inhabitants of Great 
Britain to the Norman Conquest (London: John Wyat, 1706), which indicates that the term ‘Great Britain’ 
was here employed in the purely geographical sense for the British Isles and does not denote a political 
entity.  
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disintegration of the Stuart monarchy during Charles I’ troubled reign culminated in a 
Civil War originating from and encompassing all three Stuart kingdoms. The history of 
the Stuarts might and perhaps ought to be written as a history of Britain while that of the 
house of Tudor was essentially a history of England and its direct dependencies, Wales 
and Ireland. In addition to this, the term ‘Great Britain’ gained greater currency under 
the early Stuarts than it had under the Tudors due to James’ untiring efforts in promoting 
his scheme for a more perfect union by employing the term on his seal and in his public 
pronouncements. His favourite scheme of a ‘perfect union’ never caught on however and 
Hume underlines the fact that James’ use of the term ‘Great Britain’ was largely a 
fiction, designed gradually to bring into being his vision of a political union to which he 
increasingly realized his subjects on both sides of the Tweed were diametrically 
opposed.316 While the term was briefly revived under Cromwell’s Protectorate, it largely 
remained either a purely geographical term referring to the largest of the British Isles or 
a political term employed by the advocates of an Anglo-Scottish union.317 This only 
changed in 1707, when the Act of Union brought into existence a new political entity by 
uniting the separate Stuart kingdoms into ‘one Kingdom by the Name of Great Britain’. 
It was only from this point onwards, that one could truly speak of a true ‘History of 
Great Britain’ in a non-geographic, political sense.  
    Between the Union of the Crowns of 1603 and the Union of Parliaments of 1707, the 
histories of the three kingdoms had thus been intertwined to a hitherto unprecedented 
degree, which justified and even called for a ‘British’ perspective. This raises the 
question whether Hume chose the title to signify his insistence on writing a truly 
‘British’ history, either in the geographic sense of the happenings on the British Isles or, 
more likely, in the political sense of a history that gave due attention to the political 
transactions in all of the Stuart realms, especially the kingdoms of Scotland and 
England. While Hume clearly showed an awareness of this British dimension of Stuart 
politics and iconography, it is doubtful whether he ever intended to write a truly British 
                                                 
316 HGB, pp. 85-6.  
317 For James VI and I and Cromwell’s projects see Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Union of Britain in the 
Seventeenth Century’, in The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation and Social 
Change (first published 1967; Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 2001), pp. 407-426.  
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history in the modern sense of the term. The finished History of Great Britain certainly 
belies such a notion. The very structure of Hume’s narrative in which Scottish and Irish 
affairs were dealt with in separate sections or relegated to digressions testifies to the fact 
that Hume regarded Scottish affairs during this period as intimately intertwined with, but 
ultimately subordinate to, the goings-on in the English realm.318 While British in 
geographic scope, the History of Great Britain was thus for the most parts written from 
an anglo-centric perspective in which the history of Scotland and Ireland were treated as 
in many ways an adjunct to that of England.319 Despite its treatment of Scottish and Irish 
affairs, Hume’s Stuart History does therefore not offer a more consistently ‘British’ 
perspective than other accounts of the Stuart Age written before the 1750s or, for that 
matter, in the ensuing two hundred years.  
     It is worth asking whether the title may perhaps have been chosen as an appealing 
and marketable title. After all, this was the moment when a ‘North British’ identity was 
being fashioned and advocated by sections of the Edinburgh literati and 'Great Britain’ 
became a more frequently employed term that had positive connotations.320 It is 
therefore possible – though it does not seem to have been contemplated by Hume 
scholars – that the inclusive title ‘History of Great Britain’ might have been adopted by 
Hume – and subsequently by his publishers – for its potential appeal to an audience on 
                                                 
318 In most chapters of the History of Great Britain events and conditions in the Celtic fringe of the Stuart 
realms were relegated to sections entitled the ‘State of Affairs in Scotland’ or ‘State of Ireland’, cf. HGB, 
pp. 117-123, 140-153, 449-465, 546-555; and The history of Great Britain. Vol. II.: Containing the 
Commonwealth, and the reigns of Charles II. and James II. (London: A. Millar, 1757 [1756]), pp. 4-7, 
187-194, 265-274, 339-348, 389f.  
319 Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, p. 210: ‘Hume abandoned the History of Britain, the only volumes of 
which constitute a history of seventeenth-century England interspersed with critical reflections on 
Scotland and Ireland, for the History of England, not only because a properly British history would have 
been more burdensome, technically difficult and awkward to structure, but because it would not have 
served as a more comprehensive explanation of modern British history than the history of England.’ See 
O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, p. 57, for a similar view.  
320 For the creation of a North British identity and its role in the cultural politics of the Scottish literati see 
Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Politics, Politeness and the Anglicisation of Early Eighteenth-Century Scottish 
Culture’, in Scotland and England, 1286-1815, ed. Roger A. Mason (Edinburgh: John Donaldson, 1987), 
pp. 226-246; and ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’ in The Enlightenment in national context, eds. Roy Porter 
and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981), pp. 19-40; David Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth 
Century: Union and Enlightenment (Harlow: Longman, 2002), 34-39. For a different view that emphasises 
Scottish ‘national pride’ see Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, pp. 34, 61-73, 147. For the creation of 
an overall British identity in the eighteenth century see Linda Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 1707-
1837 (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1992).  
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both sides of the Tweed.321 None the less, while it may indeed have been useful to write 
a British history for a British audience, the choice of title presupposes that Hume could 
expect his prospective audience would deem such a title appropriate for the kind of 
historical narrative he was engaged in writing from 1752 to 1756. This is indicated by 
the fact that once Hume settled on Tudor history as the subject of his next instalment, he 
immediately switched to the title History of England as the appropriate title for a 
narrative account of the reigns of the English monarchs from Henry VII to Elisabeth I. 
Taken on its own, the potential commercial appeal of the title ‘History of Great Britain’ 
does not constitute a sufficient and convincing explanation for Hume’s adoption of this 
title for his Stuart history.  
     An important clue is provided in the above-quoted letter that Hume wrote to John 
Clephane in January 1753, in which he specifies the form he intends his History of Great 
Britain to take: ‘It divides into three very moderate volumes; one to end with the death 
of Charles the First; the second at the Revolution; the third at the Accession, for I dare 
come no nearer the present times.’322 This is a frequently overlooked but highly 
significant statement which indicates that Hume intended to complement the two Stuart 
volumes he eventually published in 1754 and 1756 with a third volume which would 
deal with later Stuart history from the Revolution of 1688/89 to the Accession of the 
House of Hanover in 1714. That Hume seems to have held this plan for at least a year is 
indicated by a letter from his Edinburgh publisher, Gavin Hamilton, to William Strahan, 
written on the verge of the publication of Hume’s first volume. Describing the structure 
of Hume’s projected work, Hamilton states that ‘the three volls contians [sic] three 
grand periods, the first from the union of the Crowns to the death of the king, the 2d voll 
from the death of the king to the Revolution, and the last till the treaty of Utrecht’.323 
This suggests that until at least January 1754 Hume’s plan for a three-volume Stuart 
                                                 
321 Yet there is circumstantial evidence to the contrary consisting in the fact that in January 1754, when 
Hume had already settled on the title ‘History of Great Britain’, his Edinburgh publisher Gavin Hamilton 
failed to even mention this title in a letter to his London printer William Strahan, instead describing 
Hume’s History as ‘the prittyest thing ever was attempted in the English History’. Cf. Hamilton to 
William Strahan, 29 January 1754, quoted in Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), pp. 302-3.  
322 Hume to John Clephane, 5 January 1753, HL, i, 170.  
323 Gavin Hamilton to William Strahan, 29 January 1754, quoted in Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 
303.  
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history had remained essentially unchanged, with the slight difference that the third 
volume would end in 1713 rather than 1714. In either case Hume’s History of Great 
Britain as envisaged in 1752-54 would have been a complete history of Stuart Britain, 
spanning the entire Stuart Age from the Union of the Crowns to the last years of Queen 
Anne’s reign.324  
     Yet the evidence that Hume originally intended to continue his History of Great 
Britain until 1713/14, is important in a different sense. His initial plan for a Stuart 
history comprising three volumes has important implications for our understanding of 
the projected work and helps to account for its unusual title. Had the work been executed 
as he originally envisaged it, it would have constituted a complete history of the Stuart 
Age, beginning with the accession of the house of Stuart to the English throne and 
ending with or a year prior to the succession of the House of Hanover to the British 
throne. An important part of Hume’s discussion of Anne’s reign would have necessarily 
been the negotiations and parliamentary proceedings that led up to the Act of Union of 
1707 by which Great Britain as a political entity was brought into existence. Conceived 
as a three-volume history of the Stuart Era, the work would therefore have spanned the 
entire period between the promotion of a ‘perfect union’ by James VI and I and the 
eventual realization of such a Union in 1707. The work as envisaged by Hume in the 
years 1752-54 would have been more than a pre-history of modern British society. 
Comprising the entire Stuart Age, it would have constituted a true ‘History of Great 
Britain’ in the sense of a narrative of the pre-history and coming into being of the British 
state 1603-1713/14, taking the story up to and beyond the Act of Union of 1707. As such 
it would have culminated in either the Hanoverian accession of 1714, which brought 
about the increasingly stable regime Hume had described in his Essays, or in the peace-
                                                 
324 The assertion in Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 302, that Hume was ‘[o]riginally planning to 
commence with the reign of Henry VII and continue down to the accession of the House of Hanover’ is 
inaccurate as it conflates Hume’s 1752 letter to Adam Smith (to the effect that he was once of the opinion 
that an ‘English History’ should commence with Henry VII) with his 1753 letter to John Clephane (stating 
that his ‘History of Britain’ then in progress should eventually comprise three volumes and end with the 
Hanoverian Accession). Such inattention to dates and a failure to distinguish properly between different 
phases in the transformation of Hume’s authorial intentions have long hindered a proper reconstruction of 
the process whereby the History of Great Britain and subsequently the History of England too shape.  
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treaty of Utrecht which established the modern-European state system and consolidated 
Britain’s place within it.325  
     This clearly contradicts the prevailing view among commentators that Hume planned 
to write a history of the early Stuart and Restoration periods, ending with the Revolution 
of 1688-89. Hume’s Stuart history, as it was published between 1754 and 1756, is 
generally regarded as an account of the pre-history and coming into being of the modern 
British constitution. Thus, Nicholas Phillipson asserts that ‘the History was written to a 
specific agenda which had been developed in earlier philosophical and political writing’ 
and which meant that ‘Hume’s primary purpose was to discover the origins of the 
modern constitution and the party system and to show exactly on what foundations 
[they] had been built.’326 While this view is generally accepted, commentators have been 
at a loss to account for the fact that Hume, having brought his narration up to the 
Revolution of 1688, inexplicably failed to provide an account of the profound 
constitutional transformation that took place in the eventful decades following the 
Revolution and leading up to the Hanoverian Succession. It was, after all, in these 
decades of party conflict and constitutional change that Britain’s eighteenth-century 
                                                 
325 If Hume had indeed, as the above-quoted letter by Gavin Hamilton suggests, planned to end his third 
Stuart volume with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), we need to enquire why he may have regarded this as a 
more appropriate end-point than the Hanoverian Accession in 1714. The only scholar that appears to have 
given this any consideration speculates that Hume ‘resolved to conclude his narrative with the in 1713 ‘to 
avoid the necessity of describing the Jacobite plot which was formed by some of Anne's ministers, and 
was baffled by her sudden death. Such a matter was of too delicate a nature to have much attraction for a 
man whose love of tranquillity grew far more rapidly even than his years.’ G. Birkbeck Hill (ed.), Letters 
of David Hume to William Strahan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 3. This is an interesting suggestion 
and might well have been the case had Hume been pondering to writing his History in the direct aftermath 
of the second Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, when – as we have seen – he omitted his topical essay ‘Of the 
Protestant Succession’ from the Three Essays appearing in 1748. By 1752, however, Hume evidently 
thought that this threat of Jacobitism and the controversies surrounding it had sufficiently subsided for him 
to publish this particular essay, a fact that makes it seem doubtful whether Hume would have sought to 
avoid retelling an incident that might after all provide an interesting occasion to recall the salutary political 
lessons he had already drawn for his audience in 1752. Thus we should perhaps search not for any event 
that Hume might have wanted to avoid by stopping short in 1713, but for the potential significance of the 
mention of ‘the last till the treaty of Utrecht’ as the end-point of his narration. The Treaty saw the 
recognition by France and Spain of the Hanoverian Succession, which was to take place upon Anne’s 
death in 1714. Yet it was of wider European significance as it both concluded the War of the Spanish 
succession and was generally regarded as having inaugurated the modern European state system. For the 
place of the Treaty of Utrecht in Enlightenment historiography see Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Vol. 
II: Narratives of Civil Government, pp. 137, 170-1, 219.  
326 Phillipson, Hume, p. 11.  
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constitution was formed. As J. G. A. Pocock puts it with regard to the growth of crown 
patronage after 1688-9: 
By Hume’s time it was already a commonplace that the Revolution had 
replaced the royal prerogative with the more informal and insidious ‘influence 
of the crown’, and in Hume’s judgement that was exactly what it should have 
done. But the history of this achievement could not be written if one decided to 
stop short in 1689, and Hume and all his readers knew this perfectly well. The 
history of both England and Great Britain would have to be carried on at least 
to 1714, through the great wars in which William III had involved his new 
kingdoms and which, terminating the threat of universal monarchy in Europe, 
had made possible the government of a unified Britain by the new devices of 
standing army, public credit and parliamentary interest. … All these themes, 
and many supporting ones, were well known to Hume and had been daringly 
and minutely analysed in his Essays. But he did not write the narrative history 
to which they should provide the philosophical matrix. Instead of going past 
1689, he turned back to the preconditions of 1603.327  
Both Phillipson and Pocock point out that 1688 was after all only the beginning of a 
process that led to the intricately balanced Hanoverian constitution Hume had dissected 
in his Essays, Moral and Political in 1741/2.328 This raises a problem unresolved in the 
existing literature, namely that there exists an interpretative gap between the culminating 
point of Hume’s Stuart history, the Revolution of 1688-9, and the subject of his 1741/42 
Essays, moral and political, the Walpolean system of government, which meant that the 
latter could not be fully explained without reference of the profound constitutional 
changes that had taken place in the period 1689-1714. Yet commentators have failed to 
take proper notice of the fact that Hume did originally contemplate completing his pre-
history of the Hanoverian constitution by providing a narrative account of these changes.  
     While accurate for the History of England as it stands now, this interpretation is 
misleading for the work as Hume evidently conceived of it in the early 1750s. The 
notion that the History of Great Britain was from the outset designed as a pre-history of 
that constitution Hume had described and analysed in his Essays is difficult to sustain if 
we consider that when Hume’s first mentioned that title to Clephane he wrote that he 
was working on ‘a History of Britain, from the Union of the Crowns to the present time’. 
                                                 
327 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Vol.  II: Narratives of Civil Government, p. 221, see also pp. 198ff.  
328 Cf. Phillipson, Hume, p. 108, who notes that in 1688/89 ‘the Crown still lacked the influence it was to 
enjoy in the age of Walpole. It had been impossible to regularize its relations with Parliament, and politics 
stayed subject to the fluctuations of speculative opinions in Parliament.’  
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Hume immediately qualifies this by stating that he does not intend to go beyond the 
Hanoverian Accession and locates the pragmatic reason for this decision in the restricted 
availability of the manuscript sources required for the writing of contemporary 
history.329 Most commentators have tended to overlook the fact that prior to 1756 Hume 
shows no sign of having – in Pocock’s words – ‘decided to stop short in 1689’ and 
indeed states repeatedly that he ultimately intended his narrative ‘to be carried on at least 
to 1714’. That Hume never ventured beyond 1688 should not lead us to believe that his 
History was from the outset designed to culminate in the Revolution of 1688. Indeed, we 
shall shortly see that the overwhelming evidence of his letters does not allow us to see 
this failure to produce a continuation to the existing two volumes of his history of Stuart 
Britain as a foregone conclusion. Yet Pocock is correct in stating that Hume never 
actually continued his narrative beyond 1689. Hume’s failure to write the third volume 
of his projected History of Stuart Britain is made even more striking by his clear and 
often-stated intentions of ‘writing the Period after the Revolution’.330 This underlines the 
need for a fuller account of the reasons for that failure and poses the question of when 
and why he abandoned his original plan of completing his Stuart history with a last 
volume on the period 1689-1714.  
     Hume’s first Stuart volume, covering the contentious Early Stuart and Civil War 
period, was published in November 1754. Never before had the stakes been so high for 
Hume, both in terms of the dignity of the genre he had written in as well as the potential 
profits to be reaped from a multi-volume historical work, and never before had he been 
so sure of his success. The response was far from encouraging: Instead of being praised 
for its impartiality, the work was branded as a partisan history by the reviewers and the 
initial print-run did not sell well. If Hume had the highest hopes, his disappointment was 
                                                 
329 This letter reveals that even the accession of the House of Hanover was not a fixed end-date for 
Hume’s History as he initially conceived of it. While he had started off by saying that he was engaged in 
writing ‘a History of Britain, from the Union of the Crowns to the present time’ (italics mine), he 
immediately qualified this by saying that he did not plan to go beyond 1714. In a P.S. to the letter Hume 
stated his reason for this qualification: ‘When I say that I dare come no nearer the present time than the 
Accession, you are not to imagine that I am afraid either of danger or offence; I hope, in many instances, 
that I have shown myself to be above all laws of prudence and discretion. I only mean, that I should be 
afraid of committing mistakes, in writing of so recent a period, by reason of the want of materials.’ Hume 
to John Clephane, 5 January 1753, HL, i, 170-1.  
330 See Hume to [William Strahan], 25 May 1757, HL, i, 251, and further letters cited below.  
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all the more crushing. It is difficult to overstate the extent of the severe disappointment 
Hume felt upon the reception of his first Stuart volume.331 Work on the second volume, 
which had been considerably advanced, immediately began to falter.332 It appears to 
have been this sense of disappointment that induced him to reconsider his initial plan for 
a three volume History of Great Britain and made him contemplate embarking instead 
on a Tudor history as friends had advised him to do.333 Writing to William Strahan in 
September 1756, on the eve of the publication of the second volume of his History of 
Great Britain, Hume justified his reluctance to commit himself to writing the follow-up 
volume on the period after 1689:  
I am sensible that the subsequent [i.e., post 1689] Period of History has many 
Advantages; but I despair of procuring Materials for writing it; at least, while I 
remain in this part of the World. However, as Accidents may make me change 
my Resolution, you may, if it be not too late, put simply The End at the 
Conclusion of the Volume; which neither promises nor excludes another 
Volume. I own, that the public has shown so little Disposition to recewe [sic] 
what I think Truth, that I am much discourag’d in this Undertaking.334  
To Hume’s readers the ‘The End’ could signal either the end of the second volume or the 
end of the overall History of Great Britain. This reveals Hume’s ambivalent attitude 
towards the project of writing later Stuart history. For a while he kept pondering the 
question whether he should complete his Stuart history with a third volume or go back to 
                                                 
331 Hume’s letters of this period reflect the sense of sheer disbelief at the reception of his efforts to be 
impartial. As late as 1776 Hume dwelt at length on this episode and recalled the profound sense of 
discouragement he had felt upon the reception of his first Stuart volume in his brief autobiography ‘My 
Own Life’, Essays, p. xxxvii.  
332 Although Hume eventually ‘resolved to pick up courage and persevere’ in the composition of the 
second volume, he later confessed to a friend that he had done so ‘with infinite Disgust & Reluctance’. As 
a result the second volume of Hume’s History of Great Britain was only completed in April 1756, later 
than expected. See ‘My Own Life’, Essays, p. xxxvii; and Hume to William Mure of Caldwell, [Feb 
1757], HL, i, 242. Cf. Hume to William Strahan, 3 May 1755, HL, i, 221: ‘To tell the Truth, I was so 
discourag’d this last Winter, that I have not been so assiduous as I might have been.’  
333 Hume to Lord Elibank, 8 June 1756, in Ernest Campbell Mossner, ‘New Hume Letters to Lord 
Elibank, 1748-1776’ in Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 4 (1962/3), 431-460, esp. 440.  
334 Hume to William Strahan, 30 September 1756, in Werner Stark and Heiner Klemme, ‘Ein unbeachtet 
gebliebener Brief von David Hume’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 72 (1990), 214-219, esp. 
214. The text of the first volume concludes with ‘The End of the First Volume.’ Cf. Hume, David, The 
history of Great Britain, Vol. I: Containing the reigns of James I. and Charles I. (Edinburgh: Hamilton, 
Balfour, and Neill, 1754), p. 473. Acting on Hume’s letter, Strahan did indeed put ‘THE END’ at the 
conclusion of the second volume following an appendix which contained two source documents. Cf. 
Hume, The history of Great Britain, Vol. II (1757 [1756] edn.), p. 459.  
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the pre-history of the Stuarts.335 By May 1757 he had eventually followed the advice 
Adam Smith had given him five years earlier and was already at work on a history of the 
Tudor Era.336  
     Nevertheless, even the decision to turn back to the Tudors did not signal the end of 
Hume’s History of Stuart Britain. Around the time of the publication of the Tudor 
volumes in 1759, as after the completion of his second Stuart volume in 1756, Hume 
pondered for a while whether to continue his history ‘forward’ rather than ‘backward’ 
and consulted his friends about this and he might well have done so under the 
appropriate title History of Great Britain. At times the British period after 1688/9 
seemed to hold greater attraction to him, especially as he pondered the prospect of 
having to write the history of medieval England. This dilemma is expressed in a letter of 
April 1759, in which we find him returning to the idea of writing a third Stuart volume:  
The Truth is, I hesitate extremely about my Plans & Schemes. There are many 
People who invite me to come forward with my History, & write the Reigns of 
K. William & Q. Anne. Several have offered me their Assistance in procuring 
Papers & historical Documents for this Purpose; and in general I forsee a 
greater Facility in this Undertaking than I at first apprehended. This work 
woud be more entertaining both to me & the public, than the diving into old, 
barbarous & obscure Reigns; where I coud scarce hope to communicate any 
thing new, and might even fail of making my Narration entertaining.337  
It was only in the early summer of 1759, that Hume reluctantly and unenthusiastically 
settled on writing the history of medieval England. Even after that date, Hume did not 
entirely abandon his original plan to continue his Stuart history and although his 
enthusiasm at the thought of writing a continuation steadily decreased after 1759, it was 
almost another ten years before he was prepared openly and conclusively to renounce 
any intention of writing a continuation to his History.338   
                                                 
335 ‘Shall I go backwards or forwards in my History? I think you us’d to tell me, that you approvd more of 
my going backwards.’ Hume to Adam Smith, [February or March 1757], HL, i, 246. See also Hume to 
William Mure of Caldwell, [Feb 1757], HL, i, 243.  
336 ‘I have already begun and am a little advanc’d in a third Volume of History. I do not preclude myself 
from the View of going forward to the Period after the Revolution; but at present I begin with the Reign of 
Henry the 7th. It is properly at that Period modern History commences.’ Hume to Andrew Millar, 20 May 
1757, HL, i, 249.  
337 Hume to Lord Elibank, 2 April 1759, in Mossner, ‘New Hume Letters to Lord Elibank’, 448.  
338 Upon receiving a pension from George III in early 1768, Hume expressed his intention to fulfil the 
King’s expectation connected with this pension and ‘continue my History’, yet in October of the same 
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     Having established when Hume abandoned the plan to continue his Stuart history, we 
need to consider the distinct, but related question of when the existing volumes of 
Hume’s Stuart history were finally incorporated into the work that had appeared 
between 1759 and 1761/2 under the title The History of England. The few scholars who 
have commented at all on the change of title maintain that Hume ‘abandoned’ the 
History of Great Britain and hence his multivolume history ‘became the History of 
England with the publication of the Tudor volumes’.339 This interpretation is highly 
questionable as we shall see that it was not until the summer of 1759 that Hume decided 
to write the medieval volumes instead of completing his Stuart history with the reigns of 
the last two Stuart monarchs. It becomes untenable, however, once we take into account 
the fact that, while Hume’s Tudor volumes appeared under the title The History of 
England in 1759, the two Stuart volumes which had originally appeared in 1754 and 
1756 were being republished under the title The history of Great Britain, under the 
house of Stuart. That this was not merely down to decisions made by publishers and 
printers is documented by a letter to his publisher in which Hume explains the rationale 
behind his decision to retain the title History of Great Britain for the second edition of 
the Stuart volumes.  
The Title of it will be History of Great Britain under the House of Stuart, in 
two Volumes. As the Title of the other Volume will be History of England 
under the House of Tudor. By this Means they will be different Works; and 
some few Repetitions which will be unavoidable in this Method of composing 
them, will be the more excusable.340 
Hume thus decided to retain the title History of Great Britain for the Stuart volumes 
while he was engaged in the composition of his Tudor history, which he then still 
envisaged as a single volume, but which eventually appeared in two volumes in 1759.341 
                                                                                                                                                
year he wrote ‘I believe, however, I shall write no more History’, and categorically rejected all of William 
Strahan’s offers in May 1770: ‘I am fully determined never to continue my History, and have indeed put it 
entirely out of my power by retiring to this Country [i.e. Scotland], for the rest of my Life.’ Cf. Hume to 
the Marquise de Barbentane, 24 May 1768, HL, ii, 177; Hume to Baron Mure of Caldwell, 18 October 
1768, HL, ii, 188; Hume to William Strahan, 22 May 1770, HL, ii, 223. For the royal pension see 
Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 555.  
339 Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, p. 210; O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, p. 57.  
340 Hume to William Strahan, [July 1758], HL, i, 283.  
341 ‘I am very assiduous in writing a new Volume of History, and am now pretty well advanc’d: I find the 
whole will be comprizd in one Volume, tho’ somewhat more bulky than any of the former.’ Hume to 
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As they stood in that year, Hume’s Tudor and Stuart histories, taken together, covered 
the two hundred year period from 1485 to 1688/9, yet for the reason Hume indicates he 
chose to present them as two separate, though evidently related, historical works. Thus 
distinguished from the History of England, the History of Great Britain stood as a 
freestanding historical work throughout the 1750s. It was not until the addition of the 
medieval volumes in 1761/2 and the publication of all volumes in a chronologically 
ordered series or set from 1762 onwards that all editions of Hume’s History appeared 
under the new title The history of England, from the invasion of Julius Cæsar to the 
revolution in 1688. It was therefore only in the early 1760s that the title History of Great 
Britain was finally abandoned and effectively replaced and Hume’s Stuart History, 
which he had commenced writing ten years earlier, was ultimately integrated into a 
larger work that would henceforth be referred by Hume, his publishers, readers, and 
















                                                                                                                                                
Andrew Millar, 3 September 1757, HL, i, 265. See also Hume to Captain James Edmonstoune of Newton, 
29 September 1757, NHL, p. 43: ‘I am engag’d in writing a New Volume of History from the Beginning 
of Henry the VII till the Accession of James the I.’  
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5. Hume’s Bid to Occupy the Vacant ‘Post of Honour in the English Parnassus’                               
 
5. 1. KTHMA ES AEI: Hume’s Thucydidean Aspirations as a Historian 
 
Having sought to establish why Hume chose to work on a British history, we need to 
enquire what form that history was to take. His most significant statements on his 
nascent History of Great Britain occur in the letter to his friend, John Clephane, then in 
London, written in January 1753 when Hume was already considerably advanced in his 
Stuart history. We have seen that this was the first letter that mentions the eventual title 
of the work and outlines Hume’s overall plans and ambitions for this project. Written 
while Hume was in the midst of composing the first Stuart volume, it contains a number 
of highly significant insights into his conception of the work. Having stated that he had 
already finished writing the reign of James VI and I, Hume goes on to outline his aims 
and ambitions for his historical work: 
You know that there is no post of honour in the English Parnassus more vacant 
than that of History. Style, judgement, impartiality, care – everything is 
wanting to our historians; and even Rapin, during this latter period, is 
extremely deficient. I make my work very concise, after the manner of the 
Ancients. ... The work will neither please the Duke of Bedford [an eminent 
Whig politician] nor James Fraser [an ardent Jacobite]; but I hope it will please 
you and posterity. KTHMA ES AEI [‘a possession for all time’]. So, dear 
Doctor, after having mended my pen, and bit my nails, I return to the narration 
of parliamentary factions, or court intrigues, or civil wars, and bid you heartily 
adieu.342  
Taken together with Hume’s letter to Adam Smith written in September 1752, this is one 
of the earliest and in many ways Hume’s single most important statement on his 
projected History of Great Britain. This programmatic passage contains in condensed 
form the entire rationale and programme for Hume’s History. At the outset, he bemoans 
the lack of proper history and in so doing repeats the commonplace notion about the 
deficiencies of English historical writing. Noting the qualities absent in previous British 
historians – ‘[s]tyle, judgement, impartiality, care’ –, Hume sets out to provide the 
history evidently lacking. A close reading of this passage and similar ones in Hume’s 
                                                 
342 Hume to John Clephane, 5 January 1753, HL, i, 170-1.  
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letters of the period will therefore provide indications not only about the shape of the 
work then in progress, but will furthermore give us an indication of the kind of history 
Hume intended to write and the kind of historian he aspired to become.  
     As Hume proceeded in his research and writing, it became clear to him that the 
deficiency in British historical writing was greater than he had initially apprehended and 
consisted in far more than the failure to produce an elevated historical narrative: ‘The 
more I advance in my undertaking, the more am I convinced that the History of England 
has never yet been written, not only for style, which is notorious to all the world, but 
also for matter; such is the ignorance and partiality of all our historians.’343 Partiality and 
lack of style were the most frequent complaint of reviewers, and Hume knew he had to 
overcome these if he wanted to occupy the vacant seat in the English Parnassus. It was 
thus paramount for Hume to succeed in conveying a notion of his impartiality, and his 
letters of that period constantly refer to that notion.344 In practice this meant setting 
himself apart from the party historians who were writing to please an audience and who 
therefore tended to reinforce existing prejudices and preconceived notions. Impartiality 
was thus the most important quality to aspire to and Hume’s Edinburgh publisher 
confirmed his view that he had achieved it when he described the first Stuart volume as 
‘neither whig nor tory but truely imparshal [sic]’.345 For Hume as well as his publishers 
it was therefore of paramount importance to convey a notion that he would indeed 
provide the much-requested, truly impartial history that would fill the void in British 
                                                 
343 Hume to James Oswald of Dunnikier, 28 June 1753, HL, i, 179.  
344 This is evident from the following remarks in Hume’s letters: ‘I have the impudence to pretend that I 
am of no party, and have no bias.’ (Hume to Matthew Sharpe of Hoddam, 25 February 1754, HL, i, 185); 
‘I certainly deserve the Approbation of the Public, from my Care and Disinterestedness, however deficient 
in other Particulars.’ (Hume to William Strahan, 30 November [1756], HL, i, 235); ‘I think I have kept 
clear of Party in my History’ (Hume to William Strahan, [November or December 1760], HL, 336). Yet 
Hume came to reconsider his earlier estimation of his supposedly impartial historical narrative when 
revising his account of the reigns of first two Stuarts in 1763: ‘In this new Edition, I have corrected several 
Mistakes & Oversights, which had chiefly proceeded from the plaguy Prejudices of Whiggism, with which 
I was too much infected when I began this Work. … As I began the History with these two Reigns, I now 
find that they, above all the rest, have been corrupted with Whig Rancour, and that I really deserv’d the 
Name of a party Writer, and boasted without any Foundation of my Impartiality’. (Hume to Gilbert Elliot 
of Minto, 12 March 1763, NHL, pp. 69-70).  
345 Gavin Hamilton to William Strahan, 29 January 1754, quoted in Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), p. 
303.  
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literature.346 Paradoxically impartiality, which found its expression in a neglect of 
present interest and an appeal to posterity, could thus become a selling point with an 
eighteenth-century readership. Though he knew that expectations were going to be high, 
Hume was clearly convinced that he had succeeded.347  
     While ‘impartiality’ was the most important objective, it was not the only one 
required to secure the success of the work: ‘The first Quality of an Historian is to be true 
& impartial; the next to be interesting.’348 This underlines the fact that history was still 
to a great extent judged according to the standards that applied to literature.349 This 
required a certain kind of narrative that would keep readers interested. As we have seen, 
Hume wrote to Clephane that ‘I make my work very concise, after the manner of the 
Ancients.’ This was a conscious decision for a particular kind of history, a decision on 
which he elaborated in a later letter to the prospective translator of the first volume, the 
Abbé Le Blanc, written after he had finished the first volume of the History of Great 
Britain: 
If you consider the vast Variety of Events, with which these two Reigns, 
particularly the last, are crowded, you will conclude, that my Narrative is 
rapid, and that I have more propos’d as my Model the concise manner of the 
antient Historians, than the prolix, tedious Style of some modern Compilers. I 
have inserted no original Papers, and enter’d into no Detail of minute, 
uninteresting Facts. The philosophical Spirit, which I have so much indulg’d in 
all my Writings, finds here ample Materials to work upon.350  
The decision to adopt the classical historical narrative as his model was thus a conscious 
one that entailed the rejection of the style adopted by his immediate predecessors. Like 
his insistence on his own impartiality, Hume’s effort to provide an ‘interesting’ narrative 
                                                 
346 For the notion of impartiality see in eighteenth-century historical writing see Hicks, Neoclassical 
History, pp. 13-4, 161-2.  
347 Ten years later, when he was revising his account of the reigns of the first two Stuarts, Hume had 
occasion to change his initial assessment of his own impartiality: ‘As I began the History with these two 
Reigns, I now find that they, above all the rest, have been corrupted with Whig Rancour, and that I really 
deserv’d the Name of a party Writer, and boasted without any Foundation of my Impartiality’. Hume to 
Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 12 March 1763, NHL, pp. 69-70.  
348 Hume to William Mure of Caldwell, [October 1754], HL, i, 210.  
349 ‘History was regarded, without qualification, as a branch of literature.’ Karen O’Brien, ‘History and 
Literature 1660-1780’, in The Cambridge History of English Literature 1660-1780, ed. John Richetti 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 365-390, esp. p. 365.  
350 Hume to the Abbé Le Blanc, 12 September 1754, HL, i, 193. This passage raises questions about what 
constitutes a ‘concise narrative’ and where Hume’s Stuart history exhibits the workings of a ‘philosophical 
Spirit’, questions that will be addressed in the ensuing chapter.  
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was thus indicative of a wish to dissociate himself from his predecessors. An author of 
such a narrative needed to avoid ‘the prolix, tedious Style’ and superfluous ‘Detail of 
minute, uninteresting Facts’ that made antiquarian histories dull reading to all but 
antiquarians. ‘Interest’ was the criterion by which events, episodes and characters were 
selected and others, minute and potentially of little interest to the general reader, were 
being discarded.351 Hume was well aware of the crucial importance of a readable and 
engaging style and was convinced that a ‘lively interesting Narration & an elegant Style 
… commonly determine’ a book’s success with the public.352  
     Hume boldly states his highest ambition as a historian and his own high expectations 
of the work he was then engaged in composing in a classical reference which he knew 
his learned friend would recognize as the line from Thucydides who had famously 
described his work as not intended to please an immediate audience, but rather as ‘a 
possession for all time’ (KTHMA ES AEI).353 Hume thus associates his own aspirations 
as a historian with those of Thucydides by invoking the famous claim that occurs in the 
opening section of the History of the Peloponnesian War. It is here worth recalling that 
in his populousness dissertation Hume had stated that ‘The first page of THUCYIDES 
is, in my opinion, the commencement of real history’.354 This sentence is generally 
                                                 
351 As Hume’s friend and correspondent Hugh Blair would later state it: ‘It is by means of circumstances 
and particulars properly chosen that a narration becomes interesting and affecting to the Reader. These 
give life, body, and colouring to the recital of facts, and enable us to behold them as present, and passing 
before our eyes.’ Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric (1783) cited in Mark Salber Phillips, Society and sentiment: 
genres of historical writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000), p. 42.  
352 Hume to John Clephane, 18 February 1755, quoted in an appendix to J. C. A. Gaskin, ‘Hume’s 
Attenuated Deism’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 65 (1983), 160-173, esp. 172. In a letter of 
the same year Hume defended his controversial depiction of Charles I tragic fate by saying that a 
sufficient motive for this was provided by ‘my Interest as a Writer, who desires to please & interest his 
Readers’. Hume to William Strahan, 3 May 1755, HL, i, 222.  
353 ‘My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to 
last for ever.’ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner, with an 
introduction and notes by M. I. Finley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 48. On this passage see Simon 
Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. I: Books I-III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 61-2. 
In the introduction to his translation of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes commented on this passage: 
‘[Thucydides] affected least of any man the acclamations of popular auditories, and wrote not his history 
to win present applause, as was the use of that age: but for a monument to instruct the ages to come; which 
he professeth himself, and entitleth his book KTHMA ES AEI, a possession for everlasting.’ Cf. ‘Of the 
Life and History of Thucydides’, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. Sir William 
Molesworth (11 vols.; London: Bohn, 1839-45; reprinted London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1997), vol. viii, 
p. xxi.  
354 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 422.  
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understood as expressing Hume’s opinion that the origin of history lies in Thucydides 
rather than in the Histories of his older contemporary Herodotus, which Hume described 
as ‘HERODOTUS’S wonderful [i.e. non-factual] narrations’.355 Yet I would like to 
suggest that it can also be read literally as a specific reference to the actual ‘first page’ or 
opening section of Thucydides work, the Apologia which contains a programmatic 
exposition of what Thucydides considered as constituting ‘real history’. It is in this 
opening section that the famous lines occur which Hume quoted in his letter to 
Clephane. Hume’s letters of the period, in which he conceived and executed his History 
of Great Britain, indicate that he aspired to excel in the Thucydidean tradition in three 
important ways, which require a further examination: the type of history to be written, 
the choice of subject matter and the appeal to posterity.  
     Like Hume, Thucydides had set himself apart from his predecessors whom he 
described as being ‘less interested in telling the truth than in catching the attention of 
their public’ and whom he charged as being unreliable.356 His true innovation however 
consisted in the fact that he provided an alternative to the Herodotean cultural history in 
the form of a largely novel and profoundly influential notion of political history.357 
Practitioners of history in the eighteenth century were looking back to Thucydides as a 
model political historian to be studied and imitated.358 As for Thucydides, for Hume 
‘real history’ was primarily political history, a truthful record of wars and statecraft. This 
                                                 
355 ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, p. 424.  
356 History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Warner, p. 47.  
357 ‘The most important achievement of Thucyides was to persuade his successors that history is political 
history.’ Arnaldo Momigliano, The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 45. On Thucydides conception of political history see 
Donald R. Kelley, Faces of History: Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder (New Haven and 
London: Yale UP, 1998), pp. 28-31.  
358 Hicks, Neoclassical History contains by far the fullest discussion of Thucydides impact, but slightly 
overstates his case by classifying eighteenth-century histories as belonging to either a ‘Livian genre’ or a 
‘Thucydidean genre’ (Neoclassical History, p. 16). This is dubious in the light of the fact that Polybius 
rather than Thucyides was deemed to be ‘the master of political, diplomatic, and military wisdom’ until at 
least the end of the seventeenth century and was only beginning to be replaced by Thucydides by the mid-
eighteenth century, cf. Momigliano, Classical Foundations, p. 49. At the same time Livy’s work was 
loosing some of its former authority, cf. Hume, Essays, pp. 633-4. Hicks somewhat artificial categories 
lead him to contrast ‘Clarendon’s Thucydidean history of the Civil War’ with ‘the Livian history of the 
entire English past supplied by Hume’ (Neoclassical History, p. 209). Even if we accept Hicks’ restrictive 
categories it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Hume’s History of Great Britain was certainly more 
Thucydidean than Livian with regard to style and subject matter, even if his overall History of England 
may be Livian in scope.  
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was a commonplace Hume wholeheartedly accepted. In the case of Stuart history this 
meant ‘the narration of parliamentary factions, or court intrigues, or civil wars’ referred 
to in his letter to Clephane. This echoes his earlier description of history as ‘[t]he records 
of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions’ and, in the fullest phrase ‘those Annals of 
Wars, & Politics, Intrigues, & Revolutions, Quarrels & Convulsions, which it is the 
Business of an Historian to record & transmit to Posterity.’359 Thucydides’ brand of 
political history as described in the apologia was characterized by two elements, namely 
the extensive use of set speeches and the stress on the underlying causes of political 
events.360 Both are of vital importance for the understanding of Hume’s narrative, but, as 
they concern not so much the ambition of the historian as the practice of history we 
cannot draw on the evidence of the letters and must consult instead the narrative of the 
History of Great Britain itself, which will be analysed in the following chapter.  
     Such a history required a suitably grand subject matter. In setting his work apart from 
that of his predecessors, Thucydides claimed that the Peloponnesian war was the 
grandest possible subject, having involved the entire Hellenic world, as well as being the 
most relevant for contemporary readers. He therefore not only defended his decision to 
write the history of the war in which he participated, but his choice of subject matter, 
maintaining that this was indeed the most worthy subject for a historical narrative. 
Exceeding in greatness even the Persian War described by Herodotus, the Peloponnesian 
War was thus ‘a great war and more worth writing about than any of those that had taken 
place in the past’.361 Hume agreed with this assessment when stating in the first Enquiry: 
‘The PELOPONNESIAN war is a proper subject for history’.362 As we have seen, Hume 
himself used similar terms to Adam Smith in order to justify his choice of the Stuarts, by 
                                                 
359 EPM, p. 150; ‘Draft of Preface to a volume of D Hume’s History’ (c. 1756) printed in Mossner, Life of 
Hume (1980 edn.), p. 306.  
360 ‘The explicit formulation of a distinction between profound and superficial causes is arguable 
[Thucydides] greatest single contribution to later history-writing’, Hornblower, Commentary, p. 65. These 
are of profound importance to the understanding of Hume’s approach to the writing of narrative history 
and in particular the set-piece political debates that characterise the History of Great Britain and will 
therefore be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
361 History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Warner, pp. 35, 48. Some modern historians maintain that 
Thucydides slightly overstated the case for ‘his’ war, while others have come to agree with his 
assessment, cf. Hornblower, Commentary, p. 62.  
362 EPM, p. 106. 
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stating that ‘the Subject appears to me very fine’ as this period was ‘the most curious, 
interesting, & instructive Part of our History’. Due to its upheavals, civil war and 
constitutional changes, Stuart history had more than a fair share of those intrigues, 
factions, quarrels, wars and revolutions that formed the main subject matter of history. 
In addition, it was also the period closest to the present and, since ‘the Factions, which 
then arose, having an Influence on our present Affairs’, it would be the most relevant 
and most instructive period for a mid-eighteenth century readership.363 Hume repeated 
this assessment two years later upon having finished the first volume: ‘I esteem this 
Period, both for signal Events & extraordinary Characters, to be the most interesting in 
modern History’.364  
     The kind of history Hume wrote, the choice of subject matter together with the 
‘impartial’ and ‘interesting’ way in which he wrote it, seemed to set the work up for 
immediate success. Yet we have seen that the critical reviews and the slow sales initially 
confounded Hume’s high hopes. The profound sense of disappointment and 
disillusionment upon the hostile reception of his history and the persistent criticism of 
his treatment of both politics and religion found expression in what appears to have been 
a draft of a preface or explanatory note to be prefixed or attached to the second volume 
written in either 1755 or 1756. This draft manuscript is the closest thing we have to an 
apologia for Hume’s History of Great Britain.365 After having given a thorough defence 
of his controversial treatment of religion, Hume goes on to provide a short but scathing 
statement on the unfavourable reception accorded to the work of a historian who thought 
he had taken sufficient care to put himself beyond the reproach of partiality:  
As to the civil & political Part of his Performance, [the author] scorns to 
suggest any Apology, where he thinks himself intitled to Approbation. To be 
above the Temptations of Interest is a Species of Virtue, which we do not find 
by Experience to be very common: But to neglect at the same time all popular 
& vulgar Applause, is an Enterprize much more rare & arduous. Whoever in a 
                                                 
363 Hume to Adam Smith, 24 September 1752, HL, i, 167-8.  
364 Hume to the Abbé Le Blanc, 12 September 1754, HL, i, 193.  
365 This draft appeared as a much-altered footnote in the second volume of the History of Great Britain 
published late in 1756. Cf. Hume, The history of Great Britain, Vol. II (1757 [1756] edn.), pp. 449-50.  
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factious Nation pays Court to neither Party, must expect that Justice will be 
done to him by Time only, perhaps only by a distant Posterity.366 
This passage reveals a real sense of bitterness, a refusal to accept the reception his work 
had received from contemporaries, and strikes an accusatory note. In fact, this is the 
closest Hume ever comes to insulting his readers and it is thus not surprising to note that 
this passage of the draft did not find its way into the published work.367 As this note 
shows, Hume had not given up on the notion of writing for posterity, but now the 
classical commonplace had taken on a polemical edge, consisting in his expressed 
preference for posterity over his contemporary readers. As he wrote to a friend in May 
1755: ‘It is not so easy to put right what has once been set wrong; but Time does Justice 
to every body; at least to every Book.’368  
     In the end, due to the eventual commercial success and critical acclaim his work 
received, Hume was able to resolve this tension and reconcile the two aims, though at a 
cost. The sense of idealism and the lofty aims with which Hume had commenced work 
on the first Stuart volume did not survive untarnished his profound disappointment about 
                                                 
366 MS in Hume’s handwriting in the Keynes Library, King’s College, Cambridge. Found among the 
papers of Gilbert Elliot of Minto papers, it is endorsed by his son ‘Draft of Preface to a volume of D 
Hume’s History’. It appears doubtful to me whether this draft was ever meant to be a ‘Preface’ rather than 
an lengthy foot- or endnote given that none of the instalments of Hume’s History include a preface. The 
piece is printed in full by Mossner, Life of Hume (1980 edn.), pp. 306-7, who dates it to 1756. Mossner’s 
conjecture is based on the fact that parts of the draft appeared in altered form in the second volume of the 
History published in 1756. To be sure, the draft makes reference to the second volume, but then Hume had 
originally meant to publish that volume in 1755 as is clear from a remark in his first letter to the Abbé Le 
Blanc, 12 September 1754, HL, i, 194: ‘The Second Volume of my History will be publishd in a 
twelvemonth after the first.’ In addition to this a number of formulations used in the draft have direct 
parallels in Hume’s letters of the period February - May 1755. See in particular Hume to the Abbé Le 
Blanc, 26 Fenruary 1755, in Jérôme Vercruysse, ‘Lettre et Corrections Inédites de David Hume’, in Dix-
Huitième Siècle, 2 (1970), 33-37; Hume to William Strahan, 22 March 1755, in Heiner Klemme, ‘“And 
Time Does Justice to All The World”: Ein unveröffentlichter Brief von David Hume an William Strahan’, 
in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 657-664, esp. 659-661; Hume to William Strahan, 3 
May 1755, HL, i, 221-2. The slightly accusatory tone of the passage cited above is far removed from the 
more detached and cautious tone of the 1756 footnote and more reminiscent of Hume’s expressions of 
disappointment in early 1755. For these reasons I would cautiously date the draft to spring 1755.  
367 As this draft was found in the papers of Gilbert Elliot of Minto, I would furthermore conjecture that 
Hume followed his usual practice of sending his more controversial pieces to Minto to ask him for advice. 
Given Elliot’s well-known prudence and circumspection as well as his advice against publication of the 
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion in 1751, it was probably he who dissuaded Hume from publishing 
a piece that was more likely to insult than to appease Hume’s critics. 
368 Hume to Michael Ramsay, 3 May 1755. Cf. Hume to William Strahan, 22 March 1755: ‘[T]ime does 
Justice to all the World.’, both quoted in Klemme, ‘“And Time Does Justice to All The World”’, 660 note 
16.  
 155 
its initial reception. Hume’s authorial decisions about the History as reflected in his 
letters reveal him to have become somewhat less idealistic and more cautious and 
pragmatic. As we have seen, he admitted that he finished the second Stuart volume ‘with 
infinite Disgust & Reluctance’ and a more pragmatic attitude seems to have crept in by 
1759, when he finally and without any sense of enthusiasm decided to write the 
medieval volumes of the History of England.369 Not even the thought of posthumous 
fame could ultimately motivate Hume to commit himself to continuing his History and 
Strahan cajoled him in vain by saying that it would be ‘the only thing wanting to fill up 
the Measure of your Glory as the Great Historian and Philosopher of the Eighteenth 
Century’ whose work ‘will remain for ever the Standard History of this country’.370 The 
inherent conflict between commercial success and writing ‘a possession for all time’ is 
perhaps best expressed by Edward Gibbon in a letter to Hume dating from October 
1767, long after Hume had completed his History of England but before he had finally 
abandoned its continuation. While maintaining that aspiring historians like himself were 
writing for an immediate rather than a posthumous audience, Gibbon stressed that the 
author of the History of England was sufficiently qualified to harbour much higher 
aspirations: ‘A Hume … may leave a KTHMA ES AEI’.371  
 
                                                 
369 This is evident from a letter he wrote to Adam Smith upon signing the contract for that part of the 
History of England: ‘I shall execute this Work at Leizure, without fatiguing myself by such ardent 
Application as I have hitherto employd. It is chiefly as a Ressource against Idleness, that I shall undertake 
this Work: For as to Money, I have enough: And as to Reputation, what I have wrote already will be 
sufficient, if it be good: If not, it is not likely that I shall now write better.’ Hume to Adam Smith, 28 July 
1759, HL, i, 314.  
370 William Strahan to Hume, May 25 1771, in Birkbeck Hill (ed.), Letters of David Hume to William 
Strahan, p. : ‘If you write another volume, which the best judges of writing are daily enquiring after, you 
may demand what you please for it. It shall be granted. … I heartily wish you would seriously think of 
setting about it. It is the only thing wanting to fill up the measure of your glory as the Great Historian and 
Philosopher of the Eighteenth Century. But you certainly do not see this matter in the same light I do, 
otherwise you would not hesitate one moment in continuing a Work, which (imperfect as it is in point of 
time) will remain for ever the Standard History of this country.’ 
371 Gibbon had consulted Hume about his historical work, a history of Switzerland, written in French and 
eventually left unfinished. Hume had encouraged Gibbon to write his history in English, which he 
considered likely to become the lingua franca of future centuries. Cf. Hume to Edward Gibbon, 24 
October 1767, HL, ii, 170-1. Gibbon replied the next day: ‘A Hume (you will excuse the instance) may 
leave a KTHMA ES AEI, but the ambition of us plebeian writers is limited to a much narrower term, both 
of space and of duration. My vanity will be gratified, If I am read with some pleasure by a few of my 
contemporaries, without aiming to instruct or amuse our posterity on the other side of the Atlantick 
Ocean.’ The Letters of Edward Gibbon, ed. J. E. Norton (3 vols., London: Cassell, 1956), i, 222.  
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5. 2. ‘Impartial Reasoners’: Hume, Rapin, and the Quest for Impartiality 
 
We have seen that among all the qualities requisite for an historian impartiality ranked 
highest. This was Hume’s main concern while writing his history, as is reflected in the 
numerous references to impartiality in his letters of the period. Hume knew all along that 
the success of his History of Great Britain would depend largely on whether people 
accepted his claim to be above party. Upon its publication his History was immediately 
accused of being biased, but we should not seek to project this back into his state of 
mind during the time he composed the first Stuart volume. The letters written just before 
the publication of that volume reflect a genuine sense of complacency on Hume’s part as 
he clearly felt he had done all he could do to ensure that the work would be hailed as the 
first truly impartial history of Stuart Britain. This should lead us to enquire how he 
sought to convey a sense of his impartiality in his narrative. This, it will be argued, can 
best be done by an in-depth analysis of a neglected feature of Hume’s History of Great 
Britain, namely the set-piece political debate. Such an analysis will allow us to work out 
the meaning and implications of Hume’s concept of impartiality in contrast to that of his 
main rival for the ‘post of honour in the English Parnassus’, the Huguenot historian Paul 
de Rapin-Thoyras (1661-1725), who was Hume’s predecessor both as an analyst of the 
British party-system and as an historian of the British constitution. The differences 
between their respective ideals of impartiality and the degree to which those ideals were 
actually realised in their historical works can best be brought out by a close comparison 
between the political debates they inserted into their narratives in order to shed light on 
the constitutional conflicts of early Stuart Britain. Before we embark on this 
investigation, it will be requisite to provide a brief account of how Rapin’s History of 
England had established itself as the most impartial of all histories of England by the 
mid-eighteenth century and to consider when and how Hume came to believe that it by 
no means merited this high reputation.  
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     Rapin-Thoyras, more widely known as Rapin, was a French Huguenot who spent 
most of his life in the tolerant and intellectually vibrant climate of the Dutch Republic.372 
Having come to Britain as part of the invasion launched by William of Orange, he 
continued to be connected with influential Whig politicians, and this connection enabled 
him to consult state documents for his Dissertation sur des Whigs et les Torys (1717) 
and his multi-volume Histoire d’Angleterre (1723-1725). Even though these works were 
written with the aim of explaining the British party system and English constitutional 
history to a foreign audience, their peculiar combination of engaging set-pieces and 
antiquarian erudition greatly appealed to the British reading public. The standard 
translation by Nicholas Tindal’s (1725-1731) was an immediate bookselling success and 
remained immensely popular. Holding its ground against the works of competitors such 
as Thomas Carte, James Ralph and William Guthrie, who failed to provide a similarly 
accessible account of the English past and were generally perceived as having 
succumbed to their party biases, Rapin’s work remained the standard History of England 
until at least the mid-eighteenth century and continued to be read for a long time 
afterwards.373  
     Rapin himself was well aware of the pitfalls of partiality and stated in his History that 
‘there is scarce any Hopes of seeing an impartial History of England, from the beginning 
of King James the First’s Reign, to our Time’.374 Yet he was somehow convinced that 
he had managed to escape this dilemma and to free himself from party bias: ‘For my 
part, [I] am not engaged in either of the Parties, and aim only at Truth’.375 Though Rapin 
had influential Whig connections, his status as a foreigner who had written his History of 
England in the Dutch Republic was sometimes invoked to explain how he had managed 
to succeed whereas native historians had failed. Rapin’s ambitious claim to have written 
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the impartial account of English history was largely accepted in the years succeeding the 
publication of his work in England, when Tindal’s translation of the History of England 
soon attained an authoritative status that made it desirable for both Whigs and Tories to 
draw on this work for their own party-political accounts of English constitutional 
history. Scottish men of letters were equally willing to accept Rapin’s claim to 
impartiality as is clear from Adam Smith remark that while ‘[i]t has been the fate of all 
modern histories to be wrote in a party spirit [,] Rapin seems to be the most candid of all 
those who have wrote the affairs of England’.376 Statements such as this reveal that by 
the time Hume wrote his Essays and his History of Great Britain, Rapin continued to be 
acclaimed as the historian who had come closest to realising the elusive ideal an 
impartial history of England.   
     Hume had been aware of Rapin’s work since the early 1730s and had come to share 
his friend’s positive assessment of the Huguenot historian. Hume’s earliest account of 
Stuart history and the emergence of the British party system in the seventeenth century, 
contained in his Essays, Moral and Political (1741/42), shares some similarity with 
Rapin’s, on whom he appears to have drawn for his assessment of the reigns of the first 
two Stuarts. Consider the following concise account of ‘the first rise of parties in 
England, during the great rebellion’  in Hume’s essay ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’ 
(1741):  
The English Constitution, before that Time, had lain in a Kind of Confusion; 
yet so, as that the Subjects possess’d many noble Privileges, which, though 
not, perhaps, exactly bounded and secur’d by Law, were universally deem’d, 
from long Possession, to belong to them as their Birth-Right. An ambitious, or 
rather an ignorant,377 Prince arose, who esteem’d all these Privileges to be 
Concessions of his Predecessors, revokeable at Pleasure; and in Prosecution of 
this Principle, he openly acted in Violation of Liberty, during the Course of 
several Years. Necessity, at last, constrain’d him to call a Parliament: The 
Spirit of Liberty arose: The Prince, being without any Support, was obliged to 
grant every Thing requir’d of him: And his Enemies, jealous and implacable, 
                                                 
376 Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (The Glasgow edition of the works and 
correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. iv), ed. J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 116. In 1747 
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set no Bounds to their Pretensions. Here then begun those Contests, in which it 
was no Wonder, that Men of that Age were divided into different Parties; 
since, even at this Day, the Impartial are at a Loss to decide concerning the 
Justice of the Quarrel.378 
This description of Charles as an ‘ambitious, or rather ignorant, Prince’ who ‘openly 
acted in Violation of Liberty’ is strongly reminiscent of Rapin’s interpretation of Stuart 
history.379 This is unsurprising as Rapin was still widely considered as the historian who 
had come closest to providing a standard historical account of the Stuart Age.  
     Even before taking up the post of librarian and embarking on his reading or re-
reading of the main accounts of Stuart history, Hume seems to have developed doubts 
about Rapin’s depiction of the Stuarts kings as bent on subverting an ancient constitution 
by deliberately usurping the privileges of their subjects. In a footnote to his essay ‘Of the 
Protestant Succession’, either written when this essay was first composed around 1748 
or added immediately before its eventual publication in 1752, Hume called Rapin ‘the 
most judicious of our historians’, while at the same time hinting at his disagreement with 
the French historian’s assessment of the first two Stuarts: 
It appears from the speeches, and proclamations, and whole train of King 
JAMES I.’s actions, as well as his son’s, that they considered the ENGLISH 
government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that any considerable 
part of their subjects entertained a contrary idea. This made them discover their 
pretensions, without preparing any force to support them; and even without 
reserve or disguise, which are always employed by those, who enter upon any 
new project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. … As these were 
very common, if not, perhaps, the universal notions of the times, the two first 
princes of the house of STUART were the more excusable for their mistake. 
And RAPIN, the most judicious of historians, seems to treat them with too 
much severity, upon account of it.380 
This is the earliest instance of Hume entertaining any doubt about the French historian’s 
interpretation of early Stuart history and it is here that we can discern the nucleus of 
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Hume’s diverging interpretation of this crucial period of British history. According to 
Hume, no design to subvert the constitution could possibly be ascribed to James I or 
Charles I, whose actions only testified to their naivety concerning the nature of the 
constitution and their lack of prudence with regard to their own controversial policies. 
Any fair assessment of their political outlook and actions needed to take into account the 
prevailing notions about the English constitution, which was regarded by many of their 
subjects as an absolute monarchy. This leads us to a closer consideration of the 
following stages in the gradual process by which Hume came to change his initially 
positive assessment of his Huguenot predecessor.  
     Hume appears to have closely read Rapin’s volumes on the Stuarts while in the 
process of composing his own History of Great Britain, as is evident from his extensive 
use of the Huguenot historian’s work as a source for his own narrative of Stuart 
history.381 If Hume had come to develop doubts about Rapin’s interpretation by 1752, 
these doubts were to be confirmed and amplified when he came to make up his mind 
about the early Stuarts and construct his own account of the constitutional struggles in 
which they had been involved. On having completed his narrative of James’ reign Hume 
remarked to John Clephane in January 1753 that ‘[s]tyle, judgement, impartiality, care – 
everything is wanting to our historians; and even Rapin, during this latter period, is 
extremely deficient’.382 As he proceeded in the writing of his Stuart history, this 
dissatisfaction hardened into the outright contempt expressed in a remark he made in 
June of the same year: ‘Rapin, whom I had an esteem for, is totally despicable’.383 
Having reviewed and reversed his earlier assessment of Rapin’s qualities as a historian, 
Hume was careful to convey his revised opinion of the Huguenot historian when 
amending his earlier essays for republication, replacing the words ‘Rapin, the most 
judicious of our historians’ in the passage from the essay ‘Of the Protestant Succession’ 
quoted above with ‘Rapin, suitable to his usual malignity and partiality’.384 This 
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suggests that a profound change of mind had taken place sometime after Hume had 
commenced work on his History of Great Britain in 1752. Hume commented on this 
complete reversal of his earlier assessment of Rapin in a letter he wrote to his 
prospective translator, the Abbé Le Blanc, in July 1757: ‘To tell the Truth, I was carry’d 
away with the usual Esteem pay’d to that Historian, till I came to examine him more 
particularly, when I found him altogether despicable; & I was not asham’d to 
acknowledge my Mistake.’385  
     In little more than a decade, Hume had nearly come full circle in his interpretation of 
Stuart history. In his History of Great Britain he had put forth an account that was partly 
conceived as a refutation of the claims made by Rapin and others concerning the 
supposed guilt of the early Stuarts and in so doing he had entirely revised the 
interpretation he had set forth in his Essay, Moral and Political of 1741/42. Hume was 
well aware of the fact that his readers could not help but notice the discrepancies 
between the different evaluations of James I and Charles I in his succinct account of 
1741 and the grand narrative of 1754-56, yet he did not substantially revise his earlier 
account in successive editions of his Essays and Treatises. He did however use the 
occasion of a new edition of that work, published in two-volume in 1758, to attach a 
note to the essay ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’ in which he distances himself from his 
earlier views:  
Some of the opinions delivered in these Essays, with regard to the public 
transactions in the last century, the author, on more accurate examination, 
found occasion to retract in his History of GREAT BRITAIN. And as he would 
not enslave himself to the systems of either party, neither would he fetter his 
judgment by his own preconceived opinions and principles; nor is he ashamed 
to acknowledge his mistakes. [To which was added, in the edition of 1777:] 
These mistakes were indeed, at that time, almost universal in this kingdom.386  
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This disclaimer indicates the extent to which Hume had abandoned his earlier views. 
Had the change in his interpretation of Stuart history been a mere matter of nuances, 
Hume would have undoubtedly made use of the opportunity offered by successive 
republications of ‘these Essays’ in his Essays and Treatises to silently correct his views, 
as he had done with a number of statements on other subjects. That he felt the need to 
openly admit to the discrepancies between his interpretations of Stuart history in his 
early political essays and his account of the same period in his History of Great Britain 
indicates that he felt this discrepancy to be too great to escape the attention of his readers 
or to be amended without rewriting substantial sections of his early political essays, in 
particular the essay ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’. As it was, Hume had profoundly 
changed his views on the constitutional conflict which had led to the breakdown of the 
Stuart constitution under Charles I.  
     Hume’s realisation that Rapin was far from being an ‘impartial’ and ‘judicious’ 
historian went hand in hand with his conviction that he himself had achieved the 
impartiality which Rapin had only claimed to possess. Whereas Rapin had come to 
realise that every historian writing the history of the Stuarts ‘will be looked upon as 
Partial, by one or other of the two Factions’,387 Hume composed his own history assured 
of his success in achieving the status of impartial historian. In June 1753, when writing 
to a friend about his increasing awareness of the deficiencies of English historical 
writing and his discovery that Rapin was ‘despicable’, Hume added: ‘I may be liable to 
the reproach of ignorance, but I am certain of escaping that of partiality’.388 In this 
regard he was to be sorely disappointed, as we have seen. Reviewers praised the literary 
qualities of the work but pointed out that ‘[i]n regard to impartiality, and an inviolable 
respect to truth, the indispensable and essential qualifications of an Historian, he appears 
to us greatly deficient’.389 Hume’s success with the reviewers did not completely silence 
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these voices and Macaulay brought similar charges against Hume in the nineteenth 
century. Hume’s History is treated far more favourably in the influential reassessment of 
his political and historical writings put forth by Duncan Forbes, who insisted that Hume 
largely succeeded in realising his aspiration to become an impartial political essayist and 
historian.390 Forbes’ emphasis on the central importance of the concept of ‘impartiality’ 
to the understanding of Hume’s objectives in his political and historical writings is 
largely accepted in current Hume scholarship, though by not every Hume scholar is 
convinced that this claim is actually borne out in Hume’s History.391 In order to shed 
some fresh light on this important problem, we need to proceed to a close examination 
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6. Narrative and Philosophy in Hume’s History of Great Britain: The Case of the 
Set-Piece Debates 
 
6. 1. Party-Political Debates in Rapin and Hume’s Narratives of Stuart History 
 
Hume’s claim to have replaced Rapin and avoided what he regarded as the latter’s 
excessive partiality can ultimately only be assessed by examining his own narrative and 
comparing it to that of his predecessor. This will allow us to establish whether Hume’s 
ambitious claims concerning his impartiality as a historian are actually borne out by his 
narrative account of Stuart history. Since a comprehensive comparison of Rapin’s and 
Hume’s narratives would transcend the scope of the present work, it will be necessary to 
confine the present enquiry to a number of representative passages of both works that 
afford illuminating points of comparison. One such point is presented by their respective 
accounts of the dispute between James VI and I and the Commons in 1621, which was 
precipitated by the king’s dissolution of his third parliament and led to a general debate 
concerning the boundaries of royal prerogative and parliamentary privilege. This 
important episode occupies a prominent place in both Rapin and Hume’s narratives of 
the constitutional struggles of the Stuart Age. Both historians insert a particular form of 
debate into their narrative of this dispute between Crown and Commons and these 
debates shed light on their respective ideals of impartiality and the degree to which these 
ideals have been realised in their histories. This difference is best brought out by a 
comparison of Rapin’s and Hume’s use of set-piece political debates and the narrative 
accounts in which these debates are embedded.  
     Having related the events leading to the dissolution of James’ third parliament 
including long verbatim quotations from the declarations on both sides, which is 
followed by a lengthy digression in which he seeks to evaluate the claims of both sides 
with regard to the origins and nature of the royal prerogative on the one hand and 
parliamentary privileges on the other hand.392 Having set out the case for both sides in a 
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paragraph each, Rapin concludes that the disputed question was such that it could not be 
decided either way and that it therefore ought to have been avoided at all costs. He 
consequently accords blame to James I and his successors down to James VII and II for 
their imprudence in engaging in ‘this Quarrel’. Rapin then explicitly apologises to his 
readers for inserting such a digression into the body of his history, which he justifies by 
saying that it ‘seems of Use to set the Reader right, and help him to judge impartially of 
the Differences which sprang up in this, and brought forth so many Calamities in the 
following Reign’.393 At this point Rapin does not immediately resume the narration of 
the history of events, but instead reflects on the issues arising from the dispute between 
James and the Commons: 
But the saddest Consequence of the Rupture between the King and Parliament, 
was the Division among the Subjects, who went over more and more to the 
two opposite Parties which are in being at this Day, with some difference, 
under the Name of Tories and Whigs. These two parties which were now 
beginning to be formed, were contended at first with wrangling and contesting 
with one another, in defence of the King’s or the People’s Rights, with respect 
to what had occasioned the Dissolution of the Parliament.394  
For Rapin, as for Hume, the significance of the turbulent parliamentary session of 1621 
consisted in the fact that in hindsight this period could be identified as the moment at 
which the two factions originated that shaped the constitutional struggles of the Stuart 
Era. This was consequently a crucial period in British political history due to the fact 
that these same factions survived to become institutionalised and dominate the 
eighteenth-century political scene.  
     Rapin’s remark on the first formation of two opposing factions during the crisis of 
1621 is immediately followed by a set-piece debate outlining the arguments of the two 
sides in a paragraph each:  
The Royalists affirmed, the Commons meant to make a Republican 
Government of the English Monarchy. ... England was originally a Monarchy, 
and had all along continued upon the same Foot: But the Foundations thereof 
were going to be undermined, by making the King subject to the Parliament. 
At first they were only Remonstrances that were made to the King, afterwards, 
Advice and Counsels were added; but these Counsels were soon converted into 
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Instructions, and the Instructions into Orders and Commands: In a Word, if the 
Commons were suffered to go on, the King would soon become a mere Doge. 
… In short, it was a strange Thing, that under a Monarchical Government, the 
People, or their Representatives should tell the King how he was to govern his 
Kingdom…. 
     The Favourers of the People said on their Part, the King was not satisfied 
with England’s being a Monarchy, but would make it an absolute Monarchy. 
He affected to confound the several Kinds of Monarchies, whereof some were 
more, others less absolute, in order to acknowledge one sort only, to which he 
ascribed an unlimited Power. The English Monarchy was not of this kind, but 
began with the Parliament, which being as ancient as the Regal Dignity, 
formed, together with the Sovereign, the absolute Power the King would 
assume to himself alone. The Parliament had Their Privileges, as the King had 
His, nor could be deprived of them, without destroying the Nature and 
Constitution of the English Government. …  
     This is Part of what was then said on both Sides, and is what served to 
cherish Dissention between the two Parties, who have scarce ever since ceased 
to revile one another.395  
This passage resembles the set-piece debate Hume was to insert into his own narrative 
account of James’ dispute with his parliament. We shall have occasion to assess the 
similarities and differences between the two debates in due course, but it is worth noting 
at this stage that the significant differences between Rapin’s and Hume’s accounts of the 
build-up to the dissolution of James’ third parliament can only be fully brought out by 
taking into account the structural as well as the interpretative elements of their respective 
narrative of these events. We have seen that Rapin inserted a lengthy digression into his 
narrative which he justified by saying that it seemed useful ‘to set the Reader right’ and 
help him to form an impartial judgement about the constitutional dispute which 
originated in James’ reign and was to prove so disastrous for his successor. Hume 
largely avoided the insertion of lengthy digressions and extensive direct quotations from 
the declarations of both parties which had served both the Earl of Clarendon and Rapin 
as a means to ostentatiously demonstrate their supposed impartiality by presenting their 
readers with both sides of a given argument, thus enabling them to form their own 
judgements.396 Yet Rapin’s digression was problematic in other ways too: While he set 
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forth the case for both sides, he made clear towards the end of the digression that since 
the constitution was obscure in this crucial regard, James as well as his son and 
grandsons were to be blamed for imprudently engaging in this dispute. While he had 
thus ‘impartially’ set forth the cases for both sides, he had also ‘helped’ the reader to 
judge by pointing out that regardless which side of the constitutional argument one 
tended to agree with, King James VI and I was ultimately to blame for starting a quarrel 
that was to prove his successors unravelling. In other words, the Stuart kings had 
brought their troubles onto themselves.   
     We have seen that Hume had justified his decision not to insert any quotations from 
state papers into the body of his History by saying that he had sought to avoid ‘the 
prolix, tedious Style of some modern Compilers’.397 As for digressions, Hume realized 
from the beginning that he could not entirely avoid them since he needed to provide his 
readers with summary accounts of the most important constitutional developments 
before the start of his narration in 1603.398 The number of digressions in the text can thus 
be explained with reference to the fact that Hume decided to commence with the reign of 
James VI and I instead of beginning with an account of the preceding periods of English 
history.  When he eventually turned back to write the history of the Tudors following the 
publication of the second volume of his History of Great Britain in 1756, Hume came to 
realize that he had made his task more difficult by having starting with the Stuarts. 
Writing to John Clephane in September 1757, he states that  
I am now very busily engaged in writing another volume of History, and have 
crept backwards to the reign of Henry the VII. I wish, indeed, that I had begun 
there: For by that means, I should have been able, without making any 
digressions, by the plain course of the narration, to have shown how absolute 
the authority was, which the English kings then possessed, and that the Stuarts 
did little or nothing more than continue matters in the former tract, which the 
people were determined no longer to admit.399  
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Hume clearly thought that his History would have been all the more persuasive if its 
message had been conveyed by the narrative alone rather than by a combination of 
narrative and digressions. In this view, the ‘plain course of the narration’ which its 
sequence of events and examples had an explanatory potential far greater than that of 
any digression, since it could make the reader perceive the course of Tudor and Stuart 
constitutional history. Hume implemented this strategy in later editions of the History of 
England when he took the digressions out of the main body of the text and relegated 
them to foot- and endnotes, thus allowing the narrative of events to stand on its own and 
as it were to speak for itself. Yet this should not obscure the fact that Hume had already 
employed a similar strategy when first composing his History of Great Britain. He only 
used a small number of digressions in his account of the escalation between king and 
commons in James reign, which is largely presented in the form of a narrative. This is 
clearly done in an attempt to distance himself from the kind of historical writing 
historians like Rapin had practised, as is clear from Hume’s remark that he had ‘more 
propos’d as my Model the concise manner of the antient Historians, than the prolix, 
tedious Style of some modern Compilers’.400 It is in the context of Hume’s 
considerations about the explanatory potential of historical narrative that we need to 
understand the place and function of the set-piece debates in the History of Great 
Britain. These debates are one of the most prominent and remarkable features of Hume’s 
History and they present us with a test case of the degree to which he was able to 
translate his lofty ideal of impartiality into actual historiographical practice.401  
     Hume’s History of Great Britain contains seven proper set-piece political debates. 
When we consider their place in the narrative, it is striking to note that all of these 
debates are supposed to have taken place during three relatively brief periods. The first 
two debates are set in the period of increasing constitutional tensions that commenced 
with James’ rejection of the Protestation of the Commons in 1621 and led to the debate 
about the Petition of Right in 1628. Both these events provide opportunities for Hume to 
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present the opposing opinions arising during these disputes.402 No debates are to be 
found in Hume’s account of Charles’ so-called Personal Rule (1629-1640) for the 
obvious reason that no parliament was called during this period of relative calm. Two 
debates are inserted in Hume’s narrative of the turbulent years 1640-42, which saw the 
rapid disintegration of the Charles rule, namely the debate about subsidies during the 
Short Parliament in 1640 and Charles rejection of the Grand Remonstrance of 1641.403 
Hume’s narrative of the Civil War (1642-49), the years of the British Republic and 
Cromwell’s rule (1649-60) and the first twenty years of Charles’ reign are without 
debates. The final three debates are to be found in the last third of Hume’s second Stuart 
volume, in the account of the period extending from the Exclusion Crisis (1679-81) to 
the Revolution of 1688/89. These comprise the debate about the Bill of Exclusion, the 
debate during the first session of James II’s first parliament about revenue for life, and 
finally the first session of the Convention Parliament in early 1689.404 Though the 
debates are confined to these three relatively brief periods, these are decisive periods, 
which receive a relatively extended narrative treatment in Hume’s History. 
     What is common to these three periods is that they were all times of constitutional 
crisis, precipitating either an assertion of royal authority as after 1629 or an escalation 
into full-scale constitutional conflict as in 1642. Significantly, the debates are said to 
have taken place during periods in which parliament sat and in which a forum existed 
that allowed opposing opinions to be voiced. The debates also presuppose a situation in 
which neither the royalist nor the parliamentarian camp oppress the other side to such a 
degree that open debate becomes impossible. Even though the debates themselves are 
sometime framed as having taken place ‘throughout the nation’, they are invariably 
sparked by either a debate between monarch and parliament or a dispute between 
opposing factions in parliament. It is perhaps significant to note in this context that the 
first set-piece debate in the first volume of Hume’s History of Great Britain follows 
                                                 
402 HGB, pp. 182-5 (HE, v, 93-6) and HGB, pp. 294-6 (HE, v, 192-6).  
403 HGB, pp. 382-5 (HE, v, 273-5) and HGB, pp. 472-6 (HE, v, 352-6).  
404 The History of Great Britain, Vol. II: Containing the Commonwealth, and the Reigns of Charles II. and 
James II. (London: A. Millar, 1757 [1756]), pp. 323-5 [debate about the Bill of Exclusion], pp. 379-81 
[debates about revenue for life], and pp. 437-9 [debate about settlement of the succession]. Cf. HE, vi, 
388-91, 454-6, 524-6.  
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shortly after the digression giving an account of the rise of court and country parties 
during the reign of James I.405 Likewise, the first set-piece debate of the second Stuart 
volume follows a few pages after Hume has discussed the origins of Whig and Tory 
parties during the Exclusion Crisis.406 It is thus the rise of parties, which prepares the 
ground for the set-piece debates, and, conversely, the occurrence of such debates 
underscores the rise of opposing political principles and contrasting views about the 
nature of the English constitution. Insofar as they reflect the rise of party political 
principles, the set-piece political debates of Hume’s History can be adequately described 
as party political debates. 
     The first set-piece debate of the History occurs at the end of the fourth chapter of his 
account of the reign of James I. This debate is preceded by the description of James’ 
third parliament which Hume regards as a pivotal period in British constitutional history, 
a period that witnessed the first formation of court and country parties.407 The turbulent 
second session of that parliament led to an intense confrontation between King and 
Commons over the latter’s right to advise the former on points of foreign policy. The 
very language of Hume’s account of this confrontation conveys the build-up of tensions 
between the monarch and his Parliament: the Common’s ‘bold step’ of framing a 
remonstrance to remind the King of their ancient rights elicited a ‘violent letter’ from 
James, which is in turn triggered the parliamentarians’ ‘vigorous … answer’.408 In this 
manner the conflict slowly escalated to the point at which James tore the remonstrance 
out of the Common’s journal book with his own hand before eventually dissolving 
Parliament after a session that had lasted less than four weeks. Having traced this chain 
of events that led to the intensification of the quarrel between King and Commons, 
Hume emphasises the symbolic significance of James’ act: 
The King having thus, with so rash and indiscreet a hand, torn off that sacred 
veil, which hitherto covered the English constitution, and which threw an 
                                                 
405 HGB, pp. 169-73. This digression was later relegated to an endnote, cf. HE, v, 556-559, note.  
406 HE, vi, 381.  
407 ‘This parliament is remarkable for being the epoch, in which were first regularly formed, tho’ without 
acquiring these denominations, the parties of COURT and COUNTRY; parties, which have ever since 
continued, and which, while they often threaten the total dissolution of the government, are the real cause 
of its permanent life and vigour.’ HGB, p. 169.  
408 HGB, pp. 178f (Hume’s italics).  
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obscurity upon it, so advantageous to royal prerogative; every man began to 
indulge himself in political reasoning and inquiries; and the same factions, 
which commenced in parliament, were propagated thro’out the nation. In vain, 
did James, by reiterated proclamations, forbid the discoursing of state-affairs. 
Such proclamations, if they had any effect, served rather to inflame the 
curiosity of the public. And in every circle or society, the late transactions 
became the subject of argument and debate.409 
     Hume, following Rapin, ultimately puts the blame on James for the imprudent rather 
than unjust act of exposing the essentially obscure nature of the Elizabethan constitution 
with regard to the limits of royal prerogative and the extent to which parliamentary 
privileges could be regarded as royal concessions. As Hume had remarked to Adam 
Smith upon commencing his work on the History: ‘Twas under James that the House of 
Commons began first to raise their Head, & then the Quarrel betwixt Privilege & 
Prerogative commenc’d’.410 James VI and I had transformed a petty quarrel between a 
king and his parliament into a constitutional dispute that had the potential to unsettle the 
foundations of the Elizabethan constitution. The immediate effect of this was the 
widening of a constitutional conflict from a dispute between king and Commons to a 
public debate encompassing the whole nation, during which constitutional questions of 
relative obscurity were propelled into the public realm, where they ‘became the subject 
of argument and debate’. This wider debate was still conducted along the dividing line 
that had initially opened up in parliament, where two factions had begun to be formed 
which took the sides of king and Commons.411 This moment in Stuart history therefore 
not only marks a widening of the debate, but an extension of party distinctions that led to 
the first formation of court and country interests and Hume consequently locates the 
ultimate origins of these party distinctions in this particular period. The narration leading 
up to the debate thus bears out the statement Hume made earlier in the same chapter to 
the effect that James’ third parliament was ‘remarkable for being the epoch, in which 
were first regularly formed, tho’ without acquiring these denominations, the parties of 
COURT and COUNTRY; parties, which have ever since continued, and which, while 
                                                 
409 HGB, p. 182; HE V, 93. The edition of 1778 contains an additional footnote which identifies the pulpit 
and the press as those media which carried the debate to a large audience throughout the country. 
410 Hume to Adam Smith, 24 Sep 1752, HL, i, 168.  
411 HGB, p. 182.  
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they often threaten the total dissolution of the government, are the real cause of its 
permanent life and vigour’.412  
     The escalation of what had started as a petty quarrel between king and Commons 
ultimately led to the ensuing debate, which is summarized in the following two 
paragraphs that constitute the first set-piece debate of the History of Great Britain:  
All history, said the partizans of the court, as well as the history of England, 
justify the king’s position with regard to the origin of popular privileges; and 
every reasonable man must allow, that, as monarchy is the most simple form of 
government, it must first have occurred to rude and uninstructed mankind. The 
other complicated and artificial additions were the successive invention of 
sovereigns and legislators; or, if they were obtruded on the prince by seditious 
subjects, their origin must appear, on that very account, still more precarious 
and unfavourable. In England, the authority of the king, in all the exterior 
forms of government and in the common style of law, appears totally absolute 
and sovereign; nor does the real spirit of the constitution, as it has ever 
discovered itself in practice, fall much short of these appearances. The 
parliament is created by his will; by his will it is dissolved. It is his will alone, 
though at the desire of both houses, which gives authority to laws. … Subjects 
are not raised above that quality, though assembled in parliament. The same 
humble respect and deference is still due to their prince. Though he indulges 
them in the privilege of laying before him their domestic grievances, with 
which they are supposed to be best acquainted, this warrants not their bold 
intrusion into every province of government. And, to all judicious examiners, it 
must appear, “That the lines of duty are as much transgressed by a more 
independent and less respectful exercise of acknowledged powers, as by the 
usurpation of such as are new and unusual.” 
The lovers of liberty, throughout the nation, reasoned after a different manner. 
It is in vain, said they, that the king traces up the English government to its 
first origin, in order to represent the privileges of parliament as dependent and 
precarious: Prescription and the practice of so many ages, must, long ere this 
time, have given a sanction to these assemblies, even though they had been 
derived from an orgin no more dignified, than that which he assigns them. If 
the written records of the English nation, as asserted, represent parliaments to 
have arisen from the consent of monarchs, the principles of human nature, 
when we trace government a step higher, must show us, that monarchs 
themselves owe all their authority to the voluntary submission of the people. 
But, in fact, no age can be shown, when the English government was 
altogether an unmixed monarchy: And if the privileges of the nation have, at 
any period, been overpowered by violent irruptions of foreign force or 
domestic usurpation; the generous spirit of the people has ever seized the first 
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opportunity of re-establishing the ancient government and constitution. … Nor 
is it sufficient to say, that the mild and equitable administration of James, 
affords little occasion, or no occasion of complaint. How moderate soever 
exercise of his prerogative, how exact soever his observance of the laws and 
constitution; “If he founds his authority on arbitrary and dangerous principles, 
it is requisite to watch him with the same care, and to oppose him with the 
same vigour, as if he had indulged himself in all the excesses of cruelty and 
tyranny.”413  
     Each of these two paragraphs of equal length and structure contains a succinct 
paraphrase of the stance adopted by one of the two emerging parties. The two sets of 
arguments evolve around one fundamental issue, the origins and limitations of 
England’s monarchy, and the arguments Hume attributes to ‘[t]he lovers of liberty’ are 
in some regards a response to those of ‘the partizans of the court’. Both sides develop 
general arguments by drawing on conflicting accounts of English constitutional history 
as well as conjectural accounts of the origin and limitations of monarchical government 
based on general principles of political philosophy and human nature. In both cases the 
assertions of the first half of the paragraph with regard to the location of sovereignty in 
the English constitution are succeeded by inferences concerning the lawful behaviour of 
the people and the monarch in accordance with the accounts given of the proper 
boundaries of ancient privileges and royal prerogatives. The last sentences of each 
paragraph are given in inverted commas and are by this means distinguished from the 
preceding arguments which were rendered in a language more reminiscent of Hume’s 
earlier political writings than of the speeches and declarations of early seventeenth-
century England. The inverted commas could be understood as signalling direct 
quotations from a source document, though Hume does not provide any footnote 
references. It seems more likely that he inserted this element of direct speech at crucial 
points of the set-piece debate in order to lend greater immediacy to the lines of reasoning 
attributed to both sides. In either case, the quotation marks underline the dialogic 
character of the debate in which one set of arguments is opposed by and put in direct 
contrast to another.  
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     These two stances are followed by a third paragraph that concludes the chapter. Here 
the reader might expect Hume to merely sum up the outcome of the debate and appraise 
its role in the constitutional struggles of early Stuart Britain: 
Amidst all these disputes, the wise and moderate in the nation endeavoured to 
preserve, as much as possible, an equitable neutrality between the opposite 
parties; and the more they reflected on the course of public affairs, the greater 
difficulty they found in fixing just sentiments with regard to them. On the one 
hand, they regarded the very rise of opposite parties as a happy prognostic of 
the establishment of liberty; nor could they ever expect to enjoy, in a mixed 
government, so invaluable a blessing, without suffering that inconvenience, 
which, in such governments, has ever attended it. But, when they considered, 
on the other hand, the necessary aims and pursuits of both parties, they were 
struck with apprehension of the consequences, and could discover no plan of 
peaceable accommodation betwixt them. …. The turbulent government of 
England, ever fluctuating betwixt privilege and prerogative, would afford a 
variety of precedents, which might be pleaded on both sides. In such delicate 
questions, the people must be divided: The arms of the state were still in their 
hands: A civil war must ensue; a civil war, where no party or both parties 
would justly bear the blame, and where the good and virtuous would scarce 
know what vows to form, were it not that liberty, so requisiste to the perfection 
of human society, would be sufficient to byass their affections towards the side 
of its defenders.414 
This paragraph is in an important sense a part of the actual set-piece debate, as it 
introduces the views of a third group, distinct from ‘the partizans of the court’ and ‘[t]he 
lovers of liberty’, which Hume labels ‘the wise and moderate in the nation’. We do not 
get to know the reflections of this group with regard to the dispute over privilege and 
prerogative and the nature of the Stuart constitution. Instead, we are told that ‘the wise 
and moderate’ regard with some dismay a result of the rise of factionalism and the 
polarisation of opinion concerning the nature of the constitution, the prospect of a civil 
war as the ultimate outcome of these disputes and the impossibility of maintaining their 
‘equitable neutrality’ in the expected struggle between the advocates of liberty and 
authority. Yet while these reasoning are attributed to a group in Stuart Britain and given 
in the past tense, they do not read like anything likely to have been said at the time. 
Indeed, the remark that ‘they regarded the very rise of opposite parties as a happy 
prognostic of the establishment of liberty’ reads very much like a sentence from one of 
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Hume’s earlier essays about British party politics. There is therefore some considerable 
ambiguity as to whether the views stated in this paragraph are supposed to reflect 
opinions held in Stuart Britain or whether an idealized group of ‘wise and moderate’ 
serve as the mouthpiece for the historian representing views he recommends to the ‘wise 
and moderate’ among his readers.  
     Having established that Hume diverged from the manner of history writing practiced 
by Clarendon and Rapin, we now need to examine the way in which he appropriated the 
kind of set-piece debate employed by Rapin. Though there are no direct verbal parallels 
between the debates that Rapin and Hume inserted into their respective narrations of the 
events of 1621, both debates have a number of features in common. They are both 
concerned with the same issue, the true nature of the English monarchy as reflected in 
the disputed question of the origins and nature of privilege and prerogative, and in both 
cases a summary of the arguments of either side is presented in a paragraph each. Even 
the order of presentation is the same, as the views of the royalist or court party are being 
presented before those of the ‘favourers of the people’ whom Hume calls ‘the lovers of 
liberty’. These formal, structural and conceptual similarities between Rapin’s and 
Hume’s debate are too striking to be purely coincidental. Hume appears to have closely 
read Rapins’ History of England during the time when he composed his own account of 
Stuart history and he extensively used this work as a source for his History of Great 
Britain. This was the time when Hume came to change his mind about Rapin’s supposed 
impartiality and his remarks on the Huguenot historian reveal the fact that he had paid 
partial attention to those elements of Rapin’s text which reveal the strong Whig bias 
underneath what Hume came to regard as a mere veneer of impartiality. We can thus 
infer that Hume would have read the passage discussed above with great care and he 
appears to have adopted and appropriated the idea of inserting this kind of debate at a 
corresponding point of his own narrative in order to make a similar point regarding the 
rise of party distinctions and the opposing sets of arguments championed by the two 
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factions. Rapin’s 1621 debate should consequently be regarded as the immediate model 
of Hume’s first set-piece debate.415  
     While the basic similarities between the two debates appear at first very striking, a 
closer comparison reveals a number of small but significant differences between Rapin 
and Hume’s use of this literary device. We have seen that Rapin claimed that his 
balanced presentation of the legal cases for each side of the dispute in the preceding 
digression was designed to help the reader to form an impartial judgement and it seems 
clear that he devised the twofold structure of the set-piece debate with a similar purpose 
in mind. It is interesting to note, though, that while Rapin does indeed set out the case 
for the royalist and parliamentarian side in a paragraph each, the two paragraphs are not 
of equal length. This means that the views of the Royalist side are presented in little over 
a page while the arguments of ‘[t]he favourers of the people’ are given two pages. Such 
an imbalanced presentation can be taken as an indication of the Rapin’s own bias 
towards the latter side and thus undercuts his claim to impartiality. Hume evidently took 
greater care to balance the two opposing arguments by setting them out at more or less 
equal length. More significantly, he went to great lengths to ensure that the arguments of 
both sides were finely balanced out. In cases where the arguments of one party had 
evidently been weaker than those of the other, Hume went so far as to improve the 
weaker side’s case by inserting arguments which had not been or could not even have 
been employed by the historical actors themselves as they drew on philosophical 
principles that have a distinctly eighteenth-century flavour. Hume’s care in ensuring that 
a proper balance is struck between the two parties, conspicuously apparent from his 
presentation of the arguments of both sides, can be understood as a way of ostentatiously 
demonstrating his own impartiality as a historian.  
     Hume’s deviation from Rapin’s use of the set-piece debate and his attempt to 
refashion this literary device as a means to convey his impartiality becomes even more 
evident when we look at the second debate in his History of Great Britain. Like the first 
debate, inserted toward the end of Hume’s account of James’ third parliament, the 
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second debate occurs at a decisive moment of early Stuart history, the framing of the 
Petition of Right during his Charles’ third parliament. Having provided excerpts from 
the dramatic speeches leading up to the framing of the petition in 1628, Hume gives the 
case for and against acceptance of the petition by the ‘partizans of the commons’ and the 
‘partizans of the court’ in two paragraphs of equal length, once again balancing out the 
arguments of both sides.416 This is followed by a third, shorter paragraph, which 
commences with the sentence: ‘Impartial reasoners will confess, that the subject is not, 
on both sides, without its difficulties’.417 In this paragraph Hume reviews the arguments 
from an ‘impartial’ standpoint, drawing on eighteenth-century constitutional experience 
as well as on his own general reflections about political maxims which he had earlier 
outlined in his Essays, Moral and Political. This paragraph thus differs markedly from 
the third stance in Hume’s first set-piece debate insofar as the arguments contained 
therein are no longer attributed to any particular group in Stuart Britain. Instead these 
arguments are presented in the present tense, which suggests that when writing of 
‘[i]mpartial reasoners’ Hume means none other than himself and his polite eighteenth-
century readership.  
     ‘Impartiality’ thus represents a quality that is not to be sought for in the historical 
protagonists of seventeenth-century Britain, but rather an attitude to be adopted by 
eighteenth-century Britons with regard to the constitutional struggles of the preceding 
century. As such impartiality could be understood as a quality that elevated the historian 
and his readers above the party struggles of the past. Hume did not attempt to re-enact 
these struggles, but instead sought to encourage his readers to view them with 
detachment and to transcend prevailing party divides when forming their own 
judgements about Stuart history. In so doing Hume was sure that he had succeeded in 
transcending these party divides himself. This assuredness was not shared by all 
commentators, in fact, two successive reviewers for the Monthly Review accused Hume 
of partiality.418 Others were convinced that he was indeed the first who had succeeded in 
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418 Anon. [Roger Flexman], review of Hume’s The History of Great Britain. Vol. I: Containing the Reigns 
of James I. and Charles I., in The Monthly Review, 12 (March 1754), reprinted in Early Responses, ed. 
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providing the long-sought-for impartial History of England. Among these more 
sympathetic commentators was Voltaire, who had earlier complained about the lack of 
‘good Historians’ in Britain and partly attributed that lack to the prevailing ‘Spirit of 
Party’.419 Voltaire clearly thought that Hume’s History had achieved the status of 
impartial history of England and his review of the work in the Gazette littéraire de 
l’Europe of 1764 takes the form of an extended reflection on the ideal of the historian’s 
impartiality. Voltaire evaluates Rapin’s reputation as an impartial historian and contrasts 
it with Hume’s achievement:  
Rapin Thoiras, étranger, semblait seul avoir écrit une histoire impartiale; mais 
on voit encore la souillure du préjugé jusque dans les vérités que Thoiras 
raconte; au lieu que dans le nouvel historien [Hume] on découvre un esprit 
supérieur à sa matière, qui parle des faiblesses, des erreurs, et des barbaries, 
comme un médecin parle des maladies épidémiques.  
And he accordingly delivers his verdict of Hume:  
M. Hume, dans son Histoire, ne paraît ni parlementaire, ni royaliste, ni 




6. 2. The Fortunes of Thucydidean Speeches and Debates in Classical and Early 
Modern Historical Writing  
 
In the preceding section we have characterised the set-piece debates of the History of 
Great Britain as literary devices that have been inserted at decisive moments in Hume’s 
narration of the political history of the Stuart Era and serve the purpose of presenting the 
conflicting political opinions held by groups, factions and parties in Stuart society at 
these moments. We have examined the first of these debates in some detail in order to 
analyse its internal structure and establish its relationship with a similar debate in 
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Rapin’s History of England. The comparison between the debates found in both 
historians’ narrative of James’ third parliament has revealed that Hume may well have 
modelled his set-piece debate on Rapin’s concise summary of the English constitution 
held by the royalist and parliamentarian sides. It may be doubted, however, whether 
Rapin provided the sole model for Hume’s remarkable use of set-piece political debates, 
especially if we recall his statement to the effect that in composing his first Stuart 
volume he had ‘more propos’d as my Model the concise manner of the antient 
Historians, than the prolix, tedious Style of some modern Compilers’.421 The present 
chapter seeks to extend our investigation of the possible sources for Hume’s set-piece 
political debates by placing the debates in a far wider context, namely that of classical 
and early modern historical writing. The ensuing section will provide a concise survey 
of the place of invented speeches and debates in classical and humanist historical 
narratives with a particular focus on the work of historians whom Hume is known to 
have read. The insights gleaned from this survey will subsequently be compared with the 
results of our analysis of Hume’s debates, which should in turn allow us to formulate a 
sharper definition of Hume’s set-piece political debates and arrive at a more 
comprehensive interpretation of their overall place, function and significance in the 
History of Great Britain.  
       The speeches and debates to be found in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian 
War serve as the most convenient starting point for our survey, both because 
Thucydides’ innovative use of speeches, debates and dialogues provided the model for 
much subsequent historical writing and due to Hume’s knowledge of the work, reflected 
in his statements on Thucydides, which we have discussed earlier. To be sure, fictitious 
speeches had been a constant feature of Greek epic poetry before Thucydides and had 
already featured large in the Histories of his older contemporary Herodotus in line with 
the classical conviction that history was made up of words and deeds.422 In Thucydides’ 
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narrative, however, these speeches assume novel functions that make them at the same 
time an integral part of the narrative of events and a means by which a political analysis 
of these events is being conveyed to the reader. The speeches are perhaps the most 
conspicuous and distinctive feature of Thucydides’ History, which contains more than 
fifty orations given in direct speech that taken together make up almost one fourth of the 
text.423 Thucydides was the first historian who explicitly commented on the sources on 
which he had drawn for his speeches and the method he had employed in framing them: 
In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered 
just before and others during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the 
precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various 
informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, 
while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were 
actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by 
each situation.424  
This statement has sparked an intense debate among commentators about the 
authenticity or lack thereof of Thucydides’ speeches, yet in the present context it will be 
sufficient to point out that whatever reports Thucydides may have had of speeches 
actually delivered during the war, he clearly felt free to adapt these in accordance with 
what he thought would have been appropriate given the circumstances of the situation in 
which such speeches were alleged to have been delivered.425 This statement does not 
explicitly tell us anything about the role of speeches in the History, however, and we 
will therefore have to turn to the text of this work in order to assess the place and 
function of speeches and debates in Thucydides’ narrative.  
      The fifty-two direct speeches occurring in all but two of the eight books of the 
History of the Peloponnesian War fall into three main categories, which can be 
distinguished according to the speeches’ subject matter and structure as well as their 
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function in the wider context within which they occur. Public orations made in 
assemblies of the peoples differ from speeches made by ambassadors in the course of 
negotiations and from hortatory orations by generals to their armies before battle.426 In 
all three cases the speeches are delivered before a specific audience with the aim of 
convincing, motivating or discouraging that audience to adopt or avoid a particular 
course of action and the vast majority of speeches consequently take the form of what is 
known in classic rhetoric as deliberative orations.427 Thus far Thucydides is entirely in 
keeping with the rhetorical rules and practices of his day, even though his speeches are 
of a higher stylistic finesse and complexity than those ordinarily delivered on such 
occasions.428  His true innovation lies in the manner in which he has combined speeches, 
sometimes presenting them in pairs sometimes in groups of up to five orations. When 
pairing his speeches to form proper debates, Thucydides employs the device of 
‘antilogy’, the antithetical presentation of opposing views on a particular problem or 
situation, which had been developed by the Sophists.429 This allows him to present in a 
vivid and immediate manner the views of opposing historical characters, their 
conflicting political principles, and the different courses of actions proposed by them to 
their fellow citizens, allies or enemies. In so doing Thucydides forged the speeches into 
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accommodation; or they are those of Generalls at the head of their armies encouraging them to battle.’  
427 ‘Thucydides’ speeches are dramatic re-enactments of attempts at persuasion, not vehicles for 
expressing personal opinion.’ Tim Rood, Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), p. 40, cf. p. 44.  
428 Thucydides was taken to task for the unusual stylistic complexity of his speeches by the ancient critic 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Critical Essays, tr. Stephen Usher (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1974), i, 563-619. Thomas Hobbes was later to defend Thucydides against Dionysius’ criticisms, cf. 
‘Of the Life and History of Thucydides’, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. Sir 
William Molesworth (11 vols.; London: Bohn, 1839-45; reprinted London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1997), 
vol. viii, p. xxix-xxx.  
429 For Thucydides’ use of antilogies and T. Rood, Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation, p. 46 and 
Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. Gilbert Highet, (3 vols.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1946), i, 398. Cf. Hobbes’ comments in ‘Of the Life and History of Thucydides’, p. xxx.  
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a powerful tool capable of serving a variety of expositional and interpretative purposes 
within the History.  
       Thucydides’ orations, paired speeches and political debates have been inserted at 
crucial points in the narrative of political and military events, thus focusing the readers’ 
attention on particular moments of decision and presenting them with the different 
courses of action that had been available at these particular moments. They thus stand 
out from the narrative of events and therefore ‘serve as landmarks in his work’.430 This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the debate that resulted in the declaration of war in 432 BC 
and was concerned with those disputes between the city-states of Athens and Corinth 
over several of their colonies that Thucydides regarded as the superficial causes of the 
war. This debate is set in the Spartan assembly and takes the form of a series of speeches 
delivered before that assembly by the delegates of Corinth, the representatives of 
Athens, the Spartan king and a Spartan politician.431 Most speeches are preceded by a 
brief remark on the speaker, then given in direct speech (oratio recta) and followed by a 
short summary of how they were received by the audience. At the end of debates 
Thucydides comments briefly on the division of opinion among the audience and in 
cases where a vote was taken he reports the majority vote.432 Though the speeches 
constituting this debate are extensive and range over a variety of specific issues, they are 
all essentially concerned with one fundamental problem, the growth of Athenian 
imperialism, which was perceived as oppressive by Athens’ allies and as threatening to 
Spartan hegemony on the Peloponnesus. Following the speeches, the Spartan assembly 
voted to the effect that the truce had been broken and war could soon be declared. 
Significantly, Thucydides adds, that this was ‘not so much because they were influenced 
by the speeches of their allies as because they were afraid of the further growth of 
Athenian power’, exhibiting once again his distinction between pretexts and real causes 
                                                 
430 H. D. Westlake, ‘The Settings of Thucydidean Speeches’, in The Speeches in Thucydides, ed. Stadter, 
pp. 90-108, esp. 105.  
431 History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Smith, i, 107-149.  
432 For the structure of the speeches and debates see Westlake, ‘The Settings of Thucydidean Speeches’, 
esp. pp. 91-95.  
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for war that underpins his entire account of the war.433 The Spartan debate is 
immediately followed by the so-called Pentecontaetia, a substantial digression which 
outlines the growth of Athenian power over the preceding half-decade, which in turn 
gives way to a final speech by the Corinthian representatives, supposed to have been 
given at a second congress of Sparta’s allies, which makes the case for war against 
Athens with even greater vehemence.434 This is followed by the vote of all the allies for 
war and the ensuing declaration of war precipitates the eventual outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War a year later.  
     The speeches that make up the Spartan debate are thus one of the main vehicles for 
Thucydides’ central thesis locating the ultimate cause of the war in the growth of 
Athenian imperialism. While reflecting and illuminating the particular circumstances in 
which they were delivered, they provide the reader with different perspectives on 
Athens’ rise to imperial power. Modern scholarship consequently regards the speeches 
as an integral part of Thucydides’ extended analysis of the long-term causes of the 
Peloponnesian War, and Adam Smith advanced a similar interpretation in Hume’s day. 
According to Smith, Thucydides’ objective in composing his History was  
to explain the causes which brought about the severall important events that 
happened during this period [and] all his Orations are excellently adapted to 
this Idea of historicall writing. There are three things which are principally 
concerned in bringing about the great events of a war (and as it is the history 
of a war which he writes it is in such he is principally concerned), Viz. The 
Relative Strength of the contending powers at the commencement of the war; 
The Strength, Fidelity and Good will of their severall allies; and the 
circumstances in which the armies on both sides were placed, and the different 
incidents which influenced the success of each particular battle. The whole of 
his orations are employed in explaining some one or other of these causes.435  
Smith reappraises Thucydides’ speeches as the prime means through which the Greek 
historian undertakes his masterful elucidation of the different sets of causes of military 
                                                 
433 History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Smith, i, 149. This translation is taken from History of the 
Peloponnesian War, tr. Warner, p. 87. Thucydides’ distinction between profound and superficial causes of 
events, which informs his analysis of the long-term causes of the Peloponnesian War, is discussed in 
Jaeger, Paideia, iii, 394, and Grant, The Ancient Historians, p. 81.  
434 Cf. History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Smith, i, 149-195 (the Pentecontaetia) and 195-209 (the 
second Congress at Sparta).  
435 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 163. After comparing Thucydides with other historians, both ancient 
and modern, Adam Smith stated that ‘[t]here is no author who has more distinctly explained the causes of 
events than Thucydides’. Smith, LRBL, p. 95. 
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and political events. Having differentiated between three major groups of speeches, 
Smith maintains that all the speeches Thucydides inserted into his narrative ‘tend to 
illustrate the causes or circumstances of some important event or one nearly connected 
with them’.436 Modern scholarship concurs with Smith’s assessment that a major 
function of the speeches lies in the uncovering of underlying causes.437 The causal link 
between words as recorded in the speeches and deeds as related in the narrative allows 
readers to assess the political and military actions in the light of the speeches that 
preceded these actions. Conversely, the reader is invited to judge the success of the 
arguments employed in the speeches according to the success or failure of the strategies 
or policies proposed by the speakers. By means of their interrelation Thucydides’ 
speeches and his narrative thus become mutually illuminating.438  
      Thucydides’ search for the deep and hidden causes of events ensures his work is a 
political history elucidated by political philosophy. This makes it possible to regard 
Thucydides as a historian concerned with applying the political philosophy of his time to 
the writing of narrative history. In his seminal study of the intellectual culture of 
classical Athens, Werner Jaeger made a convincing case for regarding Thucydides as a 
political thinker as well as a political historian: 
[Thucydides] needed a special opportunity to disclose the intellectual, the 
universal aspect of events. The numerous speeches which punctuate his book 
are particularly characteristic of his narrative method: for they are above all 
else the medium through which he expresses his political ideas. … This is a 
very important device, explicable not by a historian’s passion for exactitude 
but by a politician’s wish to penetrate to the ultimate political ground for every 
event. … His belief that, after considering the peculiar circumstances of each 
case, he could set down what was demanded by the situation ( 	
) was 
based on his conviction that every standpoint in such a conflict had its own 
inevitable logic, and that a man who watched the conflict from above could 
develop that logic adequately. Subjective as that may appear, it was what 
Thucydides held to be the objective truth of his speeches. And we cannot 
                                                 
436 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, 166-7.  
437 Cf. Grant, The Ancient Historians, p. 91.  
438 ‘Speeches link both with other speeches, so that the reader is invited to compare different attitudes, and 
with the surrounding narrative, which may confirm or deny the speaker’s perceptions.’ Rood, Thucydides: 
Narrative and Explanation, p. 43. This work provides a subtle and acute analysis of what Rood calls ‘the 
interaction of speech and narrative’ in Thucydides’ text.  
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possibly appreciate it without doing justice to the political thinker concealed in 
the historian.439  
Thucydides’ orations thus add a further dimension to his narrative of events, thereby 
ensuring that his History is far more than a mere chronicle of the political events and the 
fortunes of war. The narrative of events is rendered intelligible as well as meaningful by 
speeches and debates reflecting the ideological and party-political conflicts underpinning 
those events. Thucydides' mastery lies in the fact that this commentary is not separated 
from the history of events, but instead ‘translated into intellectual events’ in the form of 
the speeches and debates.440  
      Yet while the speeches reflect Thucydides’ political thought and analysis, it would 
be inaccurate to describe them as mere mouthpieces of the historian. To be sure, they 
contain general reflections about human nature, power and justice, which can at least in 
part be taken as representative of Thucydides’ own political philosophy. Yet the 
sentiments of the speeches that advocate specific courses of action in preference to 
others cannot necessarily be taken as indications of the author’s own opinion, since they 
are assigned to individual historical actors and are often directly opposed by the next 
speaker. In the words of another scholar, the speeches enable Thucydides to become ‘a 
historian not only of the history of a war, but specifically of the intellectual history of the 
parties involved in that war, himself being detached from and not necessarily adhering to 
such reflections or theories and their applications as he records’.441 By giving the 
arguments of both sides, the impartial political philosopher withholds his own 
judgement and leaves the reader to assess the strength of the arguments put forth by the 
opposing sides. Thucydides’ paired speeches and debates thus invite judgement from the 
reader without diminishing the impartiality of the historian.  
      It will be necessary to briefly survey the use of speeches in other main historians of 
the classical period in order to assess the impact made by Thucydidean orations and 
debates on subsequent historical writing. While Thucydides had emphasised the 
                                                 
439 Jaeger, Paideia, i, 391-2.  
440 Jaeger, Paideia, i, 398.  
441 Hans-Peter Stahl, ‘Speeches and Course of Events in Book Six and Seven of Thucydides’, in The 
Speeches in Thucydides, ed. Stadter, pp. 60-89, esp. p. 62. Stahl goes on to say that ‘it is Thucydides’ 
intention to be, at his highest level, a historian of the intellectual history of the Peloponnesian War’.  
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importance of striking a balance between what was really said and what ought to have 
been said in any given historical situation, his immediate followers were even more 
outspoken about the fact that the orations in their histories represented their own 
inventions, inserted into the narrative to reflect their own opinions or increasing the 
dramatic potential of their work.442 Though Polybius took them to task for doing so, he 
himself inserted numerous speeches into his own work, thus recognising the function of 
speeches to ‘sum up events and hold the whole history together’.443 By this time the use 
of orations in works of narrative history had become an accepted practice and invented 
speeches constituted a central part of an historian’s established literary repertoire. As 
such orations were employed with considerable frequency and to great effect by the 
Latin historians, especially Sallust, Livy and Tacitus, who went to great length to imitate 
and, if possible, excel their Greek predecessors, in particular Thucydides. Sallust 
modelled his concise style on that of Thucydides and included orations in his history of 
the conspiracy of Catiline, which culminated in the paired speeches delivered by Cato 
and Caesar before the Senate.444 Livy’s use of invented orations is even closer to that of 
Thucydides insofar as his speeches make up a considerable part of his narrative and are 
used in a variety of ways to disclose the characters and motives of historical actors.445 
Tacitus deviates furthest from the Thucydidean model insofar as he employed speeches 
almost exclusively as devices that allow him to disclose the character of rulers and bring 
out the dramatic or tragic elements of the unfolding events.446 In his lecture Adam Smith 
compared each of these historians to Thucydides with regard to the use they made of 
deliberative orations in their histories. While Smith appraises all of the Latin historians, 
in particular Livy, he regards their speeches as falling short of the analytic quality and 
functionality of Thucydides’ orations.447  
                                                 
442 Cf. F. W. Walbank, ‘Speeches in Greek historians’, pp. 246ff.  
443 Quoted in F. W. Walbank, ‘Speeches in Greek historians’, pp. 247-8. According to Polybius ‘a 
historian should not …, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable remarks of his characters … but 
should simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace’.  
444 Sallust, [Works], tr. J. C. Rolfe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1921; rpt. 2005), pp. 89-101 (Caesar’s 
speech) and 101-109 (Cato’s oration). Cf. Grant, The Ancient Historians, p. 205-6.   
445 Grant, The Ancient Historians, p. 226-7.  
446 Grant, The Ancient Historians, p. 292. 
447 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, pp. 163-9.  
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      Due to the revival of Latin, and subsequently Greek, literature in fifteenth and 
sixteenth-century Europe, the works of the Greek and Roman historians mentioned were 
much admired and their works were considered as exemplary models of masterful 
historical writing, worthy of imitation by the humanist historians themselves. The 
humanists considered the invented oration mainly as a rhetorical embellishment of 
historical narratives to the extent that the description of every major battle was generally 
preceded by stylised hortatory orations or military harangues written in strict accordance 
with the rules of classical rhetoric. Due to the humanists’ emphasis on the art of rhetoric 
and the power of persuasion, speeches constituted one if not the most important formal 
element of the narrative of the fortunes of a city or commonwealth written in the literary 
genre known as ‘true history’.448  
     These conventions and practices are reflected in Niccolò Machiavelli’s close 
adherence to humanist prescriptions in his Florentine Histories (1525), even though this 
work was written well after the initial flourish of Florentine historical writing in the late 
fifteenth-century. Machiavelli, who had read Thucydides in a Latin translation, inserted 
elaborate descriptions of battles and character sketches into the body of his Histories and 
his orations are composed in strict accordance with the rules of classical rhetoric.449 Yet 
in his use of invented speeches Machiavelli goes beyond his humanist predecessors 
insofar as his orations are far more than mere rhetorical embellishments or collections of 
memorable sayings and serve a functional role in his historical account.450 His debates, 
which present the opposing viewpoints of groups and factions within Florentine society, 
reflect the overall concern of his Histories with what he calls ‘the hatreds and divisions 
                                                 
448 For the humanist conception of ‘true history’ see Peter Burke, The Renaissance sense of the past 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1969), and Peter E. Bondanella, Francesco Guicciardini (Boston: Twayne, 
1976), pp. 94-7, 104.  
449 Cf. Quentin Skinner’s concise and lucid Machiavelli (first publ. 1981; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), esp. 
pp. 88-97.  
450 Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) chapter 3 (‘The Power of Words’), esp. pp. 
103-107.  
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in the city’.451 Machiavelli’s ‘antilogies’ thus serve as illustrations of the theme of civil 
discord that provides the leitmotif of his narrative of the political history of Florence.   
      The work of another Florentine historian, Machiavelli’s contemporary and friend 
Francesco Guicciardini, marks the beginning of a novel understanding of political 
history and a markedly different approach to the writing of narrative history. 
Guicciardini experimented with humanist conventions, which he sought to adapt to a 
new and more pragmatic role of history, the teaching of concrete political lessons in 
times of crises.452 This new version of history found expression in his late historical 
masterpiece posthumously published in 1561 under the title The History of Italy and it is 
this work that best displays Guicciardini’s novel and innovative use of invented 
orations.453 Guicciardini’s skilful handling of complex political events within the 
European framework of his narrative made him in the eyes of many a worthy successor 
of the great classical historians and led Voltaire to state that ‘Italy had, in Guicciardini, 
its Thucydides’.454 The nature of Guicciardini’s speeches and debates and their function 
within his historical narrative can best be appreciated by examining the paired speeches 
about the government of Florence, which he inserted at a prominent place in the History 
of Italy.455 At the beginning of the second book of that work Guicciardini’s narrative 
shifts from the history of military and diplomatic events that formed the subject matter 
of the first book to the internal affairs of the city-state of Florence. An increasing 
demand for an extension of popular participation in the government of the city led to a 
public debate in the popular assembly with the aim of reconsidering and restructuring 
the form of government. In order to make alterations to the constitution, the magistrates 
met in the council chamber where Guicciardini inserts lengthy speeches by two citizens, 
                                                 
451 For this theme see Gisela Bock, ‘Civil Discord in Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine’, in Gisela Bock, 
Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1990), pp. 181-201, esp. 181, 186-7.  
452 This is the central thesis of Felix Gilbert’s masterful Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and 
History in Sixteenth-Century Florence (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1965).  
453 The work was posthumously published in 1561 under the title The History of Italy, which was not 
Guicciardini’s. The title is slightly misleading insofar as the work is framed as a history of the European 
state system and the disruption of Italy’s peace by foreign invaders.  
454 Quoted in P. E. Bondanella, Francesco Guicciardini, p. 135.  
455 Francesco Guicciardini, The History of Italy, tr. Sidney Alexander (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), pp. 
76-83.  
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Paolo Antonio Soderini and Antonio Vespucci, representing the two opposing 
viewpoints in this debate. According to Soderini, ‘the desire for liberty is ancient and 
almost innate in this city’ and a popular government should therefore be preferred over 
any other.456 Soderini claims that rational argument and historical experience point to 
such a constitutional solution that would provide a remedy against all the dangers 
attending free and participatory forms of government. His opponent also claims ‘reason’, 
‘experience’ and even ‘authority’ for his side while painting a pessimistic picture of 
human nature and warning of ‘the tyranny of the people’.457 While the Soderini argues 
for ‘a free regime’, Vespucci advocates ‘limited participation and authority’.458 
Following the speeches, Guicciardini sums up the decision of the assembly by stating 
that due to the very nature of this council, which comprised only a limited number of 
citizens, ‘the prevailing point of view toward a limited form of government would have 
triumphed’ had it not been for Savonarola’s intervention and advocacy of ‘an absolutely 
popular government’, which was indeed established.459  
      As an instance of Guicciardini’s skilful appropriation of humanist vocabulary the 
constitutional debate about the reorganisation of the Florentine government illustrates 
the different functions that paired speeches could serve in his History. Perhaps the most 
immediately evident purpose of this debate is the aim ‘to characterize the attitude and 
aims of social groups within a society’.460 The paired speeches that constitute the debate 
about the reorganisation of the Florentine constitution reveal the attitudes felt and the 
changes advocated by the many as well as the few. While the humanists believed in the 
                                                 
456 Guicciardini, History of Italy, pp. 76-7.  
457 Guicciardini, History of Italy, pp. 80-1.  
458 Guicciardini, History of Italy, p. 83.  
459 Guicciardini, History of Italy, p. 83.  
460 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 298-9. Gilbert identifies a number of these: ‘In his second 
History of Florence, Guicciardini used speeches in a functional way, and in the History of Italy he 
employed them still more purposefully … . He used them to emphasize the facts or events which were 
particularly relevant to the decision which a government had to make. Moreover, he used them to 
characterize the attitude and aims of social groups within a society; to show how men misjudged events; 
or to point out the difference between a reasoned evaluation of events and the distortion resulting from 
man’s insistence to giving free reign to his desires and passions. By means of speeches the historian 
fulfilled the function of a judge: Guicciardini indicated how policy was to be conducted if it were 
managed rationally, and how it was conducted in reality. In the History of Italy speeches are devices to 
disclose the multidimensional character of the historical process.’  
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capacity of rhetoric to change men’s minds and determine their actions, Guicciardini’s 
evaluation shows a stronger sense of political realism as is evident from his judgement 
that the constitutional programme advocated by the second speaker in the debate was 
more likely to have been adopted by the council since it was in their interest to retain the 
reigns of government in the hands of the few. This should not, however, be taken as 
meaning that the outcome of debates is predetermined. The insertion of speeches at 
moments of decision underscores the fact that there were alternative courses of action 
available at any given historical moment and serves to demonstrate the essential 
openness of history. Felix Gilbert has accordingly described Guicciardini’s set speeches 
as ‘devices to disclose the multidimensional character of the historical process’.461  
      So far we have confined our examination of Guicciardini’s debates to their place and 
function within his narrative of political and military events, yet to do so is surely to 
miss an important dimension of the debates, which are to some degree free-standing 
political essays. This dimension can only be fully appreciated once we consider the 
speeches in the overall course of Guicciardini’s literary career. Before composing his 
History of Italy, Guicciardini had written at length about political matters with particular 
regard to the constitutional history of his native city of Florence, especially in his 
Dialogue on the Government of Florence. Here he set out a case for a mixed constitution 
in the form of a debate between four citizens about the history of Florentine 
government.462  In the course of this debate, arguments in favour of a return to an 
idealized ancient constitution are rejected, as are the ones of those who propose to base 
the constitution on abstract political principles without consulting the lessons of history. 
These debates are not only related to Guicciardini’s other political works but bear a 
distinct resemblance to the constitutional debate in his History of Italy.463 Set-piece 
orations and debates can therefore be regarded as literary devices employed by 
Guicciardini in an attempt to apply his political insights to his narrative account of 
                                                 
461 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 299. A concise but lucid assessment of Guicciardini’s 
orations is provided by Mark Phillips, Francesco Guicciardini: the historian’s craft (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1977), esp. pp. 96-7.   
462 The Dialogue was begun in 1521 but not published until after the author’s death. Cf. P. E. Bondanella, 
Francesco Guicciardini, pp. 49ff.  
463 This point is well stated in P. E. Bondanella, Francesco Guicciardini, p. 60.  
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political history without having to insert a tedious commentary that would have been 
incompatible with strict humanist prescriptions for the writing of such an account.464 
Guicciardini’s use of paired speeches and constitutional debates in his History of Italy 
thus enable him to effectively integrate his political thinking into his political history. 
     Guicciardini’s new political history exerted a profound influence on British 
historiography through Francis Bacon’s use of the Storia d’Italia as a model for his own 
History of the Reign of Henry VII (1622). Bacon’s conception of civil history was akin 
to that of the Florentine pragmatic historians, especially in its insistence that the role of 
history lies in providing lessons of statecraft. Bacon’s knowledge of Guicciardini’s work 
is well attested and he quoted the latter’s historical work in several of his writings. There 
are a number of structural similarities between their works, including the chronological 
rather than thematic arrangement of the narrative, the focus on political and military 
events, the emphasis on the European framework of national history and the use of 
character sketches and elaborate orations.465 The most important difference between the 
two works lies in their respective scope, however, since Bacon’s work is to a far greater 
degree centred on a particular ruler and is therefore as much political biography as 
political history.466 Bacon shared with Guicciardini a Tacitean emphasis on uncovering 
the true causes of events and the hidden motives of rulers, a psychological interest which 
is reflected in the carefully drawn character sketches of his History.467 The most striking 
similarity between their historical narratives consists in the use of orations, which are 
elaborately constructed and contain numerous political maxims.468 Bacon’s History even 
                                                 
464 That Guicciardini regarded his speeches and debates as free-standing pieces – or, in Felix Gilbert’s 
words, as ‘independent essays’ – is evident from the fact that the unfinished draft for his second History of 
Florence contains elaborate speeches; cf. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 245.  
465 Vincent Luciani, ‘Bacon and Guicciardini’, PMLA, 62 (1947), 96-113, esp. 113. Having discussed 
Bacon’s extensive use of Guicciardini’s work and examined the similarities in style and subject matter 
between their main historical works Luciani concludes that ‘Bacon used [Guicciardini’s] Storia [d’Italia] 
as a model for his own History of Henry VII’.  
466 ‘Bacon’s work is both a political biography and a politic or pragmatic history, a study not only of 
actions but of policy and statecraft.’ Perez Zagorin, Francis Bacon (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998).  
467 Cf. Brian Vickers, ‘Introduction’ to Francis Bacon, The History of the Reign of King Henry VII and 
Selected Works, ed. B. Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), pp. xi-xxxv, on Bacon’s debt to 
Tacitus (pp. xv-xix) and his sustained psychological portrait of the Henry VII (pp. xxiii-xxix).  
468 On Bacon’s orations and ‘dialogue orations’ see B. Vickers, ‘Introduction’, p. xx, and V. Luciani, 
‘Bacon and Guicciardini’, pp. 110, 112.  
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features two instances of paired speeches in the manner of Guicciardini, though the more 
important of these consists in a specific exchange between an ambassador of the French 
king Charles VIII and King Henry’s emissaries rather than in a rehearsal of general 
constitutional arguments.469 Despite such differences, it is clear that Bacon drew on the 
Florentine historians, in particular Guicciardini, for the overall structure as well as the 
speeches and orations of his influential work of political biography and political history.  
      After Bacon there was a decline in the fashion of inserting invented speeches in 
British historiography, which was partly due to the rise of erudition with its emphasis on 
exact documentation rather than the relation of exemplary words and deeds. Historians 
and commentators shared a general ambivalence about whether speeches ought to have 
any place in works of narrative history.470 Thomas Hobbes wrote appreciatively about 
the speeches in the History of the Peloponnesian War and defended Thucydides’ use of 
deliberative rhetoric against the latter’s main ancient critic, the Greek historian and 
rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus.471 Hobbes’ contemporary Edward Hyde, later 
Earl of Clarendon, on the other hand, refrained from inserting invented speeches into the 
body of his History of the Rebellion.472 Their place was taken by lengthy direct 
quotations from the declarations of royalists and parliamentarians during the build-up to 
the Civil War. The intense party political debates that began to evolve around early 
Stuart history at the time Clarendon wrote his History and which continued well into the 
next century called for documentation in any narrative account of this contested period 
of British political history.  
                                                 
469 See the orations in direct speech by the French ambassador Robert Gagvien (Bacon, History, pp. 73-78) 
and the reply by the Lord Chancellor (pp, 78-80), as well as the indirect speeches by Charles VIII’s 
envoys (pp. 41-43) and the King’s answer (p. 43).  
470 For the declining popularity of set speeches in British historical writing during the early modern period 
see Hicks, Neoclassical History, pp. 58-59 and 230-231.  
471 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Of the Life and History of Thucydides’, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of 
Malmesbury, ed. Sir William Molesworth (11 vols.; London: Bohn, 1839-45; reprinted London: 
Routledge/Thoemmes, 1997), vol. viii, pp. xxi, xxix-xxx. Dionysius was not opposed to the insertion of 
invented speeches into works of history, but censured Thucydides’ orations on stylistic grounds, cf. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Critical Essays, tr. Stephen Usher (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1974), i, 563-613.  
472 Cf. Hicks, Neoclassical History, pp. 58-9: ‘Clarendon was very much a man of his time when he chose 
to dispense with invented speeches.’  
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      The insertion of lengthy quotations from documents to be found in seventeenth-
century works of history tended to interrupt the flow of the narrative and was 
consequently regarded as a breach of the rules of historical writing. Writing about the 
way in which he had composed his History, Clarendon defended his own use of such 
extensive quotations:  
[T]here is a great deal of difference between troubling the series of grave and 
weighty actions and counsels with tedious relations of formal despatches 
(though of notable moment), and the relating solemn acts and consultations, 
from which all the matter of action is raised and continued. … And therefore 
you will find D’Avila (who I think hath written as our’s should be written, and 
from whence no question our Gamesters learnt much of their play) insert the 
declarations of both sides in the main body of the story, as the foundations 
upon which all that was after done, was built.473  
Underpinning this is a fundamental assumption that Clarendon shared with those 
classical and humanist historians who believed that actions were generally preceded by 
words and that the former could not be fully understood or assessed without reference to 
the latter. Words mattered because they could sway men’s minds one way or the other 
and therefore it was necessary to relate exactly what had been said when people took 
sides in a conflict.474 Yet whereas the humanists had opted for speeches that could be 
integrated into the flow of the narrative, Clarendon and his contemporaries replaced 
these literary devices with extracts from source documents, which reflected more 
accurately what had actually been said or written at decisive moments in the run-up to 
the constitutional conflict of the 1640s.475  
     By the early eighteenth century the use of extracts from documents had become an 
established practice in British historical writing, a fact to which the works of Rapin and 
his contemporaries testify. Speeches, on the other hand, had almost entirely fallen out of 
fashion. In his public lectures on rhetoric and belles letters, delivered in Edinburgh 
                                                 
473 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Bristol, quoted in Hicks, Neoclassical History, pp. 59-
60.  
474 For the Humanists’ belief in the power of words see Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1998), chapter 3, esp. pp. 75-6.  
475 ‘The forth book contains all the passages from the King’s going to York to the setting up the standard; 
which time being wholly spent in talk, and all that followed of action proceeding from that talk, I have 
been obliged to set down (which I had a great mind to have avoided) many declarations even in terminis’. 
Clarendon to the Earl of Bristol, quoted in Hicks, Neoclassical History, p. 60.  
 194 
between 1748 and 1750, Adam Smith found occasion to comment on this trend and 
provide his own assessment of the role of orations in works of narrative history. Smith 
followed Hobbes in criticising the practice of inserting lengthy ‘dissertations’ into works 
of narrative history and he thought that it was partly this practice that had rendered 
modern works of history considerably ‘less interesting than those wrote by the 
Ancients’.476 Orations, on the other hand, were not open to the same kind of criticism:  
Speeches interspersed in the narration do not appea[r] so faulty (tho they may 
be of considerable length) as long observations or Rhetoricall [sic] 
declamations. The Stile inde[e]d is altogether different from that of the 
Historian as they are oratoricall compositions; But then they are not in the 
authors own person, and therefore do not contradict the impartiality he is to 
maintain. Neither do they interrupt the thread of the narration as they are not 
considered as the authors, but make a part of the facts related. They give also 
an opportunity of introducing those observations and reflections which we 
observed are not so properly made in the person of the writer. … The only 
objection then that can be made against the using speeches in this manner is, 
[t]hat tho they be represented as facts, they are not genuine ones. But neither 
does [he] desire you to consider them as such, but only as being brought in to 
illustrate the narration.477  
This dense and important statement outlines the advantage of inserting speeches into 
works of narrative history. According to Smith speeches have two advantages over 
dissertations and digressions, namely that they can be fully integrated into historical 
accounts without interrupting the flow of the narrative of events and that they do not 
compromise the historian’s impartiality. Smith furthermore confronts the objections 
traditionally raised by those who were reluctant to accord invented speeches a place in 
post-classical historical writing. He admits that the ‘oratorical’ style of such speeches 
necessarily differs from the style maintained throughout the rest of the narrative and 
concedes that such speeches ought to be regarded as fictitious rather than genuine.478  
      Smith justifies the presence of invented speeches in an otherwise factual historical 
narrative by pointing out that they serve a dual purpose insofar as they convey certain 
facts about the situation in which they have been delivered and allow the historian to 
                                                 
476 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 102.  
477 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 103.  
478 Humanists historians tended to be outspoken about the fact that they generally invented orations and 
felt justified in doing so since they regarded the speeches in classical histories as fictitious; cf. Gilbert, 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 211, 298.  
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insert his ‘observations and reflections’ without compromising either the stylistic unity 
of the narrative or the sense of impartiality to be upheld by the historian. Thus we have 
seen that Smith considered Thucydides’ speeches as an effective means for conveying 
‘the causes which brought about the severall important events that happened during this 
period’.479 In Smith’s view speeches are thus ‘brought in to illustrate the narration’, or, 
as he put it with regard to Thucydides, they ‘tend to illustrate the causes or 
circumstances of some important event or one nearly connected with them’.480 Smith’s 
statement is an important reappraisal of the role and function of speeches in works of 
narrative history. He appears to be advocating a reversal of the trend that saw speeches 
fall out of fashion and replaced by lengthy source documents.  
     Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres conclude our review of the fortunes 
of speeches and the variety of uses to which they were put in classical and early modern 
historical writing. We have seen that set-piece orations and debates allowed historians 
like Thucydides and Guicciardini to bring the insights of political philosophy to bear on 
political history. Turning now to an in-depth examination of Hume’s place in this 
historiographical tradition, we may first recall what importance Hume attached to 
Thucydides, whom he regarded as the first political historian and indeed the first true 
historian. There is plenty of evidence both direct and circumstantial to suggest that 
Hume was also familiar with the works of the other historians discussed above, 
especially Sallust, Livy, Tacitus among the ancients,481 and Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini among the moderns.482 Hume was certainly familiar with Bacon’s 
                                                 
479 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 163.  
480 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, pp. 166-7. In Smith’s usage the term ‘illustrate’ connotes more than a 
mere provision of illustrative examples of what has been described in the narrative, but rather that they 
help to shed light on the particular situation within which they are delivered, either by providing ‘facts’ 
about that situation or by giving ‘observations and reflections’ which are put into the mouth of historical 
protagonists.   
481 Apart from Hume’s use of Thucydides work for his populousness dissertation there are numerous 
references to Sallust, Livy and Tacitus in Hume’s early Essays, Moral and Political (1741/2) as well as 
the Political Discourses (1752). Cf. Essays, passim.  
482 A list and brief discussion of Hume’s varied remarks on Machiavelli is provided in Frederick G. 
Whelan, Hume and Machiavelli: Political Realism and Liberal Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2004), p. 9-10. Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia is mentioned in book II of the Treatise (1739) as well as in a 
letter of the same year. Cf. Treatise, p. 244; Hume to Francis Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, HL, i, 33-4. 
Further references occur in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) and the Political 
Discourses (1752), cf. EPM, pp. 112, 182; Essays, p. 273. Hume made extensive use of the work as a 
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philosophical work, though there is no evidence to suggest that he had in fact read 
Bacon’s History of the Reign of Henry VII before commencing to write his Tudor history 
in 1757.483 Likewise there is nothing to suggest that he had read Clarendon before 
commencing work on his History of Great Britain.484 Hume would not have missed the 
significance of their speeches, even though he does not explicitly comment on the use of 
speeches in his extant statements on the craft of the historian and the art of historical 
narrative. Though we cannot ascertain whether Hume had attended Smith’s Edinburgh 
lectures or indeed whether these lectures were in fact delivered in the form in which they 
have come down to us, it is intriguing and perhaps significant to note that Smith 
reappraised the role of invented speeches in historical writing shortly before Hume 
embarked on the composition of his own narrative history.485 Yet since the available 
sources do not allow us to speculate whether Hume and Smith ever discussed the role of 
speeches in history, we shall have to turn to a closer examination of the text of the 
History of Great Britain to see whether our examination of classical and humanist 
orations and debates can help us understand the peculiar set-piece debates Hume chose 
to insert into his narrative of Stuart history.  
                                                                                                                                                
historical source in Tudor volumes of his History of England (1759): there are sixteen references in the 
first and one in the second Tudor volume, cf. HE, iii, 89-201; iv, 379.  
483 Hume’s knowledge of Bacon’s work is well attested. References to Bacon as natural philosopher can 
be found in Treatise, p. 5, Essays, pp. 55, 83, 209, 265-6, EHU, p. 185, EPM, p. 109. See also Hume on 
Bacon as prose writer, Essays, pp. 91-2. There appears to be no evidence indicating that Hume had read or 
consulted Bacon’s History of the Reign of Henry VII prior to the mid-1750s. In his assessment of the role 
and importance of Bacon in literary and intellectual terms, Hume considers Bacon ‘as a public speaker, a 
man of business, a wit, a courtier, a companion, an author, a philosopher’, but does not explicitly deal with 
the historian. When composing his own account of the Tudor period, however, Hume was to make 
extensive use of Bacon’s History as a source, cf. HE, vol. iii and iv, passim.  
484 Interestingly, there is no single reference to Clarendon in Hume’s writings prior to 1754, when Hume 
appears to have perused and made extensive use of the History of the Rebellion as a source for his own 
narrative of the reign of Charles I and the run-up to the Civil War. See the discussions of Clarendon’s 
work in ‘Of Tragedy’ (published as part of the Four Dissertations in 1757) and in the second volume, 
dealing with Clarendon’s later political and literary career. Essays, pp. 223-4, for Hume’s assessment of 
Clarendon qualities as a historian see The history of Great Britain. Vol. II. Containing the Commonwealth, 
and the reigns of Charles II. and James II. (London: printed for A. Millar, 1757), pp. 127-8. See also HE, 
vi, 154; as well as The history of Great Britain. Vol. II. (London: printed for A. Millar, 1757), p. 180. See 
also HE, vi, 215.  
485 The two were friends by at least the autumn of 1754, when Hume wrote his first extant letter about his 
ongoing work on a History. We have seen that he discussed the ‘Elocution’ of parts of his work with 
Smith, who seemed to have offered constructive criticism at every stage of the work. The earliest extant 
letter from Hume to Smith dates from 24 September 1752, cf. HL, i, 167-9.  
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     The preceding survey of the various uses of orations and debates in classical and 
humanist historical writing and in particular in the works of Thucydides and 
Guicciardini provides us with a useful interpretative framework for our examination of 
the function of the set-piece political debates in the History of Great Britain. Bringing 
the insights we have gleaned during this survey to bear on Hume’s debates will allow us 
to establish in how far these literary devices ought to be understood as variants of the 
Thucydidean model. In so doing we will pay particular attention to the theme and 
internal structure of the set-piece debates as well as to their semi-fictional character, 
before considering whether they constitute a continuation of Hume’s earlier 
preoccupations with party ideologies and political opinion. This will lead us to consider 
in how far the debates can be regarded as part of Hume’s attempt to provide a history of 
opinion within the framework of a wider political history and if so, what they tell us 
about his approach to the writing of such a history. Finally, we will seek to identify the 
overall place and function of the debates within the narrative structure of the History of 
Great Britain, which will in turn provide the basis for our concluding assessment of the 
wider significance of the debates for our understanding of the nature of Hume’s political 
history of the Stuart Age and its overall relationship to his political philosophy.  
 
 
6. 3. Between Political Science and the Natural History of Opinion: The Nature and 
Significance of Hume’s Set-Piece Political Debates  
 
Even at first glance the set-piece debates of Hume’s History of Great Britain can be seen 
to be markedly different from the orations and debates found in major works of classical 
and humanist historical writing. The most obvious difference consists in the fact that 
they are not given in direct speech (oratio recta) as the classical orations, though it 
needs to be remembered that it was not unusual for classical and humanist historians to 
present orations in indirect speech or insert a précis of what had been said. Yet Hume 
clearly departs from the classical convention of ascribing speeches to specific persons, 
or at least specific social groups such as the inhabitants of a town or the followers of a 
politician. Instead, the stances in his set-pieces debates either characterise the division of 
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opinion throughout the entire nation, or, more specifically, the positions associated with 
either of the two emerging camps (Royalist and Parliamentarian) or parties (Whig and 
Tory). Hume’s debates are more abstract in other regards too: they are not delivered on 
very specific occasion, but sum up the controversies that raged over a certain decisive 
period. Accordingly, they do not deal with the specific circumstances of a historical 
moment and therefore do not – to use Adam Smith’s formulation – ‘make a part of the 
facts related’ such as the strength of opposing armies or the fate of politicians.486 Most 
importantly, they lack the immediacy and rhetorical fervour of the classical and 
humanist orations, which were designed to mirror the passions motivating the speaker 
and engage the sentiments of the reader. It is thus misleading to regard the set-piece 
debates that constitute such a characteristic element of Hume’s History as little more 
than an updated version of the classical oration.487 This should not lead us to dismiss the 
link between these two distinct literary devices, however, since only a careful and 
systematic comparison can bring out the true extent of the differences or similarities and 
reveal how far Hume’s debates served the functions traditionally assigned to invented 
speeches or at least occupied a similar place in the narrative.  
      Hume’s debates have an important precedent in the coupled speeches to be found in 
Western historical writing since Herodotus, which serve to present opposing viewpoints 
and contrasting political opinions. Like Hume’s set-piece debates, the orations found in 
the ancient and early modern histories we have surveyed could take the form of debates 
in which two or more opinions on a matter of dispute were put before the reader. It has 
been noted above that such coupled speeches, known in classical rhetoric as ‘antilogies’, 
presented a dialectical engagement with a controversial topic through the contrast of 
diametrically opposed viewpoints.488 We have seen that paired speeches feature 
prominently in the works of a number of classical and post-classical historians, but 
                                                 
486 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 103. 
487 Philip Hicks, Neoclassical History, p. 180: ‘Not only did the war and politics and didacticism of the 
classical historian find a place in the History, so did the invented speeches, or at least something that 
looked very much like them. Neoclassicists had disagreed about the propriety of putting words in the 
mouths of protagonists in order to dramatize and clarify issues at hand, but Hume found the device to be 
useful … . It was remarkable that this telltale conceit of classical historiography survived into the third 
quarter of the eighteenth century, but Hume did modify the invented speech to serve his own goals.’  
488 The device is discussed in G. Bock, ‘Civil Discord in Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine’, p. 187.  
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Hume’s debates bear a particular resemblance to those of Thucydides and Guicciardini. 
The paired speeches and debates in Thucydides’ narrative are preceded by a brief 
introductory remark on the speaker or the occasion and followed by a summary of the 
division of opinion, and our analysis of Hume’s set-piece debates has shown them to be 
framed by similarly concise statements, which serve to link the debates to the overall 
narrative and to provide the necessary background information about the setting and 
outcome of the debates. While the basic similarities between Thucydides and Hume’s 
debates are largely structural, the set-piece debates in Guicciardini’s History share more 
concrete structural and conceptual aspects with those in the History of Great Britain. We 
shall have occasion to discuss these once we come to assess the overall place and 
function of the set-piece debates in Hume’s narrative. For the moment it is sufficient to 
note that insofar as they present antithetical viewpoints on a subject, Hume’s debates can 
be aptly described as ‘antilogies’.  
      We have yet to appraise the similarities between Hume’s set-piece debates and the 
debates in classical and humanist histories with regard to the latter’s most controversial 
aspect, the fact that, as Adam Smith put it, ‘they are not genuine ones’, i.e. that they 
were generally deemed to be have been invented by the historian.489 Thucydides 
characterised his method of composing the debates by stating that while he had sought to 
keep as closely as possible to ‘the general sense of the words that were actually used’, he 
had made ‘the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation’.490 His 
speeches thus reflect, at least in part, the historian’s view of what would have been 
appropriate given the circumstances of the specific situations in which these speeches 
were supposed to have been delivered.  Many historians and critics from Polybius to 
Hugh Blair frowned upon this kind of fictional element as a violation of the truth-claim 
of history, but Werner Jaeger has reminded us that while such an approach to the 
speeches may appear unacceptably subjective to us, ‘it is what Thucydides held to be the 
objective truth of his speeches’ insofar as it revealed the universal and regular rather 
                                                 
489 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 103.  
490 History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Smith, i, 39. The translation is taken from a more recent edition, 
History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Warner, p. 47.  
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than the particular and contingent dimension of political events.491 It remains to be seen 
whether the debates in Hume’s History reflect a similar approach.  
      We have seen that Hume chose to use his own words and sometimes arguments 
rather than those available to him in the historical sources and that on occasion he even 
went so far as to improve the arguments of the weaker side in the interest of maintaining 
his aim of impartiality. The most lucid critical assessment of the practice Hume adopted 
when composing his set-piece debates is that put forth by the eminent Whig lawyer, 
critic and publicist Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review of 1824:  
Mr Hume’s summaries of the conflicting views of different parties at 
particular eras, have been deservedly admired for the singular clearness, 
brevity, and plausibility with which they are composed: – But, in reality they 
belong rather to conjectural than to authentic History; and any one who looks 
into contemporary documents will be surprised to find how very small a 
portion of what is there imputed to the actors of the time had actually occurred 
to them, and how little of what they truly maintained is there recorded in their 
behalf. The object of the author being chiefly to give his readers a clear idea 
of the scenes he described, he seems to have thought that the conduct of the 
actors would be best understood by ascribing to them the views and motives, 
which, upon reflection, appeared to himself most natural in their situation. In 
this way, he has often made all parties appear more reasonable than they truly 
were; and given probability and consistency to events, which, as they actually 
occurred, were not a little inconceivable. But in so doing, he has undoubtedly 
violated the truth of history – and exposed himself to the influence of the most 
delusive partialities.492  
This is an important interpretative statement that provides us with a number of helpful 
leads for our investigation of Hume’s set-piece debates, which Jeffrey aptly describes as 
‘summaries of the conflicting views of different parties at particular eras’. Jeffrey 
crucially states that these debates ‘belong rather to conjectural than to authentic History’ 
and we shall later have occasion to enquire what he means by conjectural history and 
whether he accurately represents Hume’s approach to the set-piece debates. For the 
moment it is sufficient to note that his statement to the effect that Hume attributed to 
historical actors those views ‘which, upon reflection, appeared to himself most natural 
                                                 
491 Jaeger, Paideia, i, 392.  
492 Francis Jeffrey, review of George Brodie’s History of the British Empire (1822), in Edinburgh Review 
40 (March 1824), pp. 92-146, partly reprinted in Early Responses. Cf. Early Responses, ii, 274 note 1 (the 
italics are Jeffrey’s).  
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in their situation’ is very close to Thucydides’ attempt ‘to make the speakers say what, 
in my opinion, was called for by each situation’. While Jeffrey acknowledges Hume’s 
didactic aim of employing the debates as means to clarify party opinions for the benefit 
of his readers, the inclusion of semi-fictional debates into a historical narrative was 
clearly an unacceptable practice in the eyes of this nineteenth-century critic. Hume 
himself had stated that ‘[t]he first Quality of an Historian is to be true & impartial’; in 
considering his set-piece debates Jeffrey found him wanting on both accounts.493  
    Debates in classical and humanist histories were not only characterised by their 
internal structure and their fictional character, but also by their place within the overall 
narrative. This is reflected in Polybius’ statement that the function of speeches was to 
‘sum up events and hold the whole history together’.494 We have seen that both 
Thucydides and Guicciardini inserted orations and debates at crucial moments in the 
narrative of political and military events, thereby focusing their readers’ attention on 
particular moments of decision and presenting them with the different courses of action 
available at these particular moments. In both classical and humanist historical writing 
the interplay between debates and narrative mirrored the causal relationship between 
thought and action, deliberation and implementation. Clarendon defended the need to 
relate the ‘solemn acts and consultations, from which all the matter of action is raised 
and continued’, though we have seen that he dispensed with fictional orations and 
debates and instead followed the Italian historian Davila in inserting lengthy quotations 
from the written declarations of both sides of the conflict ‘as the foundations upon which 
all that was after done, was built’.495 Turning once again to Hume, we find that he too 
inserts his debates at key points in the narrative of constitutional history and presents the 
views of both sides in the heated controversies sparked by such crucial events as the 
framing of the Petition of Right (1628), Charles’ rejection of the Grand Remonstrance 
(1641), the Exclusion Crisis (1680) and the framing of the Declaration of Right (1689). 
Hume’s debates, too, ‘serve as landmarks in his work’ insofar as they draw the reader’s 
                                                 
493 Hume to William Mure of Caldwell, [October 1754], HL, i, 210.  
494 Polybius, quoted in F. W. Walbank, ‘Speeches in Greek historians’, p. 247.  
495 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Bristol, quoted in Hicks, Neoclassical History, pp. 59-
60. 
 202 
attention to the key junctures in the history of the Stuart constitution.496 Their function 
goes beyond merely highlighting these turning points, however, since they act as 
reminders that there were always alternative courses of action available and that the 
outcome of these crucial debates was consequently not predetermined. Like 
Guicciardini’s paired speeches Hume’s set-piece political debates thus become, in Felix 
Gilbert’s phrase, ‘devices to disclose the multidimensional character of the historical 
process’.497 
      These considerations about the place of set-piece debates in historical narratives 
provide us with an important hint concerning their function. We have seen that by 
inserting his debates at crucial points in his narrative of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides was able to forge them into an effective tool that allowed him to probe into 
the causes of the events in accordance with what Adam Smith identified as his main 
objective in composing the history of that war, namely ‘to explain the causes which 
brought about the severall important events that happened during this period’.498 The 
speeches delivered at the Congress at Sparta, which precipitated the outbreak of the war, 
look beyond the superficial causes for the war and constitute a major vehicle for 
Thucydides’ central thesis locating the ultimate cause of the war in the growth of 
Athenian imperialism and its pretension to hegemony in the Greek world. We have seen 
that insofar as they probe into the underlying causes of events Thucydides’ debates are 
‘explicable not by a historian’s passion for exactitude but by a politician’s wish to 
penetrate to the ultimate political ground for every event’.499 Hume’s narrative is 
similarly concerned with the uncovering the deep and sometimes hidden causes of the 
events leading up to the constitutional crises of the Stuart Age such as the steady growth 
of the middling ranks after the decline of the feudal system and the resulting pretensions 
of the Commons to exert a corresponding influence on the way in which royal 
                                                 
496 Westlake, ‘The Settings of Thucydidean Speeches’, p. 105. Mark Salber Phillips observes that Hume 
‘marks significant occasions again and again by presenting the arguments of the opposing sides’. Cf. 
Phillips, Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2000), p. 63.  
497 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 299.  
498 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 163.  
499 Jaeger, Paideia, quoted above, n. 169.  
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prerogatives such as the levying of taxes were exercised. The set-piece debates of the 
History of Great Britain are part of this extended enquiry into the causes of the British 
Civil Wars as well as the crises of later Stuart history insofar as they reveal the 
ideological underpinnings of party-political conflicts. The debates in Hume’s History 
consequently fulfil a function similar to that which Adam Smith had assigned to 
invented speeches, namely to provide ‘an opportunity of introducing those observations 
and reflections which we observed are not so properly made in the person of the 
writer’.500  
      The parallels we have just observed between the uses of paired speeches and debates 
in Hume’s and Thucydides’ work go further, however, and it is intriguing to note that 
both historians employ debates to probe into the ideological causes of factional conflict 
and war. We have seen that a modern commentator has characterised Thucydides as ‘a 
historian not only of the history of a war, but specifically of the intellectual history of the 
parties involved in that war, himself being detached from and not necessarily adhering to 
such reflections or theories and their applications as he records’,501 and this description 
can equally well be applied to Hume since he presents the build-up to the Civil War as at 
least in part an ideological conflict. His work differs markedly from Thucydides’, 
however, insofar as the latter is primarily concerned with external politics and war, 
while the History of Great Britain focuses mainly on internal politics, constitutional 
conflict and civil strife. While Hume employs set-piece debates in a broadly similar 
fashion to present the views of opposing camps and factions, he goes beyond 
Thucydides in fashioning them into a powerful device that allows him to trace the 
emergence of opposing sets of opinions about the nature of the ancient constitution and 
reveal the different stages of the process whereby these opinions congealed into the 
party doctrines familiar to his readers. In this regard Hume’s use of debates is even 
closer to Guicciardini’s constitutional debate about the reorganisation of the Florentine 
government, which highlighted the ideological struggle between those who were 
actuated by what one of the speakers called ‘the desire for liberty’ and those who 
                                                 
500 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 103.  
501 H.-P. Stahl, ‘Speeches and Course of Events’, quoted above, n. 171.  
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advocated ‘limited participation and authority’.502 Though ostensibly concerned with 
specific policy issues, Hume’s set-piece debates are thus essentially constitutional 
debates, which present the opposing opinions of parties and groups within society 
concerning the nature of the English constitution and reflecting the tension between the 
two fundamental and conflicting principles inherent in any constitution, authority and 
liberty. If like Thucydides Hume was using debates to account for the build-up to a war, 
like Guicciardini he employed debates to analyse fundamental controversies about the 
nature of a polity’s constitution.  
     So far we have sought to interpret Hume’s set-piece debates in the light of their 
relationship with classical orations and debates, their semi-fictional character as well as 
their place and function in the wider narrative. This complements our examination of the 
extent to which Hume drew on Rapin’s History when writing his first debate about the 
1621. We have seen that this debate is clearly modelled on Rapin, though they also share 
a number of features with the paired speeches and debates in classical and humanist 
historical writing. In our examination we have so far neglected a third possibility, 
namely that the debates may owe something to Hume’s own earlier writings, in 
particularly his essays on political and historical matters. Even though Francis Jeffrey 
already tentatively raised this possibility, it has not been explored in more recent 
scholarship. In the following we will therefore briefly consider in how far the debates 
can be said to represent a continuation of Hume’s earlier preoccupations.  
     The set-piece debates of the History of England with their dialectic presentation of 
contrasting viewpoints bear a striking resemblance to a number of literary devices 
employed by Hume in his earlier writings. From the Treatise onwards, Hume had made 
use of an argumentative strategy that allowed him to present two sets of opposing 
arguments to the reader before subsequently proceeding to outline his own position, 
often in an attempt to integrate the arguments of both sides and thereby reconcile 
seemingly conflicting viewpoints. This particular manner of exposition can be found in 
almost all of Hume’s writings and is indicative of a dialectic turn of mind that has been 
                                                 
502 Guicciardini, History of Italy, pp. 76-83.  
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identified as a hallmark of his philosophy.503 While in his earlier writings Hume 
presented carefully balanced summaries of the opposing arguments, he increasingly had 
recourse to the more vivid dialogue form and in the period he spent at Ninewells 
between 1749 and 1751 he composed both A Dialogue and the first draft of his 
Dialogues concerning the Natural History of Religion. The latter work is preceded by 
introductory remarks in the form of a fictive letter from ‘Pamphilus to Hermippus’, 
which contains some of Hume’s most lucid statements on the dialogue form. He 
commences these remarks by criticising modern philosophical dialogue for its 
didacticism, but goes on to justify the suitability of this genre by stating that ‘[t]here are 
some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is particularly adapted, and where it 
is still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition’.504 This is the case 
with  
[a]ny question of philosophy … which is so obscure and uncertain, that 
human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should 
be treated at all; seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and 
conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can 
reasonably be positive: Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford 
an agreeable amusement: And if the subject be curious and interesting, the 
book carries us, in a manner, into company; and unites the two greatest and 
purest pleasures of human life, study and society.505  
While it is important to keep in mind that Hume is here writing about philosophical 
rather than historical subjects, this statement can nevertheless help us to shed light on his 
set-piece political debates. The controversy over the nature of the Stuart constitution was 
just such an ‘obscure and uncertain’ question,506 since the precise extent of 
parliamentary privileges boundaries and the exact boundaries of royal prerogatives had 
not yet been fixed. Consequently this too was a question about which ‘[r]easonable men 
may be allowed to differ’ and it was here too that the contrast of ‘[o]pposite sentiments’ 
                                                 
503 Cf. the extended discussion of ‘Hume as dialectical thinker’ in Donald W. Livingston, Hume’s 
philosophy of common life (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 34-59.  
504 Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin 
(Oxford: OUP 1993), p. 29.  
505 Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 30.  
506 Cf. Hume’s remark what precipitated the first set-piece debate was the fact that James had ‘torn off that 
sacred veil, which had hitherto covered the English constitution, and which threw an obscurity upon it, so 
advantageous to royal prerogative’. HE, v, 93.  
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engaged the reader’s attention, although it is clear from the detached style of the debates 
that Hume did not want to draw his readers into the debate but rather sought to teach 
them to judge such party disputes from the detached and moderate stance of ‘[i]mpartial 
reasoners’.507 On the whole, therefore, the set-piece debates reflect the dialectic manner 
of exposition that is so characteristic of Hume’s philosophical and political writings.  
      While the set-piece debates share certain general features with Hume’s earlier 
philosophical and political writings, the resemblance between the debates and the 
Essays, Moral and Political (1741-2) is particularly striking. We have seen that scholars 
working on Hume’s political and historical thought have demonstrated the extent to 
which he drew on his earlier preoccupation with the history of the mixed British 
constitution and the party system that grew out of and developed alongside that 
constitution when commenced writing a political history of the Stuart Age in the early 
1750s. While these preoccupations are clearly reflected in the History of Great Britain 
as a whole, it is worth noting that the set-piece debates themselves are not so much 
concerned with the actual nature of the constitution or even the rise of opposing parties 
as with the opinions which different groups, factions and later parties within society held 
about that constitution. Hume had emphasised the axiomatic importance of ‘opinion’ to 
his project of a science of politics when stating in 1741 that it is ‘on opinion only that 
government is founded’ and he had sought to classify different types of opinions on 
which the rule of the few over the many was founded and by means of which it was 
being perpetuated.508 As a result of the crucial role Hume had accorded to opinion, ‘the 
central task of the science of politics’ became therefore, in the words of a modern 
commentator, ‘to account for the formation and transformation of [the] fundamental 
opinions’ that underpin all political associations.509 The set-piece political debates of the 
History of Great Britain can be regarded as a primary means by which Hume undertook 
this central task as therefore as an extension of his science of politics.  
     Once we understand the set-piece debates as exemplifying Hume’s interest in the 
history of political opinion and in particular the opinions which had formed around the 
                                                 
507 HE, v, 195.  
508 ‘Of the First Principles of Government’, in E, p. 32.  
509 Knud Haakonssen, ‘The structure of Hume’s political theory’, in CCH, pp. 182-221, esp. p. 195.  
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English constitution, we need to enquire what they tell us about the way in which he 
sought to write the history of political opinion. Once again a helpful lead is provided by 
Francis Jeffrey, who, as we have seen, regarded the set-piece debates of Hume’s History 
as belonging ‘rather to conjectural than to authentic History’ insofar as Hume had used 
them to ascribe to historical actors ‘the views and motives, which, upon reflection, 
appeared to himself most natural in their situation’.510 Jeffrey further elaborated on this 
point when remarking about the set-piece debates that  
[s]uch a hypothetical integration of the opinions likely to prevail in any 
particular circumstances, seems at all times to have been a favourite exercise 
of [Hume’s] ingenuity. Very early in life, for example, he composed four 
Essays, to which he gave the names of the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Platonist, 
and the Sceptic – and prefixed to them the following very characteristic 
notice. ‘The intention of these Essays is not so much to explain accurately the 
sentiments of the antient sects of philosophy, as to deliver the sentiments of 
the sects which naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain different 
ideas of human life and of happiness. I have given each of them the name of 
the philosophical sect to which it bears the greatest affinity.’ These very 
words, we think, might be applied, with very little variation to most of the 
summaries of which we have been speaking. They, too, are mere conjectural 
views of the different sentiments that may be supposed naturally to arise in the 
world at particular periods; and they are given under the name of the historical 
party to which they bear the greatest affinity.511  
Taken together with the passage quoted earlier, this is probably the most important 
interpretative statement made about the set-piece political debates in Hume’s History. 
Jeffrey aptly describes Hume’s debate as a ‘hypothetical integration of the opinions 
likely to prevail in any particular circumstances’ and draws an insightful comparison 
between the debates in Hume’s History and the argumentative strategy in some of his 
early Essays, namely the four essays on the theme of human happiness as represented by 
the ancient schools of philosophy.512 Jeffrey’s comparison of Hume’s set-piece debates 
with these early essays allows him to apply Hume’s own description of the 
argumentative strategy he employed in these essays to the set-piece political debates of 
                                                 
510 Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review 40 (1824), reprinted in Early Responses ii, 274 note 1.  
511 Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review 40 (1824), reprinted in Early Responses ii, 274 note 1 (the 
italics are Jeffrey’s).  
512 ‘The Epicurean’, ‘The Stoic’, ‘The Platonist’, and ‘The Sceptic’ (E, pp. 138-80) were published as part 
of the second instalment of Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political in 1742 and therefore not ‘[v]ery early in 
[Hume’s] life’, as Jeffrey mistakenly suggests.  
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the History, which Jeffrey accordingly characterises as ‘mere conjectural views of the 
different sentiments that may be supposed naturally to arise in the world at particular 
periods’.  
     Jeffrey’s interpretation, drawing on Hume’s phrase that he sought to outline the 
debates which ‘naturally form themselves in the world’, opens up the intriguing 
possibility that the set-piece debates should perhaps be understood as constituting a 
natural history of opinion. We may note in this context that it was in the period just 
before or even during the time when he wrote his Stuart history that Hume composed his 
Natural History of Religion, which Dugald Stewart would later cite as an example of 
what he famously labelled ‘Theoretical or Conjectural History’.513 It is important to 
keep in mind, however, that both in Hume’s Natural History of Religion and in 
Stewart’s later account of conjectural history the historian was to resort to philosophical 
conjecture only to make up for the gaps in the historical record concerning early periods 
by drawing on what little evidence existed and supplying the rest by means of a priori 
arguments drawn from the regularities observed in human nature and societies.514 Yet 
there was no shortage of evidence for what was spoken in parliament during the great 
constitutional crises of the Stuart Age, even if we concede that it may have been very 
difficult for Hume to reconstruct accurately the divisions of opinion in the country as a 
whole. Jeffrey is clearly puzzled by Hume’s evident decision to ignore the recorded 
views of ‘the actors of the time’ and instead insert his own summaries of opposing 
political opinions containing arguments that did not and in some cases could not have 
occurred to them. Hume’s decision to compose ‘hypothetical’ debates in cases where 
records of actual debates had been preserved and were available to him is remarkable 
and in order to understand it we must follow Jeffrey’s lead and look for the direct 
antecedent of these set-piece debates in Hume’s philosophical and political writings 
composed before 1752.  
                                                 
513 Dugald Stewart, ‘Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D.’, in Adam Smith, Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980; rpt. Indiana: 
Liberty Classics, 1982), pp. 263-351, esp. 293.  
514 Dugald Stewart, ‘Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith’, pp. 292-6.  
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     It should be noted that while Hume had indeed stressed the importance of both party 
and opinion as central themes of his political science as early as 1741, he had not at that 
stage combined his interests in political parties and political opinions by providing a 
comprehensive analysis and critique of party political opinions. This only happened in 
1748 with the publication of the third instalment of his Essays, Moral and Political and 
it is consequently to these Essays that we must look in our search for direct antecedents 
of the set-piece political debates of Hume’s History. The third instalment of his essays, 
which appeared in 1748 under the title Three Essays, Moral and Political, was originally 
to have consisted of Hume’s two essays on the respective central tenets of Whig and 
Tory political ideologies, ‘Of the Original Contract’ and ‘Of Passive Obedience’, as well 
as a third one entitled ‘Of the Protestant Succession’.515 We have noted earlier that 
Hume, or rather his friend Charles Erskine acting on his behalf, withdrew this last piece 
before publication and replaced it with the essay ‘Of National Characters’. In the form in 
which it was originally conceived, the collection would have examined the controversy 
between the Whigs and Tories over the origins and foundation of political allegiance as 
well as the conflict between the advocates of the House of Stuart’s claim to the British 
throne and the defenders of the Hanoverian Succession. As such the slim volume would 
thus have consisted of the two ‘debates’ in which Hume demonstrates his impartiality 
and moderation by presenting balanced summaries of contested party political 
arguments.  
     When comparing Hume’s 1748 essays to the set-piece debates in his History, it needs 
to be borne in mind that the former are primarily concerned not with historical but rather 
with current party political debates, even if we allow for the fact that Augustan political 
discourse was intrinsically a discourse about history and vice versa. The essays on Whig 
and Tory doctrines are written from a general and abstract viewpoint that allows Hume 
to draw on the principles of his political science in order to evaluate the validity of party 
                                                 
515 That this is the order in which the essays were originally supposed to appear is suggested by the order 
in which Hume mentions them in his letter to Chares Erskine, cf. Hume to Charles Erskine, Lord Tinwald, 
13 February 1748, HL, i, 112. When the collection entitled Three Essays, Moral and Political eventually 
appeared in late 1748, the essays on Whig and Tory doctrines had been relegated to second and third place 
and the first essay was ‘Of National Characters’.  
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political arguments that still had currency in his own day. This is confirmed by Hume’s 
remark to a correspondent that the line of argument laid down in his essay ‘Of the 
Original Contract’ provided ‘a short, but compleat Refutation of the political Systems of 
Sydney, Locke, and the Whigs’.516 By contrast, the essay ‘Of the Protestant Succession’ 
is framed as a hypothetical debate set in the period between the Revolution Settlement 
and the Hanoverian succession, as is made clear by the opening paragraph of the essay:  
I SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King WILLIAM or 
Queen ANNE, while the establishment of the Protestant Succession was yet 
uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would chuse in that 
important question, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and 
disadvantages on each side. I believe the following particulars would have 
entered into his consideration.517  
These sentences make clear that we ought to regard the following line of argument as a 
hypothetical, conjectural rather than an accurate summary of what had demonstrably 
been said by a specific member of parliament under William or Anne. These opening 
remarks are followed by a long paragraph presenting ‘the great advantage resulting from 
the restoration of the STUART family’, which is immediately followed by another one 
of equal length outlining ‘[t]he advantages of the HANOVERIAN succession’, after 
which Hume interposes the following remark:    
These are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in the house 
of STUART, or in that of HANOVER. There are also disadvantages in each 
establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order 
to form a just judgement upon the whole.518  
This time it is no longer a member of parliament but more generally ‘an impartial 
patriot’ who seeks to come to a balanced assessment of the disadvantages of either 
course of settling the succession, which anticipates the ‘[i]mpartial reasoners’ who 
formed the third, hypothetical group in the set-piece debate about the framing of the 
Petition of Right in the History of Great Britain.519 Both the introductory remarks of 
Hume’s essay on the Protestant Succession and the ensuing debate closely resemble the 
                                                 
516 Hume to Lord Elibank, 8 January 1748, in Ernest Campbell Mossner, ‘New Hume Letters to Lord 
Elibank, 1748-1776’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 4 (1962/3), 431-460, esp. 437.  
517 ‘Of the Protestant Succession’, in E, p. 502.  
518 ‘Of the Protestant Succession’, in E, p. 506.  
519 HE, v, 195.  
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set-piece political debates in Hume’s History, which, as we have seen, evolve along a 
similar structural pattern.  
      The historical setting of the debate that opens Hume’s essay ‘Of the Protestant 
Succession’ obscures the topical nature of the arguments and appears like a deliberate 
attempt to impose a certain amount of distance and detachedness on a problem that had 
been both highly topical and deeply controversial in the period immediately preceding 
the essay’s intended date of publication in 1748. The reverberations of the suppressed 
Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 and its aftermath, including the violent attempts to ‘pacify’ 
the Scottish Highlands, could still be felt at the time of the intended publication of this 
essay in early 1748 and they had sparked an intense debate among the lawyers and 
literati of Edinburgh. Writing to Charles Erskine Hume stated that he had examined the 
question of the Protestant Succession ‘as coolly & impartially as if I were remov’d a 
thousand Years from the present Period’.520 Hume had thus framed the debate between 
the adherents of the Stuart cause and the defenders of the Hanoverian Settlement as a 
historical debate, and it is this that separates this essay from the numerous other 
dialectical presentations of opposing philosophical and political arguments.521 The 
historical framework of the essay ‘Of the Protestant Succession’ as well as the specific 
structural similarities it shares with Hume’s later set-piece debates suggests that we 
should regard this essay and as the immediate precursor to the set-piece political debates 
in the History of Great Britain.  
      The debate that opens ‘Of the Protestant Succession’ would not feel out of place in 
the History of Great Britain and it is noteworthy that Hume did in fact insert a very 
similar set-piece debate into his narrative of the Revolution of 1688/89. This debate 
occurs during the first session of the Convention Parliament when James II, who had 
fled the kingdom following William’s invasion in 1688, was declared by the Commons 
                                                 
520 Hume to Charles Erskine, Lord Tinwald, 13 February 1748, HL, i, 112.  
521 It is before this background that should read the statements Hume made in his letter to Charles Erskine, 
where he shows himself aware that it was precisely the detached and impartial stance which he had 
adopted in this essay and which was reflected in the fact that the arguments of the followers of the Stuarts 
were presented on an equal footing with those of the defenders of the Hanoverian Succession, that could 
easily be held against him and those with whom he associated in an atmosphere in which everything that 
could be construed as an expression of sympathy with the Stuart cause was regarded with extreme 
suspicion. 
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to have ‘abdicated the government’ and thereby to have left the throne vacant. This met 
with opposition from the Tory peers in the House of Lords and the ensuing debate 
between Tories and Whigs revolved around the question of the lawfulness and 
expediency of the two proposed constitutional solutions according to which the Crown 
should either be settled on a regent nominally ruling in James’ name or else on William 
and Mary.522 Hume comments about the manner in which this debate was conducted in 
parliament:  
Never surely was national debate more important, or managed by more 
able speakers; yet is one surprised to find the topics, insisted on by both 
sides, so frivolous; more resembling the verbal disputes of the schools than 
the solid reasonings of statesmen and legislators. In public transactions of 
such consequence, the true motives, which produce any measure, are 
seldom avowed.523  
It is clear that Hume disapproves of the manner in which this momentous parliamentary 
debate was conducted and he discusses the ‘frivolous’ topics or ‘verbal disputes’ that 
revolved around the question whether James had ‘forfeited’ the crown, ‘abdicated’, or 
else had ‘deserted’ the throne of England.524 By contrast, the set-piece debate, inserted 
just a few paragraphs earlier in the narrative, reflects none of these trivialities and 
technicalities. Instead, the two opposing sets of argument display a systematic and 
balanced manner of arguing about the application of general constitutional principles 
and the expediency of particular political actions, which seems much closer to what 
Hume called ‘the solid reasonings of statesmen and legislators’. This confirms Francis 
Jeffrey’s assessment that Hume ‘seems to have thought that the conduct of the actors 
would be best understood by ascribing to them the views and motives, which, upon 
reflection, appeared to himself most natural in their situation’.525 This conjectural 
approach is common to both the debate that opens Hume’s essay ‘Of the Protestant 
Succession’ and the debates in his Stuart history and marks the former out as a possible 
model on which he could have drawn for the latter.  
                                                 
522 HE, vi, 523-8.  
523 HE, vi, 526-7.  
524 HE, vi, 527.  
525 Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review 40 (1824), reprinted in Early Responses ii, 274 note 1. 
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      Having identified a dialectical approach and an attempt to write the natural history of 
opinions as those aspects which the set-piece debates of the History of Great Britain 
share with Hume’s earlier philosophical and political writings, particularly his early 
Essays, Moral and Political (1741/2), we are now in a position to attempt an overall 
assessment of the nature and functions of debates within Hume’s narrative of Stuart 
history. This will in turn lead us to consider the significance of the debates for Hume’s 
History of Great Britain as a whole as well as their overall importance to our 
understanding of Hume’s concept of political history as embodied in that work. For the 
purpose of locating the precise place occupied by the debates in the overall structure of 
the History it will be useful to introduce a distinction between two structural levels of 
any grand historical narrative, the narrative and the metanarrative. While the narrative 
consists in a chronological account of the history of events, the metanarrative comprises 
the main underlying theme or themes of that account. In the present context, the term 
‘metanarrative’ should thus be understood as describing the overall interpretative 
framework employed by the historian to lend meaning and unity to his narrative of the 
history of events. This basic distinction should facilitate our attempt to locate the place 
occupied by the debates in Hume’s History.  
      The first thing that strikes us when we consider the overall place of the set-piece 
debates in the History of Great Britain and their relationship to the rest of the text is the 
extent to which they have been successfully integrated into Hume’s narrative account of 
Stuart history. Thematically the debates fit into what Hume described as ‘the narration 
of parliamentary factions, or court intrigues, or civil wars’ and they constitute an integral 
part of his account of the rise of parliamentary factions as well as the descent of 
factional conflict into civil war.526 We have seen that Hume was from the very beginning 
intent on composing a fast-flowing or ‘rapid’ historical narrative ‘after the manner of the 
Ancients’, a narrative that would not be encumbered by those extended quotations and 
frequent digressions that had become the hallmarks of antiquarian history.527 We have 
seen that Adam Smith had defended the use of invented speeches in historical writing on 
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the grounds that they did not ‘interrupt the thread of the narration as they are not 
considered as the authors, but make a part of the facts related’ and this observation 
applies to Hume’s set-piece political debates as well.528  
     While they are embedded in the narrative of political events, the set-piece debates 
stand out from that narrative in at least one important respect. In the narrative Hume is 
concerned with giving a more or less detailed account of particular actions and 
individual characters, whereas the set-piece debates are composed from an abstract, 
general viewpoint. In contrast to the orations found in classical works of history, they 
are neither attributed to individual speakers nor concerned with specific policy issues. 
Even though the debates are sparked by specific disputes between the King and the 
Commons or between adherents of opposing factions or parties, the lines of argument 
developed in these debates go beyond such issues and raise the debates to the level of 
general reflections about the nature of the English constitution.  
     We have seen that the first debate, inserted at the close of Hume’s account of James’ 
turbulent third Parliament, was conducted between ‘the partizans of the court’ and ‘[t]he 
lovers of liberty’,529 and most debates in the History of Great Britain represent the same 
fundamental divide between those who regarded the English constitution as an absolute 
monarchy and those who deemed it a limited one. On the most fundamental level the 
dispute about the extent of parliamentary privileges and the limits of royal prerogative 
which dominated Stuart history was a particularly intense manifestation of the basic 
struggle between liberty and authority inherent in any mixed constitution, which in the 
British case had lead through constitutional breakdown, civil war and revolution to the 
eventual establishment of a mixed and balanced constitution. Most modern 
commentators have identified the struggle between liberty and authority as the 
fundamental metanarrative theme of Hume’s History.530 While Hume’s interest in the 
struggle between liberty and authority in the English constitution was, as we have seen, 
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expressed in the digression that preceded the first set-piece debate, the same theme is 
dramatised in the debates themselves. The set-piece debates transcend the account of 
political actions in the course of which they are related insofar as they are concerned 
with those abstract, fundamental constitutional issues that determined political history in 
the Stuart Age and therefore point towards Hume’s overall concern in the History of 
Great Britain with the structure and transformation of the Stuart constitution. In the 
widest sense, the debates can consequently be understood as literary devices that enable 
Hume to convey his meta-historical reflections on the wider political and philosophical 
issues at stake in this period of English constitutional history.  
     The set-piece debates, while fully integrated into the narrative of Hume’s Stuart 
history, clearly reflect the predominant metanarrative theme of that history, the struggle 
between the opposing principles of liberty and authority. Since they are part of both the 
narrative and the metanarrative level of the work, the debates have the unique potential 
to connect the works’ narrative of political actions with its metanarrative of 
constitutional development. In this way they serve as links between the narrative and 
meta-narrative levels of Hume’s History, anchoring its overarching theme – the 
momentous constitutional struggle between authority and liberty – in the narrative of 
events leading up to the Civil War and the Revolution of 1688. We have seen that the 
speeches in Thucydides’ History also are at the same time an integral part of the 
narrative of events and a device used to convey the political analysis of these events. By 
this means Thucydides’ orations and debates serve the function of rendering the 
narrative intelligible as well as meaningful by providing an analysis of the ideological 
and party-political conflicts underpinning those events. Hume’s analysis, like 
Thucydides’, ‘does not appear as a tedious running commentary, but is usually translated 
into intellectual events, by the speeches, and is thus put directly and vividly before the 
thoughtful reader’.531 As ‘intellectual events’, Hume’s set-piece political debates reflect 
the interplay between the narrative account of civil transactions and the History’s 
metanarrative of constitutional transformations.  
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     In order to round off our concluding assessment of the set-piece political debates we 
need to look beyond the History of Great Britain and consider the wider significance of 
these debates for our understanding of the relationship between Hume’s political 
philosophy and his political history. We have identified the set-piece debates as a 
vehicle for his treatment of the metanarrative theme of the continuous struggle between 
liberty and authority that led to the establishment of the mixed and balanced British 
constitution. As such, the debates can be understood as a direct expression of Hume’s 
political thought, which was concerned with precisely these themes, as his Essays, 
Moral and Political (1741-48) abundantly show. Thucydides’ speeches have been 
described as being ‘above all else the medium through which he expresses his political 
ideas’,532 and this applies to some degree to Hume’s debates as well, though we have 
seen that while Hume draws freely on arguments he had earlier developed within his 
political science, it would be misleading to regard any of the stances in this debates as 
exclusively representing his own political views. The fictitious debate that opens 
Hume’s essay ‘Of the Protestant Succession’ is only the most immediate of numerous 
parallels that could be drawn between the political insight provided by Hume’s essays 
and the debates of his History. The debates thus provided Hume with an opportunity to 
bring his extended analysis and critique of party-political opinions about the British 
constitution to bear on his account of British constitutional history. The set-piece 
political debates therefore represent an element of Hume’s political science in his 
political history. The set-piece political debates can therefore be understood as focal 
points within the text of Hume’s History of Great Britain, since they allow the rays of 
Hume’s political thinking to illuminate his narrative of Stuart history.  
     This has led Duncan Forbes to state that the debates ‘belong to political philosophy, 
not history’, but it is a slightly misleading statement as Hume’s History, as Forbes 
acknowledges elsewhere, is primarily a political history informed by political 
philosophy.533 What Werner Jaeger said about Thucydides’ speeches and debates is true 
for Hume’s as well: ‘we cannot possibly appreciate it without doing justice to the 
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political thinker concealed in the historian’.534 Ultimately, Hume’s History – like 
Thucydides’ – is a work of political history elucidated by political philosophy and the 
set-piece debates are the main vehicle through which the latter enters the former. The 
debates thus constitute a major element of continuity between Hume’s political science 
of the 1740s and his political history of the 1750s. We have seen that Guicciardini’s 
debate about the reorganisation of Florence can be regarded as a similar element of 
continuity between an earlier stage in the philosopher’s career, in which he presented an 
analysis of the Florentine constitution in the form of a dialogue and a later stage, in 
which a similar constitutional debate is inserted into a full-scale narrative of political 
history. As a literary device the set-piece debate enabled Guicciardini as well as Hume 
to apply their political insights to political and constitutional history without having to 
inserting tedious digressions and by this means to effectively integrate political thinking 
and political history. The set-piece debates therefore constitute a major link between 
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Conclusion: Hume and the Writing of History En Philosophe 
 
The present study has provided a survey and analysis of Hume’s intellectual and literary 
career from the publication of the first Enquiry in 1748 to that of his History of Great 
Britain in 1754 and 1756 with regard to the development of his views on the philosophy 
of history, the transformation of his intentions to write a narrative history and the 
construction of an ‘impartial’ narrative of the Stuart Age as reflected in Hume’s use of 
set-piece political debates. We shall now proceed to assess the significance of our 
findings in order to address the important question of the development of Hume’s 
thinking on history during this period and the possible interconnections between such a 
development and the overall trajectory of his literary career. We have seen in the 
introduction that those commentators who have insisted on an overall continuity in 
Hume’s thinking have often simplified the development and unfolding of his works, 
which is evident from J. B. Black's remark that Hume’s ‘philosophy stands to his history 
in the relation of a Prolegomenon, and both, taken together, represent an organic 
unity.’535 Though Hume scholarship has advanced enormously since Black wrote at the 
beginning of the century, Hume’s transformation from moral philosopher to 
philosophical historian is still sometimes represented as a straightforward process. Over 
thirty years ago, Duncan Forbes sounded a cautionary note against any account of 
Hume’s intellectual and literary career written along such straightforward lines, insisting 
that ‘[t]here is no single route leading directly from Hume’s philosophy of human nature 
to his History of England’. According to Forbes,  
[t]hose who think that Hume’s History is the sort of history one would expect 
from his science of man must be working with an abridged and oversimplified 
notion of the latter. There is enough social realism and sociological emphasis 
in Hume’s philosophy of human nature to have provided (in theory, and 
forgetting the enormous technical difficulties in writing narrative history of a 
revolutionary nature) a quite different sort of History to the one actually 
written. Suppose a reader knowing Hume only from Book III of the Treatise 
and the Enquiries and certain of the essays, or parts of them, were to be told 
that Hume had also written a History of England, and then asked to hazard a 
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guess as to what sort of a history he would expect it to be. Might he not be 
justified in replying: ‘I note what Hume has to say about sympathy, social 
experience, national character, the evolution of morality, social rules and 
institutions, and “moral” causes; so on the whole I expect to see a social 
history, with the emphasis on the gradual evolution of English society and 
social institutions, on national character (and possibly its development), on the 
Common Law and manners and customs etc., neglecting “physical causes”.’ 
Would he not be surprised to learn that the narrative has often been criticized 
for being too narrowly political?536  
In this thought experiment Forbes presents us with a lucid exposition of one of the most 
challenging interpretative problems confronting Hume scholars. This problem stems 
from the apparent contradictions and inherent complexities of Hume’s intellectual 
career, which render problematic any attempt to put forth a straightforward 
interpretation of the relationship between a ‘science of man’ that emphasises the social 
and cultural dimension of human nature and a narrative history that is largely focused on 
constitutional and party-political history. In the following we will seek to provide a 
provisional interpretative solution to this problem by drawing on insights gleaned from 
our examination of several areas of Hume’s work and career in the main body of this 
study. 
     The present investigation of Hume’s career in the late 1740s and early to mid-1750s 
has revealed that his manifold intellectual preoccupations in the period spanning the 
years 1748 to 1752 are markedly different from those of the post-1752 period to the 
extent that they constitute a distinct intellectual project. Hume partly developed this 
project while he was engaged in a close reading of a wide range of classical sources for 
his erudite dissertation ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’. Hume’s profound 
interest in the history of classical antiquity has so far not been properly recognised by 
modern scholars, though it is reflected in James Boswell’s remark about Hume to the 
effect that the latter ‘has apply’d himself with great attention to the study of the ancients, 
and is likeways a great historian’.537 The fame of Hume’s History of England has 
subsequently eclipsed his earlier pieces, which taken together constitute a cultural 
history of classical antiquity, and obscured the seriousness and sophistication of the 
                                                 
536 Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), p. 121.  
537 Quoted in Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Forgotten Hume: Le bon David (New York: Columbia UP, 
1943), p. 171.  
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philosophy and methodology of history that underpinned these pieces. It is the 
contention of the present study that Hume’s reflection on the historicity of human nature 
and attempts to assemble a complete picture view of classical civilisation that comprises 
all aspects from economic conditions to religious thought and amounts to an agenda for 
a new kind of philosophical history.  
     The concept of history Hume worked out in the period 1748-52 differs widely from 
the one reflected in the History of Great Britain. This draws our attention to the fact that 
the question asked by Forbes in the passage quoted above can be regarded as une 
question mal posée since it does not take proper account of the fact that Hume was to 
some degree compelled to write a history that would today be considered as ‘being too 
narrowly political’. To the eighteenth-century history was political history, a distinct 
literary genre that demanded an elegant and elevated narrative of statecraft and warfare, 
embellished with set-pieces and judicious reflections. This in effect imposed strict 
limitations on the historian reflected in the fact that lengthy digressions and discussions 
of evidence were considered as infringements of the humanists had called ‘the rules of 
history’. Hume’s earlier foray into classical terrain in his populousness dissertation 
could therefore not be called ‘history’ in this sense; instead it was a work of erudite 
scholarship displaying Hume’s skill in ‘the critical art’, the reading and use of historical 
sources. Given this distinction we should not be surprised to find that Hume ended up 
composing a history with a strong political focus.  
     Yet while we have seen that Hume took care to observe classical and humanist 
prescriptions for the writing of history, he did at the same time strive to write a work that 
displayed the workings of ‘[t]he philosophical Spirit, which I have so much indulg’d in 
all my Writings’.538 It has been argued in the present study that the principal means 
through which Hume affected the reconciliation between narrative and philosophical 
elements in his history consisted in the set-piece political debates. Though its 
significance has been largely overlooked by modern commentators, it is argued that it is 
this ingenious device, even more than that of the character sketch and the survey of 
economic and cultural history in the appendices, which best reflects Hume’s conception 
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of political history as philosophical history. The effectiveness of these devices rests in 
the fact that they are embedded in the narrative while serving a number of functions, 
from providing summaries of party opinions to conveying to the reader the all-important 
impression that the work they were reading had been written by an impartial historian. 
So far we have stressed the clear distinction between cultural history as envisaged by 
Hume in the late 1740s and early 1752s and political history as enshrined in the History 
of Great Britain (1754-56), yet we should enquire whether the two share some common 
characteristics.  
     Here we need to look beyond the History of Great Britain, since an illuminating, 
though so far overlooked, instance of convergence between political and cultural history 
can be found in the first Tudor volume of the History of England, published in 1759. In 
his account of the reign of Henry VIII Hume examines the arguments that has been put 
forth at the time in favour of the king’s right to divorce his first wife Catherine of 
Aragon ‘by the principles of sound philosophy’. Hume commences this examination by 
considering in the light of ‘natural reason’ why marriage between close relatives has 
generally been forbidden. He then goes on to discuss the history of marriage laws in 
Greece, Rome and ancient Israel, accounting for the often widely differing prescriptions 
in each of these cultures by reference to the manners and mores of the societies in which 
they occur, which he in turn seeks to trace back to common human traits.539 This way of 
proceeding is of course reminiscent of A Dialogue, a piece on which Hume draws 
directly for his discussion of incest and the role of women in this passage of his Tudor 
volume. Hume, the reader of the classics has thus not been entirely useless to Hume, the 
historian. Tudor and, more generally speaking, Christian concepts of marriage are 
considered by Hume in their widest possible perspective, which serves to underline the 
relativity of manners and mores in human societies as well as their dependence on a 
number of wider social and cultural factors. This passage can thus be regarded as a point 
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Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace Book, ed. Douglas L. Wilson (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989), pp. 
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of convergence between Hume’s A Dialogue and his History of England, between moral 
philosophy and philosophical history.  
     This instance of Hume’s awareness of the variation of customs across history leads us 
to consider the extent to which the History could be said to follow the philosophy of 
history Hume had outlined in A Dialogue. We have seen that Hume formulated a 
position akin to but in many ways distinct from a historicist position. The first review to 
comment on the extent to which such a position was maintained throughout Hume’s 
narrative of Stuart history was the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen. In 
December 1755 this journal, which had already reviewed most of Hume’s writings 
published before that date, carried a review of the first volume of the History of Great 
Britain:  
It is well known that Mr. Hume is well acquainted with the world and is wont 
to serious observation of customs. In this volume we find the quite rare talent 
of using this knowledge for the purpose of enlightenment and promoting the 
usefulness of history. It is a well know rule that the historian, if he wants to 
uncover the historical motivations of the period in question, must put himself 
in the times about which he writes and that he must judge the action of people 
not according to principles popular today, but rather, according to those 
principles which predominated in those days about which he writes. The rule is 
least observed by those historians who work on the history of recent times, 
probably due to the prejudice that, as they believe, in such a short time no 
noticeable changes in the political mind-set can be discerned. Other historians 
err by not giving the reader any guidance in order that they themselves might 
see the differences between past and present constitutions and the rules of state 
that derive from them. To his advantage Mr. Hume has generally avoided these 
errors and from his book one becomes well acquainted with what Great Britain 
looked like at the time of King James and King Charles.540  
The reviewer approves of Hume’s practice to judge historical actors according to the 
practices and rules of their time rather than his. This is particularly true of the standards 
of political judgement which depended on the state of the constitution at the time as well 
as other factors such as the prevailing manners and religious beliefs. Yet it would be 
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147 (December 1755), translation printed in Responses, i, 22-25. The reviewer was most impressed by 
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wrong to infer from this that Hume was a proto-historicist whose views anticipate the 
classical exposition of historicism by Hegel and Ranke. This becomes clear when we 
consider the latter’s well-known assertion that ‘every epoch is immediate to God, and its 
worth is not at all based on what derives from it but rests in its own existence, in its own 
self’.541 Hume never envisaged such a position, which would have been irreconcilable 
with his conception of the role of history. To Hume history was a selective narrative that 
fulfilled a didactic role and presupposed value judgements on the part of the historian, 
not an attempt to reconstruct history in its entirety and ‘merely show the past as it really 
was’.542  
     Having thus surveyed different elements of ‘philosophical history’ in Hume’s work 
of the 1740s and 1750s, we may enquire whether these can be translated into a definition 
of the term with regard to Hume’s manner of thinking and writing about history. Hume 
is generally deemed to have ‘followed the practice of writing history en philosophe’, 
although the possible meanings of that expression are rarely discussed.543 It was coined 
by Voltaire who from 1738 onwards had repeatedly called for history to be written ‘en 
philosophe’.544 In 1744 he was to renew this call in a short piece entitled Nouvelles 
considérations sur l’histoire in the following terms: ‘Il faudrait … incorporer avec art 
ces connaissances utiles dans le tissu des événements. Je crois que c’est la seule manière 
d’écrire l’histoire moderne en vrai politique et en vrai philosophe.’545 According to 
Tobias Smollett Hume had excelled in this manner of writing history. In his review of 
the Tudor volumes, Smollett particularly applauded ‘the skill with which our author has 
involved the reflections of a philosophical historian in the detail of his facts, in a manner 
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which throws a light upon every subject, without sensibly interrupting the course of the 
narration’.546 A history written en philosophe was therefore above all a history that 
succeeded in integrating philosophical reflections into the body of a narrative history of 
events. While these reflections might either be of a political nature or consist in remarks 
on the social, cultural and economic framework of the history of events, it was important 
that they were woven into the very fabric of the narrative. Insofar as Hume’s set-piece 
political debates were fully embedded in his narrative of constitutional conflict while 
reflecting the metanarrative theme of constitutional development, they exemplify 
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A List of Classical Citations in Hume’s ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’ 
 
The following is a list of the classical works cited in Hume’s essay ‘Of the Populousness 
of Ancient Nations’, first published in 1752 as part of his Political Discourses. This list 
provides the basis for my discussion of Hume’s reading during the period he spent at 
Ninewells between 1749 and 1751 (see Chapter 2.1). Collectively, the titles listed below 
provide us with a general indication of the extent of Hume’s classical reading during this 
period, though it must be born in mind that citations cannot strictly speaking be taken as 
proof that Hume actually read the classical work to which he refers. Due to the obscure 
nature of some of the works listed below as well as Hume’s limited access to classical 
texts during the period in question, it is at least possible that references to those classical 
works which are cited only once may in fact have been second-hand citations, i.e. 
references culled from works of antiquarian scholarship rather than collected during a 
reading of the classical texts themselves. For this reason the discussion of the works in 
this list revolves around those classical works which Hume cited more than just once or 
twice, as it is assumed that in these cases there is a greater likelihood that he actually 
read the texts in question.  
     All references are to page numbers in the Liberty Classics edition of the Essays, 
Moral, Political, and Literary, which is the most complete modern edition of Hume’s 
Essays. Though most citations of classical works are to be found in the notes rather than 
the text of this essay, I have refrained from referring to specific footnotes by number 
since the numbering of footnotes in this edition differs from that in the editions produced 
in Hume’s lifetime due to the fact that the editor Eugene F. Miller has inserted his own 
explanatory notes among Hume’s notes while at the same time numbering all notes 
consecutively. I have also indicated those cases in which Hume merely alludes to a 
classical text without providing any reference to specific parts or pages of that text. An 
 252 
attempt has been made to identify citations added by Hume after the first publication of 
this essay in 1752, since it is assumed that these later additions probably reflect reading 
subsequent to that undertaken during the Ninewells period, 1749-51. It should be 
remembered, however, that the list of variant readings provided in the LibertyClassics 
edition is incomplete and not entirely reliable. It is to be expected that a far more reliable 
resource will soon be available to Hume scholars in the form of the forthcoming edition 
of Hume’s Essays, edited by T. L. Beauchamp and M. Box with the assistance of 

























Classical author and work as cited by Hume 
 
Page number of citation in Hume’s ‘Of 
the Populousness of Ancient Nations’ 
(Essays, ed. Miller, 1987) 
 
1. Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon 409, 417 
2. Aelius Lampridius, Augustan History 421 
3. Aeschines, Against Timarchus 429 
4. Ammianus Marcellinus, History of Rome 443 
5. Appian, Roman History 396, 402, 406, 408, 424, 454 
6. Aristides, To Rome   437, 459 
7. Aristophanes, The Knights 391 [added in 1758] 
8. Aristotle, Ethics 447 
9. Aristotle, Generation of Animals 450 [added in 1777] 
10. Aristotle, Politics 391 [added in 1758] 
11. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander 416 
12. Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 427, 429, 431, 460 
13. Aurelius Victor, History of the Caesars  440 [mentioned] 
14. Caesar [Hirtius], The Spanish War 456 
15. Caesar, The Gallic War 402, 453 (2x), 454 (3x), 455 (2x) 
16. Cato, De re rustica 394 
17. Cicero, Against Verres   418, 427 
18. Cicero, De Haruspicum Responsis 456 
19. Cicero, Letters to Atticus 418 
20. Cicero, Philippic     407 
21. Cicero, Pro Coelio 385 
22. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 441 
23. Columella, On Agriculture  
  
378, 385 (2x), 388, 395, 396, 420, 451 (2x), 
457 
24. Cornelius Nepos, Lives of Illustrious 
Men 
390 
25. Demosthenes, Against Aphobus  391, 417 (4x), 429 (2x), 430 
26. Demosthenes, Against Aristogeiton  427 
27. Demosthenes, Against Leptines  432 
28. Demosthenes, Against Meidias  390 
29. Demosthenes, Against Onetor  385 
30. Demosthenes, On the Embassy  402 
31. Demosthenes, On the Navy Boards  430 
32. Demosthenes, Third Philippic  429 
33. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 
  
403 (2x), 406, 409f (5x), 410, 413, 415, 416 
(2x), 418 (2x), 422, 423 (3x), 424, 425, 428, 
432, 433, 435, 443 (2x), 444 (2x), 449, 454, 
459, 464 
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34. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers
  
423 
35. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman 
Antiquities  
413, 428, 437 (2x) 
36. Donatus, Commentary on Phormio  394 
37. Florus, Epitome of Roman History  397 (2x) 
38. Herodian, History of the Empire [Latin 
translation by Politian] 
443, 444, 445, 453 
39. Herodotus, History    417 (2x), 427, 436 [added in 1753-4] 
40. Hesiod, Works and Days   393 
41. Historia Augusta    434, 440, 445, 446 
42. Horace, Odes     388, 445 
43. Horace, Satires    389, 445 
44. Institutes [Roman Law] 406 
45. Isocrates, Areopagiticus 409  
46. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 412 
47. Isocrates, Panegyricus 390, 411, 432 
48. Isocrates, To Philip 411 
49. Josephus, The Jewish War 444, 460 
50. Justin, [Epitome of] Philippic History 436, 456 
51. Justinian, Pandectas [Digest] 392 
52. Juvenal, Satires 396, 437, 449 
53. Livy, History of Rome 402, 406, 416, 432 [added in 1770], 436 
(2x), 456 
54. Lucan, The Civil War  397 
55. Lucian 400 [mentioned] 
56. Lucian, On Salaried Posts in Great 
Houses 
462 
57. Lucian, The Ship or the Wishes 432 
58. Lysias, Orations 407 (2x), 408, 411, 412, 417, 424, 427, 429, 
434 
59. Martial, Epigrams 389, 397 
60. Olympiodorus  440 [mentioned] 
61. Ovid  452 [mentioned] 
62. Ovid, Amores 385 
63. Ovid, Letters from Pontus 450 
64. Ovid, Tristia 450 
65. Paterculus, Roman History 425, 456 
66. Pausanias, Description of Greece 435 
67. Petronius, Satyricon 389, 450 [added in 1758] 
68. [Pindar], Commentary on  431 [mentioned] 
69. Plautus, Stichus 429 
70. Pliny the Younger, Letters 438 
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71. Pliny, Natural History 388, 395, 397, 403, 425 [added in 1777], 
438ff, 443, 445, 447, 458 
72. Plutarch, Lives 384, 391, 396, 403, 406, 415, 425, 426, 427, 
431, 456 
73. Plutarch, Moralia 398, 399, 409 
74. Plutarch, On the Delays of the Divine 
Vengeance 
461 
75. Plutarch, The Obsolescence of Oracles 460 
76. Polybius, Histories 402, 406, 424, 430, 433, 435 (2x), 446, 450, 
452, 461 
77. Publius Victor [?], The Regionaries 434 
78. Quintus Curtius, History of Alexander 443 
79. Res Gestae Divi Augusti [Acts of 
Augustus] 
441 
80. Sallust, Histories [fragmentary] 442 
81. Sallust, War with Catiline 408 
82. Seneca the Elder, The Controversies 396f 
83. Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi 409 
84. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 386, 438 
85. Seneca, On Providence 389 
86. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism 
399 
87. Strabo, Geography 388, 390, 394, 422, 426, 427, 437, 443, 447, 
450, 451, 452, 453, 454 (2x), 456, 458, 460, 
461 
88. Suetonius,  Lives of the Caesars 384, 388, 438, 442 (2x), 443 (2x), 444f, 457 
89. Suetonius, Of Illustrious Rhetoricians 385 
90. Suidas 460 
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